Thank you.
My focus today will be on the political and security aspects of the situation in Syria as it has evolved since my director general, Mark Gwozdecky, appeared before you on December 3, 2013. Details on the humanitarian situation will be given by my colleague Leslie Norton. My colleague Isabelle Roy will update you on the international community’s response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in Syria.
The war in Syria continues to rage, and Syrians continue to die and flee their homes in horrific numbers. The death toll now exceeds 130,000. The regime continues to target fighters and civilian population centres indiscriminately. The humanitarian consequences and regional political implications are dire. The regime retains the military momentum in the conflict, but overall, neither the Assad regime nor opposition groups are in a position to militarily defeat the other in the medium term. It is not clear, however, that either side realizes that reality.
An increasingly noteworthy development has been the emergence of conflict between various opposition military groups. While the opposition fighters have never really managed to produce a united front, the war is now evolving into a series of different conflicts involving a variety of actors with different goals and shifting allegiances.
In addition to fighting the regime, elements of the opposition have begun fighting each other as al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, seek to stake out territory. This is being resisted. Two separate al-Qaeda groups, ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra, have even clashed with each other. The Kurds, meanwhile, have announced the establishment of a provincial government in northeastern Syria. Efforts continue to bring the various arms of the opposition under some form of coherent leadership control—excluding the al-Qaeda groups—but that remains a work-in-progress.
The Assad regime has taken advantage of these clashes and divisions within opposition-held areas to attempt to expand its terrain in and around the cities of Homs and Aleppo. These divisions on the battlefield mirror the cleavages that continue to exist at the political level in the opposition ranks. The Syrian opposition coalition is the main opposition political umbrella, but it continues to be divided and has little credibility on the ground inside Syria. It remains only partially representative of the myriad opposition groups on the ground.
In the meantime, the war continues to leak across Syria’s borders. Bombings and violence in Lebanon have accelerated. Echoes of the sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni in Syria are being heard in Lebanon, fuelled in part by Hezbollah's intervention on the side of Assad. Both Jordan and Lebanon, but also Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, continue to bear the heavy social and economic burdens of rapidly growing refugee movements. Free-flowing arms and the implantation and growing strength of terrorist groups in the Levant threaten the stability of the entire region. Despite these challenges, the spillover risks are, for the moment anyway, being contained.
In response to increasing needs, during his recent trip to the region Prime Minister Harper announced additional Canadian assistance in response to the Syrian crisis. Canada’s total assistance to date now includes $353.5 million in humanitarian assistance, $210.6 million in development assistance to Jordan and the region, and $67.6 million in security-related regional assistance. My colleagues Leslie and Isabelle will discuss this assistance in greater detail.
Despite the carnage, the regional threats, and the military stalemate, the prospects for peace in the medium term remain dim, but a step in the right direction was taken with the convening of the Geneva II conference last month. Joined by 40 other countries, including Canada, the opposition coalition and the representatives of the regime met for the first time, face to face, in Montreux and later Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss Syria’s future.
Expectations going into Geneva II were very low, and the opposition coalition very nearly boycotted the conference entirely. Many members of the coalition opposed sitting down with the regime, and a number disavowed it entirely. Some extremist elements even threatened coalition members who did attend. In the end they came, but the episode reaffirmed the dysfunction of the opposition and renewed doubts about their ability to deliver their supporters in the event of any agreement short of regime surrender.
But the opposition did find a largely sympathetic room on the opening day in Montreux. Most countries blamed the Assad regime for the war and its consequences, while expressing support for the goals of the opposition. At the same time, they urged both sides to work towards a political solution that respected the rights and freedoms of the Syrian people.
As Minister Baird noted:
Until the dignity and freedom demanded by the Syrian people are enshrined in a peaceful settlement and the institutions that will uphold it, this war will not end, the terrorist threat will increase, the human nightmare will continue, and the violence will threaten all of Syria’s neighbours.
In Geneva, the three main points of discussion were: prisoner releases, humanitarian access, and the formation of a transitional governing body.
The question of a transitional governing body was and remains the most contentious. It is the fundamental point of division. The Assad regime was not prepared to talk about a post-Assad era, while the opposition came to Geneva expressly to underscore that Assad and those close to him would have no role in the transitional period. In this, the opposition has wide support, including Canada’s.
The first round of talks ended on January 31 without agreement on any issue. They are scheduled to resume on February 10, but the regime has not yet agreed to the date. In the meantime, the war continues.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today.
My colleagues will now provide an update on the humanitarian and chemical weapons situations in Syria.