Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and honourable members.
My focus today will be on the political and security aspects of the situation in Syria. Detail on the humanitarian situation will be given by my colleague Stephen Salewicz. My other colleague, Sabine Nolke, will update you on the international community's response to Assad's use of chemical weapons in Syria.
The situation in Syria has evolved considerably over the last few years and now presents a dire conundrum for the international community. The conflict began in March 2011, when the Assad regime responded with sustained, indiscriminate and brutal repression to pro-democracy demonstrations. From the starting point of a purely domestic conflict, the crisis has since evolved to have multiple regional and global players and implications. These additional players and agendas further complicate the search for a solution.
Following the regime's crackdown, a variety of armed opposition groups emerged. The armed opposition is a collection of actors existing along a wide spectrum, from the secular elements of defected Syrian security services personnel, through domestic Islamist groups, to al-Qaeda affiliated militia with significant foreign membership and support.
A number of groups in the opposition draw support from gulf states and from western countries such as Turkey and others, while the Assad regime draws support from Iran, the Hezbollah, based in Lebanon, and Russia.
The opposition groups are not united, and they will occasionally alternate between loose cooperation on the battlefield and elsewhere and clashing militarily. At present, the parties to the conflict have largely reached a military stalemate, although tactical momentum does shift to one side or the other from time to time.
The intervention and support of Hezbollah and Iran has worked in favour of the regime of late, but a decisive victory by one side or the other remains highly unlikely. The involvement of external supporters with a religious agenda has ignited strong sectarian forces in what was and has been a traditionally non-sectarian society.
Further, the conflict has been seen by some in Syria's Kurdish population as an opportunity to pursue nationalist aspirations. This complicates the delicate relations between the neighbouring Kurdish populations in Turkey and Iraq and their respective governments.
As a result of all these factors, any solution for serious conflict must reconcile the various interests of multiple regional powers and domestic groups, all vying for pre-eminence, as well as foreign countries protecting their regional interests.
Canadian interests are heightened by the fact that Syria's neighbours are either struggling with the economic, security, and political pressures related to hosting large and ever-growing refugee populations and/or are concerned about the security implications of extremist groups operating freely on their frontier. This in turn has served to heighten concerns about regional stability, and particularly the political stability of Jordan and Lebanon.
Against this backdrop, allow me to outline Canada's approach to the crisis.
Our response has five main elements: one, providing humanitarian assistance to address the needs of the many hundreds of thousands affected in Syria and in refugee host communities; two, responding to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats; three, increasing pressure on the Assad regime and its allies through sanctions and diplomatic engagement; four, providing bilateral development and security assistance to regional countries to assist them in responding to Syrian refugees; and five, carefully calibrated support to the Syrian opposition's efforts to become a viable alternative to the Assad regime by providing training in key fields, including communications, documentation of human rights abuses, and local governance.
On this last point, it should be noted that Canada has not recognized the Syrian Opposition Coalition, or the SOC, as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people, as we are not persuaded that the SOC is sufficiently representative, has reassured Syria's minority communities that their rights will be protected or has unequivocally condemned extremism. We have gone to great lengths to ensure that any support provided to opposition actors is directed at the democratic, secular, progressive elements of the opposition and is not diverted to extremist groups.
Canada continues to believe that the only way to end the crisis is through a Syrian-led political transition leading to the emergence of a free, democratic, and pluralist Syria.
Over the past months, considerable diplomatic effort with the parties to the conflict and regional players has been brought to bear with the aim of holding a second Geneva-style peace conference. This conference is currently confirmed for January 22, 2014. Postponement remains, however, an ever-present possibility, given the fractious nature of the opposition, disagreements over pre-conditions to negotiations between the regime and the opposition, and continued debate about who can attend the negotiations.
Fragile though they may be, these talks represent the current best chance for a negotiated solution through the emergence of a transitional governing body.
In the run-up to Geneva II, however, it is likely that we will see concerted efforts by both sides to gain advantage on the ground in order to increase their leverage at the negotiating table.
With that, I conclude my statement, and I will hand the floor to my colleague, Stephen Salewicz.