Intentions can change a lot faster than capability. Certainly in the case of the Russian government, they now have the capability. They've demonstrated it in Syria, and if you draw straight-line distances from what they have demonstrated in that country, then we have room to be concerned. They've demonstrated an ability to do some of the things Dr. Charron was talking about at distances the current systems designed to defend North America aren't effectively positioned to defend us against.
There has been enough indication of other Russian malign intent—in Syria and in eastern Europe and Ukraine, as well as some of the attacks they've conducted in the United Kingdom—that would indicate they are a revisionist country that is looking to change the status quo. Even beyond that, though, if it's not yet clear they have intentions to do something towards Canada, the fact they're acting in what you could construe as an aggressive manner presents a significant possibility of miscalculation on their part, which could end up providing us with the same type of defensive challenge as it would if they were doing something with intent. Again, intentions can certainly change.
With respect to NATO, we're doing all the right things. The inconsistency for Canada is that we seem to draw a large imaginary line around the west coast of Greenland. West of that we treat the Arctic in a fundamentally different way than we do from Greenland east. From Greenland east, Canada is an active member of the NATO alliance, deterring and attempting to provide enhanced defensive measures against Russia in the North Atlantic at sea, and on the ground soon in Norway—right up to the Arctic Circle, I believe, from some of the discussions about Trident Juncture—as well as in the air. However, we seem to have a fundamentally different approach and characterization of the Arctic once you get west of Greenland.