Foreign Affairs Committee on June 14th, 2018

[Alison LeClaire]

I agree with you that there are geostrategic considerations that we need to watch really carefully. The dynamic between Russia and China is complicated. Russia is isolated from the west, with an economy that is affected by sanctions. They need economic growth. They are looking to their north as an engine of economic growth, and they are looking for economic partners.

China is one of them; Japan is another; Korea is another; and the north Asians, even Singapore, because of the shipping interests. That is an active and growing area of co-operation that we need to watch very carefully, and our understanding of the triggers or drivers for the military modernization that Russia is undertaking is that Russia wants to be positioned for surveillance, for search and rescue, as well as anything that is defence-related.

Yes, we do need to watch that carefully.

We also need to understand that the two countries are not necessarily like-minded. That's a relationship where they're watching each other carefully too. Russia is watching China's rise. So we do need to be conscious of those geopolitical or geostrategic shifts. As far as Canadian interests are concerned, with respect to our Arctic and co-operation in the Arctic Council, it is a matter of working where we can, where our interests coincide. We want to ensure that the growth that is happening in the Arctic is sustainable and responsible, and that it benefits our northern communities.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

I'll have to leave it there for now.

We'll have a chance to explore that more fully.

Mr. Blaikie, please.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Thank you very much.

I'm new to the committee and I haven't done a study of this before, but on the theme of changing geopolitical relationships, one of the things I'm curious to know about is the changing attitude in the United States—which continues to be Canada's long-standing ally and friend—to Russia. The President has been advocating that Russia rejoin the G7.

To what extent have Canada's sovereignty efforts in the Arctic depended upon a sympathetic United States, and what does it mean for Canada in the Arctic if there's a rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia, and they begin co-operating more closely? Is there any potential threat to Canada there, that U.S.-Russian co-operation would put the squeeze on Canadian interests in the Arctic?

[Alison LeClaire]

In the context of the work I do, Russia and the U.S. already co-operate very closely. For example, they just let a project on identifying safe shipping lanes up through the—not the Beaufort, but the—

[Alan H. Kessel]

Chukchi Sea?

[Alison LeClaire]

—the Chukchi Sea. Geography is not my strong point. My apologies.

In any event, in the Arctic there is really strong co-operation. The Arctic Council is a very flexible institution where Russia and the U.S. are co-operating on this particular issue, and Canada and Russia are leading co-operation on another issue, as well as Norway and Russia. It's not as if all of us are always working together, but if there's an issue of interest to two or more states, they will work together.

I would say, in terms of Arctic co-operation, that rapprochement is not actually a word that I would use because the co-operation has remained quite strong and there is really an agreement that the common interests we have up there in keeping the Arctic a zone of peaceful co-operation mean that it is, to some extent, buffered from geopolitical events and dynamics elsewhere.

As I noted in my comments, that doesn't apply to economic co-operation and the sanctions that we have applied, but in other areas, co-operation has gone on unabated.

[Alan H. Kessel]

May I jump in here on some of the legal things we're doing? In fact, we work very closely with the Russians in the Arctic on certain key issues. For example, the legal analysis of our approach to dealing with the internal waters of our archipelago is identical to the Russian legal analysis with respect to their archipelago. In fact, we have a coincidence of views.

We are also working with our Russian colleagues closely in sharing information and approaches to dealing with the delineation of the continental shelf. That is in our interest because we'll be going before the same committee of the UN.

The other thing may be how to think of the Arctic Ocean. There are five states around the Arctic Ocean that own their land, and there's no dispute over their land except in the case of the little ones that I've mentioned. Just think of the Mediterranean. Many vessels come into the Mediterranean. They may have interests in whatever for scientific reasons. They are never a threat to the sovereignty of either Italy on the one side, Greece on the other, or Algeria to the south.

Then the other thing to remember is that the Arctic and the Antarctic are very different. The Antarctic, of course, is ice-covered land over which there is some dispute, which many of these countries are part of an international convention to resolve. There is no dispute about land in the Arctic, which is ice over five kilometres of water.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Steil, in your remarks I believe you suggested that not all foreign investment in Canadian Arctic infrastructure might be innocent with respect to the question of Arctic sovereignty, particularly in the Chinese context. What are some of the things that you believe Canada needs to be looking for when evaluating foreign investment in the Arctic as a red flag?

[Shawn Steil]

I would say that all critical infrastructure deserves special attention with regard to investment, not only for standard security concerns but also, as my colleagues pointed out, for environmental sustainability and that sort of thing.

Looking at what the interests of our potential partners are in making those investments is key, as is understanding what they are with our eyes wide open. To give you an example of some of the other partners who have received Chinese investment in the Arctic areas, Finland, for example, is looking at big, big infrastructure projects there. China has its own goals in establishing these ports or other infrastructure projects, which may be compatible or congruent with what the local countries are trying to do, but which are also part of its broader objectives. If we think of the polar Silk Road, which China has been quite upfront about, it's about developing supply chains and transportation routes that lead back to China and their interests. I think we have to be conscious of what the motivations are. In a lot of cases, it's going to be a win-win proposition where an infrastructure development will work for both sides, but I think we need to be conscious of what the risks might be as well.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

We'll go to Mr. Wrzesnewskyj, please.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Listening to the introductory remarks, I can't help but think how timely this study is. Mr. O'Toole said he was surprised by some of the things he heard. Perhaps I'd like to say that I'm not only surprised, but also very concerned.

We seem to be relying and to be quite confident that the international rules-based order based on multilateral treaties will resolve issues of territory or territorial questions in the Arctic. We often talk about how Canada has the longest unprotected border in the world, and everyone thinks of the United States. Notwithstanding the current challenges, I don't think any of us are concerned about that border. It's the Arctic. As you said, it's been icebound, but clearly, we're looking to a future where that may not be the case. This reliance and hope—I made some notes, I wrote down quotes, like “mutual respect”, “built on trust and mutual benefit” when talking about China and Russia....

I don't share the department's confidence. China has done a territorial grab in the South China Sea. Just in this past month, Russia built a bridge across the Kerch Strait and, at the same time, moved five of its largest military vessels from the Caspian Sea into the Sea of Azov and have done a de facto territorial grab of the Sea of Azov, to which they had a limited shoreline. These are countries that do not respect an international, rules-based order.

I understand our hope to rely on people playing nice, but then I also take a look. How many icebreakers do we have? Perhaps whoever could answer that quickly. Do we have three? I understand the Americans—

[Alan H. Kessel]

We have one good one.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

We have one good one. That's encouraging. The Americans have two. The Russians have 40 and their hulls are much thicker than ours. In fact, just last year, they launched the Sibir, the world's largest—and by the way, the only nuclear-powered icebreakers in the world are Russian icebreakers. They are not just investing in deep-sea drilling. They're making huge multi-billion dollar investments in six Arctic bases. They have plans to add a third Arctic brigade. Not that long ago, they planted a flag on the Arctic seabed.

Listening to how the picture was painted by the department, I'm very concerned.

To my questions, have we ever not granted passage?

[Alan H. Kessel]

Not that I'm aware of. We usually do, but they always are on—

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Not only have we set a very specific precedent, we have a precedent of not denying passage.

[Alan H. Kessel]

Why would we deny passage?

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

That's the question, but I'm just talking about precedents.

[Alan H. Kessel]

If we don't have a reason to deny passage, why would we? It's a road. We're trying to actually encourage increased vessel traffic within our Arctic.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Sir, there are certain established.... If we're going to rely on the rule of law, when there is right of passage across certain territories, there is also the precedent, in law, that sometimes you block that passage once a year or you put a gate up to establish the fact that you have the authority to do so. In all of the time that you're aware, we have never denied passage.

[Alan H. Kessel]

To my knowledge, it's never been in our interest to deny passage. The vessels that have been going there have usually been related to scientific research, trade interests, hydrographic work, cruises, and environmental work. We have had no reason to stop a legitimate vessel going through our territory.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

What I'm getting at are precedents in law. When you allow passage across territory that you control, every once in a while you actually establish the fact that you have the right to deny passage, by in fact denying passage at a regular point in time. That's why I asked that particular question.

[Alan H. Kessel]

I would suggest that every time we give authority to come through, we're exercising our law.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Sorry?

[Alan H. Kessel]

We're exercising our law every single time we assess a vessel's worthiness to come through.