First of all, we were big investors in Mali and have been for ages. Before the coup in Mali we were spending somewhat over $100 million a year in development assistance. Understandably, we reduced that when confusion reigned in Bamako. A couple of weeks ago we pledged $13 million to assist Mali, from a humanitarian point of view, in this crisis, which by my calculation was 2.8% of the moneys pledged in Addis Ababa at that conference. Do I think that's enough? No, of course, I don't think that's enough.
I also hope I made very clear in my testimony that I think we ought to be assisting militarily. I also cautioned about confusing the two—that is, development assistance and military assistance—because that's what we did in Afghanistan and that's what got us into all the trouble. What I think we should be doing.... There is nothing to negotiate with these al-Qaeda guys—nothing. They will not negotiate, and I guarantee, Mr. Chairman, if they were sitting here they would agree with me. They don't want to negotiate; they want everything. If we're prepared to give them everything, they'll be satisfied. Anything short of that is not enough.
Therefore, we have to hurt them. We have to diminish them to the point that our African friends can deal with them militarily. When that is achieved, then I hope we resume our generous aid contribution to Mali and the entire region, because by God they will need it. We are facing the possibility of a massive Darfur across the widest part of Africa. My colleague and other witnesses here happily spoke about the humanitarian angle, so I didn't have to. It is extremely important, but it is also separate from dealing with al-Qaeda.