Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members, for inviting us here today.
My colleague Mr. Kessel has spoken to some of the legal elements of Arctic sovereignty. What I would like to do is share an overview of some policy approaches that we take internationally to bolster our leadership position and to advance Canadian interests with respect to the Arctic. I'd like to speak on the Arctic Council and our engagement there as well as on Canada's bilateral Arctic relations, with some focus on our relationship with Russia in the Arctic.
I'll turn first to the Arctic Council.
Canada has played a leading role in the council's agenda in many areas since its establishment here on Parliament Hill in 1996, including by chairing the council twice in its 22-year history. The Arctic Council's high-quality science, both social and physical, has provided northern people and communities with additional tools to enable them to meet the opportunities and challenges of living and working in the north at a time of extraordinary change driven by climate change.
Some of the council's accomplishments that Canada has contributed to and benefited from include the following: first, groundbreaking assessments on economic development, on ice and cryosphere, on climate change, and on shipping; second, legally binding agreements that serve as platforms for practical co-operation on issues such as search and rescue, oil pollution preparedness and response, and scientific co-operation, the last of which just entered into force late last month; and finally, frameworks on key environmental issues and most recently an aspirational target to reduce black carbon and methane as well as to prevent oil pollution.
Turning to our Arctic bilateral relations, I'll start by saying that it is in Canada's interest to build on the bilateral relations we have with all our Arctic neighbour states, as we often have shared interests and face similar challenges. It's also increasingly important for Canada to engage with those far from the Arctic who wish to work with us in areas of common interest, leveraging capacity, resources, and technology. Science co-operation is one such area.
With respect to co-operation with Russia, one need only look at a map of the circumpolar north to understand why working with them is in our interest. Together we share 75% of the Arctic area. I'm pleased to say that Russia's contributions to the work of the Arctic Council are important and worthwhile, and that co-operation is positive. At the same time, it's important for me to note that Russia's illegal actions in Ukraine and involvement in other global events not related to the Arctic are preventing more robust bilateral engagement with Canada on Arctic issues. For example, we have suspended work at the Arctic and North Working Group of the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission.
It is generally known that Russia is modernizing its military capabilities, including in the Arctic. Indeed, Russia has increased Arctic military drills, opened or reopened military bases, made investments to its northern fleet, and enhanced its surveillance capabilities in recent years. However, Russia's military presence in the Arctic is still much more modest than it was in the 1980s.
Canada sees no immediate military threat in the Arctic, but we remain vigilant and are working with our allies and partners to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and co-operation, a goal we share with Russia.
Building on our co-operative success at the Arctic Council, we are confident that, over the medium to longer term, bilateral co-operation with Russia on the Arctic will improve, benefiting both Canada and the circumpolar region as a whole.
I'll conclude with that, noting that my colleague Shawn Steil will focus more on China's emerging interest in the Arctic. Of course, I'm happy to go into more detail through questions later.
Thank you.