Foreign Affairs Committee on May 7th, 2015

[Prof. Simon Young]

If any compromise occurs, it has to be within the structure of the nominating committee. In fact, what just came out in April is quite interesting. I don't think people fully grasp the implications of it, because although the composition of this nominating committee is the same as that of the old election committee, the rules of voting are a bit different. It used to be the case that the nominating committee members could only choose one person, whether for nomination or election. This time around you have a low threshold to get people into the race, a 10% threshold—you get 10% votes from the committee. You may have up to five or ten people who then go up before the committee for the vote, to get to 50%.

That's what's interesting. In getting that 50%, for the first time the committee members can actually vote for more than one person, and that's never happened before. I think it's sometimes known as approval voting. What's interesting about it, and the way I've described it in an article, is that you have three types of voters in the nominating committee: those who vote for only pro-establishment people; those who vote for only the pan-democrats; and then those who are prepared to vote for both, maybe with the hope of having a more competitive election.

How big that chunk in the middle is we don't know. We know that those who only vote for the pan-dems may be about 16%. There might be enough there in 34% for a pan-dem to be nominated. There are many unknown questions there.

I think the best thing would be to just try the system, because ultimately it comes back to the question of the composition of that committee. Unfortunately, right now the government is not prepared to change it, but maybe the next time around it could be more liberalized. Maybe it could involve some directly elected members.

So there's lots of room for discussion.

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

Thank you.

Mr. Tiberghien, you suggested that perhaps there was not complete unanimity in Beijing itself with respect to how this process should go forward, in that there were conservatives and what I could perhaps call progressives.

Is there any chance that this is going to evolve in the direction of the progressives? Is this something that is a possibility in the years to come, that perhaps, if Beijing is not ready to budge this time, it might at the next election of a chief executive?

[Prof. Yves Tiberghien]

Yes, the game is open in the long term.

In the short term we have to remember that Xi Jinping is somewhat in a fight to the death right now. The real “top top” in his mind is to move forward with economic and social reforms to get out of the so-called middle-income trap and the terrible inequality. He has really big problems to solve, but he can't solve them without going after the state-run prices and some big interests.

It's partly to destroy the opposition that his party is using the anti-corruption campaign, but he's the first leader in 30 or 40 years who has taken on at the same time the head of the military, the head of internal security Zhou Yongkang, a major protégé of the previous leader Jiang Zemin. There are people who think that he's actually fighting for his life here. If he makes one wrong move, he could be either assassinated or.... It's a high-risk game right now.

Within that context, I don't think he has much room before the next party congress to give an impression that he's being soft on sovereignty. But after the next party congress, the game is—

[Marc Garneau, Liberal, Westmount—Ville-Marie, QC]

That would be in 2018.

Mr. Lung, I have a question for you.

You mentioned polls. What is your sense of what the polls are saying at the moment with respect to the issue we're talking about today?

[Alan Ka-lun Lung]

The latest poll results appear in the footnote. On April 28th 2015, overall there was 47% support, 38% against, and 16% with no opinion. However, within the 18-29 year-old age group 65% were opposed. So the young people sitting in the back of the chamber are opposed. My son is opposed. They fear the future is being taken away from them.

It's very interesting that 55% of those with a university education are opposed, whereas 55% of those with only a high school education or less are support it. So it's the younger and more educated people who don't like it.

I agree with Yves Tiberghien, the previous witness, that the room hasn't been used fully. Even within the 8.31 NPC-SC decisions, it has not been explored fruitfully.

I'm not saying it must be my proposal, but there is room for improvement. Why is this not being explored by the Hong Kong government itself? Why is it not being negotiated by both sides? We don't know. For example, the proposal I submitted, which was not detailed enough, is that the nomination by the Legislative Council should screen it down to two or three candidates as a requirement of the 8.31 decision. This is effectively party nomination. There's no party law in Hong Kong; there's no way we can get party nomination because there's not enough time to create a party law. But this is effectively a party nomination. This is 100% compliant with ICCPR article 25.

Because the pan-democrats have more than 20 members, they will get in. But also, 50% approval of the list gives Beijing the power of veto with its so-called national security concerns. It really serves to delete a candidate they don't like, but they would have to delete the whole list.

This theory is not our invention; it is an invention by the so-called group of 13 scholar. This proposal of list approval by 50% is actually an economic theory. They call it “game theory” because they think the nomination committee members are totally rational. If one is rejected by the committee, someone acceptable to Beijing could be included the next time before going to election. All this actually conforms to the 8.31 decision.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Lung, that's all the time we have.

We're going to start our second round, which will be for five minutes each.

I'm going to start with Mr. Trottier.

[Bernard Trottier, Conservative, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for being here today with us.

Ms. Wright, I appreciated some of your comments and observation that China today is not the China that negotiated the joint declaration. A lot has happened since then, and at the time, Deng Xiaoping was unafraid of Hong Kong separateness. Today I think there's a certain reluctance to respect Hong Kong's unique identity for other reasons that are internal to China.

However, the fact of the matter is that, as you pointed out, this is a formal treaty recognized by the UN and other entities. The other important signatory to this treaty is the United Kingdom, and I was wondering if you could comment on what the United Kingdom has been doing to ensure that the treaty it entered into with China is being enforced.

I know there's an election right now in the U.K. and political signals might change. But over the last 15 years or so, what has the U.K. been doing to make sure that its treaty is being enforced?

[Dalena Wright]

I think sadly, very little. I think that certainly the party in power until possibly midnight tonight, has favoured commerce, has favoured trade. It's the sign of the times, and everyone's doing it. But they have had a very difficult time finding their point of intercession. What is their moment for speaking up for Hong Kong, or reaffirming the treaty, or asserting what rights they did retain for the oversight of the treaty? They've been very tepid on the subject.

I think you saw disharmony between members of Parliament who wanted a more robust response and the government, which did not. You saw something very unusual in London, which was the ambassador going after members of Parliament, and China's refusal to give visas to members of Parliament who wanted to do their own work or investigate the situation in Hong Kong.

These are not surprising responses. But there does not seem to be a will to find their moment. Where is the chance for the government, the Foreign Office, Parliament to find some common ground and stick to it?

My own government has done the same in the sense of truncating the policy, in the sense of congratulating China and Hong Kong on this move toward universal suffrage and being relatively silent on the elephant in the room, which is how delimiting the proposals are as they stand. You can't celebrate one part and be silent on another part.

Even if you're going to be judicious, even if you're going to be prudent, even if you're not going to be bombastic about it, you do have to find a solid set of proposals and espouse them.

Hugo Swire, the minister in charge, has said different things at different times. He has been inconsistent. He was much more robust a year ago than he has been recently. This is not healthy: at least find your ethical position, find your practical position, find your way forward, and then be consistent.

It's been hard for them to do.

[Bernard Trottier, Conservative, Etobicoke—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Young, you mentioned in your testimony that the words “universal suffrage” are not in the joint declaration. I guess in a way Hong Kong itself has moved beyond the joint declaration. It's looking for specific things.

Can you shed some light on that? Why was universal suffrage left out of the joint declaration? Was that something that the U.K. or the Hong Kong democrats demanded and it was negotiated out? Or was that never part of the vision in the initial joint declaration?

[Prof. Simon Young]

You're assuming it was left out. We don't know if anyone ever suggested it. I think the two parties, the U.K. and China were content that the word be “elections” and to keep it vague, with the knowledge that these things would be fleshed out later on.

But of course, you have to know that in the drafting process of the basic law, the constitutional instrument, which is a Chinese statute, the British were not involved. It was a process that involved the drafting committee made up of mainland members and Hong Kong members, but mostly mainland members. In that process they arrived at the words “universal suffrage”.

Who proposed it? We don't know because we don't have the minutes from the meetings. They're not available. It was in a Chinese process, as the Chinese will claim, that those words came out.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much for that.

We're now going to turn it over to Mr. Saganash for five minutes, please.

[Romeo Saganash, NDP, Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik—Eeyou, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses today. Having been to Hong Kong on a couple of occasions, I can readily relate to what I've heard today. So thank you for that.

Mr. Tiberghien, in the reference document you submitted to this committee, you made the following recommendation:

In its official response to the situation in Hong Kong, Canada should stand by the principles of rule of law, the protection of human freedom and rights, and the orderly process set out in the Basic Law. It should also continue to encourage restraint and the absolute importance of sticking to peaceful means, including in the government response.

As I am sure you know, the NDP made a motion in the House of Commons that was passed unanimously. The motion basically referred to the same principles, such as exercising restraint during demonstrations, respecting the existing agreement, the “one country, two systems” principle and a meaningful and constructive dialogue on electoral reform.

In your opinion, are there other means that the Government and Parliament of Canada could use to express support for these matters of principle that affect human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong?

Despite the very positive tone you have used before this committee, I believe you said that the people who govern Hong Kong should be competent, autonomous and patriotic, all at the same time. But that seemed impossible to you.

Is that the case, and why?

[Prof. Yves Tiberghien]

Thank you. You raise a lot of tricky questions.

Let me just add a few words about the previous question. A book entitled Experiences of China by Percy Cradock explains a great deal about that. Percy Cradock was one of the British advisors in 1984. In his book, he explains that the British agreed that they would not implement a democratic process before 1997. There was an entire secret agreement behind it that was made public when Chris Patten became governor because he broke the promises revealed in Percy Cradock’s book.

In terms of these difficult issues, it is true that it is a dance of a kind. A democratic country like Canada, which sees a lot of issues and human relations at stake, must be able to reaffirm all its values, principles and so on.

For instance, on September 28 of last year, we saw that the police response was not appropriate. That was definitely a baptism of fire for them. The police officers were not properly trained for a situation like that and they made mistakes. In such cases, it is true that a country like Canada can still take a strong stand and reaffirm its values, which still has an impact. It is not a direct intervention, since no one is dictating any course of action, but it does make a difference.

I think that one of Canada’s great qualities is its ability to have a multicultural dialogue and debate. These are very strong qualities, multicultural mediation skills and so on. Canada needs to try to bring those forward. For the impact to be more far-reaching, perhaps we need to promote the win-win aspects all the time. We are aware of the challenges facing Chinese leaders but we are not trying to intervene. On the one hand, we want the reforms, but on the other hand, we want our values. So we continue to believe that it is possible to achieve both by encouraging dialogue.

Furthermore, we need to decide the issue of finding competent, legitimate people supported by the public and also trusted by Beijing. Beijing is not able to square the circle. One of the problems is that Beijing does not have good relations with all the democratic leaders and the new young ones. This is true not only for the more reactionary members, but also for the reformers.

How can these ties be encouraged? Significantly more dialogue is needed, from both sides. As a professor, I see that fewer young people from Hong Kong are now graduating with two degrees, one from China and one from Hong Kong, or trying to be trained in China while still being in Hong Kong. It is important to attempt to build those human relations because, today, the issue is one of trust. Competent people from Hong Kong are not able to reassure Beijing that, despite that competence, they have no desire to be the cause of secession or security problems. At the same time, Beijing cannot bring itself to trust them although the gap is actually very small.

As Simon and Alan said, it is very unlikely that a lawyer or a professional from Hong Kong who is close to the Democratic Party will be a secessionist or will want to threaten the integrity of China. However, he is not able to demonstrate that to China. So China is shutting out people who are not actually a real threat. That is the tragedy of mistrust.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you very much Thank you.

, Mr. Saganash. That's all the time we have.

We're going to finish off the second round with Mr. Goldring for five minutes, please.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses for appearing here today.

Mr. Lung, I certainly agree with your notes and the statement you made here today. The Canadian government can't help us because it's considered to be a bad foreign influence, and of course that was spelled out graphically for us in the ambassador's letter. I also think it would be the same thing with the United Kingdom and the United States, for those countries to directly try to suggest....

There is another group, though, a group of parliamentarians from some 150 countries, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which is somewhat attached to the United Nations in New York. Would this not be a body to take your concerns to directly? Perhaps everybody could benefit from it because you also stated relating that term “universal suffrage” to Iran's election is a bit of a stretch. Would it not be good to take this term "universal suffrage” and your issues and concerns to that body to get a form of resolution from them much like our report that we're going to be putting out? I'm not sure how directive it will be, but from a group of 150 countries' members of Parliament, I would think it would have far-reaching effect and would be very credible. What would you think?

[Alan Ka-lun Lung]

Unfortunately, Canadians can't help us. The Canadian government, Parliament, as well as your foreign service, has to position itself and careful of the backlash we might get from whatever sort of open criticism we make, which we know is an action and reaction phenomenon.

I also suggest that Canadian diplomats have advised Beijing in a very indirect way on issues unrelated to Hong Kong. I really encourage your diplomatic service or whoever to do that and explain to them how they will be perceived if they just give Hong Kong a little more room, the benefit they would get from that. But open criticism of China from a foreign government, including this body of 150 parliamentarians, will not be taken well.

At the end of the day, it may not deliver the results, because we are very close, two months, and we have to get it to pass not by four or five votes, but maybe by about a dozen votes, meaning an absolute majority. That needs to be mediated.

Of course, Canadians have a mediation role, but mediators should do it very quietly. I would encourage the Canadian government to do that. That would be helpful.

[Peter Goldring, Conservative, Edmonton East, AB]

Another note here too said that this agreement was to respect citizens' human rights for 50 years after the transfer of colonial rule. Is there a concern about that limitation of 50 years? Chinese philosophy being what it is, 50 years is a blink in time. Was there a reason why it was only established at 50 years?

Who would like that?

Mr. Tiberghien.

[Prof. Yves Tiberghien]

When we read Deng Xiaoping's speeches, at the time he said, “I'll give you 50 to show I mean business”. He had this long-term plan that in 50 years China would develop and modernize enough to converge to the level of development of Hong Kong. That was his big idea. He also said said, “I could give you another 50”, or “We'll see where it goes”. China has not closed the door.

It came down from Deng Xiaoping as an image of a whole plan that he had for China. I don't think it was thoughtfully calculated.

[The Chair, Conservative, Dean Allison]

Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Goldring.

We're going to turn over to Mr. Schellenberger now for five minutes, please.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you, and thank you to our witnesses here today. I heard Mr. Garneau say that he's been enlightened. I have also been.

Mr. Lung, how concerned is Beijing about alienating youth in Hong Kong?

[Alan Ka-lun Lung]

That is a shorter question than I expected.

I think Beijing is really, really concerned about losing a generation. From what I read immediately after Occupy Central, they're really, really afraid of losing Mr. Law, the chair of the student union, who I think testified here. I don't know why they have been, in their terms, “quite lenient” in trying not to criticize them. They blame it on economic development instead. They're really concerned and one of the motivations of Beijing is, how do they win back the confidence of this generation, because if they alienate me—I'm in my fifties already—how long do I have to live? It really doesn't matter. They can put up with me for 20 years, and I'll be dead. But the youth will live longer and losing a generation is really a big deal for them. This is why they have been in their terms “quite lenient” in their mind toward Occupy Central.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

We've heard different versions of what might be done, but how would you envision a political compromise regarding election of Hong Kong's administration? Is there room to compromise, and what nomination process might Beijing tolerate that respects the preferences of Hong Kongers?

[Alan Ka-lun Lung]

There are many proposals on the table. Mine mine is not the only one. Simon and other people have proposed many things. I think the bottom line for Beijing is that it must conform to the August 31 proposal. The main thing is that they will not give up their deletion capability. It is not in the minds of the so-called western minority, the democrats. They see it as a sort of universal suffrage, a principle thing. Beijing sees it as a protection of sovereignty. In their mind they cannot accept someone who fights against China's interest becoming the chief executive. To be fair, they always had the power not to appoint; so 50% approval is really giving the dirty work to the nomination committee. You can see it this way. So will the majority in Hong Kong be willing to get that compromise? As Simon said, we're not an independent country. Beijing still has appointment power and unlike the provinces of Canada, where there is no appointment made by the government in Ottawa, there is an appointment process. It has always been in the basic law.

[Gary Schellenberger, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Thank you.

Ms. Wright, you've written that Hong Kong's inability to govern itself was set in motion by policies under British rule. Given how long gradualism has been the norm in Hong Kong's government, how long would it take to achieve full democracy? Is it impossible under current circumstances?

[Dalena Wright]

I think, yes. The answer is it is impossible under current circumstances. China would have to be a different China for democracy to flourish. It's not in the cards any time soon.

If I could just make one point that came up earlier about the early years and about universal suffrage and joint declaration, it should be known that China wanted no mention of elections or future governance in the joint declaration. This is why it remains such a long-term issue. They were taking a snapshot of what Hong Kong was in 1984 and that's what they wanted to continue and figured that governance and institutions would be decided on later in the context of the basic law.

It was Britain who said to China, you cannot get the support of the people in 1984 on the promise that something good will happen four or five years later in the basic law. So they persuaded China to take some language on the subject of democracy or on the subject of future governance and they put forth any number of proposals in that summer of 1984. These were constantly rejected by China. The only reason they got what they got was that the deadline approached in September and the British finally came in with the language and China in desperation took the final version. For that reason it was not well considered, well thought out, or deeply significant language.

To amplify here that what Cradock was referring to in his memoirs was not an agreement to have no democracy by 1997. He was saying that they were not going to get out ahead of what the Chinese were willing to tolerate. But in the context of the basic law, the British did enter the process and did argue vehemently for more directly elected seats to set the bar higher in the years to come. So this is a very complicated history and it gets to your point, which is that it's been iterative since 1984 and it will go on being iterative for some years to come, I fear.