Thank you very much, Mr. Allison, and thank you very much for inviting me to appear today to give evidence on the situation in Hong Kong.
I would like to provide you with some context based on my knowledge of Canada's interaction with the Government of China and the British embassy in Beijing with regard to the arrangements that were being made made for Hong Kong at the time. I was serving as a diplomat in the Canadian embassy to China on my first posting in the early 1990s, and because of the concern that Canada had over this matter we had quite a number of interactions with the Government of China and the British embassy.
I think we were engaged on this question of the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty due to two major factors at the time.
First, the Chinese community in Canada was very concerned about what would happen in Hong Kong after 1997. At that time the Chinese community in Canada consisted largely of Cantonese-speaking Canadians, most of whom had connections in Hong Kong and family there. As we know, due to the political uncertainty about what would happen in Hong Kong after 1997, we had very high levels of immigration from Hong Kong to Canada in the years leading up to 1997. I had a look at the website of our Canadian Consulate General in Hong Kong. It says, “Hong Kong boasts one of the largest Canadian communities abroad (an estimated 295,000). This community, along with some 500,000 people of Hong Kong descent in Canada, plays a dynamic role in building vibrant bilateral relations.” There are estimates that place the number of Canadians living in Hong Kong even higher, in the sense that a number of Canadians who are in Hong Kong may not have identified themselves to the Consulate General. It's probably more, and some say there are as many as a half a million Canadians in Hong Kong at present.
As an aside, if the current crackdown on civic liberties in Hong Kong continues, we could see a large number of Canadians leaving Hong Kong to resume residency in Canada. That would be an effect that would have an impact on us. I think if things continue to deteriorate there, we could also see a significant increase in the number of consular cases involving Canadians in Hong Kong.
I think the other question that engaged us very much at that time was that because the issue of Hong Kong’s future was in question, much of Canada's trade with China in those years was brokered through Hong Kong. Prior to 1997 Canadian businesses that did business in China typically had their headquarters in Hong Kong in those years. It was very important to Canada that the transition to Chinese sovereignty be done in such a way as to protect our significant economic interests there.
That's why we sought and we received assurances from both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Kingdom over the promises of “one country, two systems”, “no change for 50 years”, and that “Hong Kong people would govern Hong Kong”.
I think with regard to the last, it was clear that this meant Hong Kong would be governed by Hong Kong people who would represent the aspirations and interests of the people in Hong Kong. There was no indication that this would mean the citizens of Hong Kong would be told, in effect, that you can elect whoever you want, providing it's either Tweedledum or Tweedledee, both of whom will be representing the interests of the Chinese Communist party and its business elite in Hong Kong. There was no ambiguity about this, based on my memory of the discussions at the time.
We had good feelings about the 50 years of no change formula, because we expected, from statements by Mr. Deng Xiaoping and his successor, that China would be making a political transformation to modern norms of democracy and rule of law before 50 years were up. We thought the one country, two systems, issue would be resolved by China gradually coming into compliance with international norms of governance. Over the period of negotiations on Hong Kong there were strong indications that this was already happening. The Chinese started to have village elections, which we expected would expand upwards in a staged way from villages to counties, to provinces, to election for the president of China.
Moreover, in 1998 China signed the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Canada was immediately very forthcoming with offers of developmental aid to assist the Chinese authorities in bringing Chinese law and practices into compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. We offered assistance in how to fulfill the relevant UN reporting requirements because our anticipation was that if China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they would move to ratification, but 17 years later we see no movement in that direction; in fact, it could be the other way around.
Up until 2012, the Chinese leadership would give us periodic assurances that democratic political institutions and full rule of law were social goals of the regime, even though they couldn't do it immediately due to historical, cultural, and developmental factors. We were told to wait, and we waited a long time. Then in 2012, there was a new leadership in China under President Xi Jinping, and shortly after he assumed his leadership, President Xi made a number of statements that strongly and explicitly renounced key political ideals such as constitutionalism and freedom of the press, speech, and assembly. He's renounced judicial independence and separation of powers as incompatible with sustained Communist party rule in China. One of the party’s official newspapers, the Global Times, has condemned these freedoms as “a ticket to hell” for China. So it's pretty clear that they're not moving towards our interpretation of democracy and rule of law under this current leadership.
I would see the recent backtracking on the promise of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong and the fraying of the promise of 50 years no change as connected to this new political orientation in China, which is explicitly anti the universal values of human rights and governance.
But it is clear that the Chinese government's sovereignty over Hong Kong is conditioned by its international agreements comprised by the joint declaration and the “basic law”. I would suggest that the Government of Canada would do well to take the lead with other like-minded nations informally monitoring China's compliance with the joint declaration and the basic law, because it's in our national interest to do so. I think it would be prudent for Canada to respond to the Chinese government's discarding of its commitment to democracy and human rights—as we understand those terms—and the moving backwards on legal protections for Chinese citizens by readjusting the way that we do our engagement with China. We have a three-part policy mix, I think, where we want to realize Canadian prosperity in China, protect Canadian security from Chinese espionage and so on, and ensure that Canadian values inform our programming with China. I think we should be re-emphasizing our commitment to those Canadian values while strengthening our programming with China to promote trade and investment and to address the serious problem of Chinese espionage.
China's policies have changed. They have implications for how Canada should be doing foreign policy with China. I think we are perceived as offering tacit consent for what is happening in Hong Kong and in China at large by not speaking out and by not following up what we say with constructive foreign policy programming. I don't think this would have a significant impact on our trade with China, if we manage it correctly, and I think we are strengthened in our foreign relations with China if we can gain respect by being true to what we believe.
I note that ministers Baird and Paradis last December 10, in their statement to mark Human Rights Day, said: “Canada stands for what is right and just, regardless of whether it is popular, convenient or expedient.” I think the people of Canada expect nothing less from us.
Thank you.