Mr. Chair, honourable members, ladies, gentlemen, dear colleagues who have just testified, thank you.
In reply to the question submitted by the committee, here is the perspective I propose: let us try to see why the Canadian reaction at the international level was and is limited in its consequences, and is subject to the constraints of the choices made by its allies, especially those of the Obama administration. However, the sovereign reaction here in Canada remains open and promising. It can perhaps affect matters in a more interesting way, thanks to the credit and more positive balance sheet Canada has to draw on.
Firstly, with regard to the dual Canadian reaction, i.e. both diplomatic and military, there has been an unfortunate shift in Canadian diplomacy. At the start of the Arab Spring, and even in the beginning of the Syrian conflict and the Iraqi political deadlock, Canadian diplomacy was much more focused on containing what has been called the emergence of the Iranian superpower and its expansion into Iraq, Syria and all of the Levant.
Secondly,this may have provoked or helped the attempt to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria by impacting its legitimacy, which explains the Canadian diplomatic decision to declare Iranian and Syrian diplomats personae non gratae.
However, since the emergence of the Islamic State group, we have noted a fairly important shift in the direction of Canadian diplomacy, which is now more focused on this barbaric situation. That said, it must be understood that the Islamic State group, despite its horrors and barbaric nature, was born of regional and local frustrations, whether in Syria or in Iraq. It is an unfortunate, blinded and blinding attempt to respond to a certain remodelling of the Iraq and Syria borders along ethnic and sectarian lines.
In that sense, the Islamic State group, with all of its attendant horrors, is a late product of the relative and current failure of the Arab Spring and its attempt to bring about modernity and liberal democracy. In fact, in Syria and Iraq, rather than seeing liberal and democratic reform, Sunnis et Shiites are embroiled in a sectarian war, commonly referred to as the fitna. Moreover, there is something even more destructive and menacing going on. In Iraq, in Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East, a proxy war is raging between the two great powers in that region, that is to say Saudi Arabia, representing Arab Sunni rather fundamentalist and antidemocratic positions, which played a counter-revolutionary role during the Arab Spring, and Iran, which supports and works to strengthen the Shiite communities and has the imperial ambition to dominate that space, that Arab Muslim territory.
In that sense, Canadian diplomacy is limited and constrained in dealing with that situation, since Canada is not an important or powerful actor in the Middle East.
There is also another important point. It is highly improbable that on the Middle East in general, and against the Islamic State in particular, Canada will have its own distinct and independent policy, separate from that of the Obama administration.
In that sense, the Obama administration has a clear choice: it can change its strategy and let the conflict in Iraq and Syria expand, let the situation deteriorate, provoke conflicts among all of these enemies, whether we are talking about pro-Iranian Shiite militias, Hezbollah or the Asaib Ahl al Haq group, or Al-Nosra, al-Qaeda or its latest version, which may be the most barbaric, the Islamic State group.
Canada is caught in that situation. In addition, Canadian diplomacy is limited because what is happening appears to be a multi-level war among Muslim factions.
As I said, the first level involves Shiites and Sunnis, Iran and Saudi Arabia and others, but especially, the allies of the United States and the strategic west. I will mention the rivalry between Turkey and Egypt as an example. On the one hand, there is Turkey and Qatar that support the Muslim Brotherhood and political fundamentalism, and on the other, there is Saudi Arabia and Egypt that support another political Salafism. This may be described as a cold war or a hot one, but it is taking place among Muslim fractions, which means that the Canadian intervention is limited by definition.
The Israeli government, which is the main actor in the region, also has the choice of letting the self-destruction rage on in Syria, in order perhaps to avoid the strategic threat the Syrian regime had become at a certain point. For the moment it prefers to play according to the perspective that the Syrian conflict is becoming self-destructive and that the Islamic State group, according to Israeli strategic and military assessments, is not a direct threat, but a potential one. For the Israeli government, the most important thing is that the conflict remain in its theatre, i.e. Iraq and Syria. It has not really chosen to adopt a policy that would seek to overthrow the Assad regime or to intervene directly in some overt way.
The Islamic State and fundamentalists in general currently have the wind in their sails, and as such millions of Arabs have been subjugated by the fundamentalist and sectarian ideologies, from Yemen to Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria, and others. The arrival of the Islamic State group and of the political fundamentalist ideologies destroys the social link among citizens and provokes the collapse of the states and borders, even artificial ones, that exist between countries.
Allow me to say here that internally, Canada certainly has some major obligations to respond to this phenomenon, which has global, expansive ambitions.
Canada is caught in what is referred to as Karl Popper's well-known paradox of tolerance. If people show absolute tolerance even toward the intolerant, and do not defend the tolerant society against assaults by the intolerant, the tolerant will be annihilated, as will their tolerance. This idea helps me to submit measures, observations, approaches or recommendations.
First, Canada has the obligation to consolidate the pillar of the Canadian social contract, built on the reciprocal independence of state and religion, with tolerance toward both, by consolidating civic values.
Secondly, in a public debate between citizens and Canadian elites, there has to be a discussion to put an end to the double exploitation of politics and Islam. That is a crucial point. To do so, we have to encourage debate between Canadian elites and others elsewhere in the world, especially those of the Muslim world, regarding the importance of democratic values and the peaceful value of civic, liberal democracy, os opposed to getting embroiled in fundamentalist wars.
I will also point out that in the debate in Canada a distinction is not easily and readily made between terrorism, despotism, and authoritarianism. These three elements can feed into each other, and that is why they must be defined separately.
As to interpreting the ideologies at play, the understanding of Salafist jihadism is accurate. It is threatening, it is barbaric, and it is inhuman.
However, one must hope that Islam will tolerate another school of thought that will be more rooted in liberal democracy and modernity. On the legal front, perhaps we need to close any loopholes the terrorists may take advantage of in terms of human rights. We have to apply policies and possibly create observatories or more well-defined chairs on the issues of radicalization and deradicalization, and put an end to the legal uncertainty in Canadian culture with regard to the glorification of violence, exclusion and hate.
The terrorism practised by the Islamic State group, and the horrors of despotism which may be considered by Canada as a tactical, non-existential threat—and that is a debatable point—are an existential, strategic threat for the people of Iraq and the Levant. In that sense, Canada cannot remain impassive and not rise to the defence of the values of modernity.