Thanks.
Good afternoon. It is my pleasure to appear before the committee on this important theme.
Canada's Arctic sovereignty is a subject rooted in many misperceptions, and it's less sensational a subject than it's often made out to be. You heard last June from Alan Kessel, the legal adviser at Global Affairs, that “increased vessel traffic, if conducted properly and in accordance with Canadian law and policy, actually serves to reinforce Canada's Arctic sovereignty.”
That is correct, as is his assertion that no one disputes Canada's sovereignty over our Arctic lands, with the minor exception of Hans Island. The northern maritime disputes with the U.S. in the Beaufort Sea and with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea are well managed and will be resolved in accordance with international law when there is a perceived imperative to do so. In neither case do I anticipate an immediate need to solve these boundary issues. They really come down to an issue of political will to compromise with neighbours with whom we have a long history of co-operation.
If we went back a decade, I would spend most of my time countering what I saw as misplaced narratives about an alleged race for resources and threats of naval or commercial ships driving through the Northwest Passage and destroying Canada's legal position that these are our waters. Despite all the hoopla back then, this has not occurred, nor do I see activities of this sort posing a great threat to Canada's Arctic sovereignty today or in the foreseeable future.
You've heard from far greater experts than me, such as Mr. Kessel and Professor Lalonde, that Canada considers all the waters of our Arctic archipelago, including the various waterways commonly known as the Northwest Passage, to be internal waters by virtue of historic title. We have built up a strong legal position since the Second World War, and I do not feel that it is in particular peril today.
However, I'm sure you're less interested in blanket statements such as these than in my thoughts on the three main topics your committee is studying at present: Russian militarization of their Arctic, China's growing Arctic ambitions, and Canada's extended continental shelf claims. All are interrelated, but I'll take each one in turn.
First, in regard to Russia, although the end of the Cold War seemed to portend a new era of deep co-operation between Canada and Russia, lingering wariness about geopolitical motives and a mutual lack of knowledge about the other's slice of the circumpolar world are conspiring to pit our countries as Arctic adversaries. Furthermore, Russian aggression in the Ukraine and Syria, and strategic bomber flights to the limits of North American airspace, suggest a return of great power competition globally. These activities warrant careful monitoring and analysis in concert with the United States and other NATO partners. Although meeting near-peer competitor threats may require new or renewed capabilities in the Canadian Arctic, such as modernizing the north warning system, I would highlight that these threats are not borne of Arctic-specific sovereignty issues or disputes.
Russian military activities in its Arctic do not in any obvious way relate to environmental change or maritime corridors, or military threats in or to our Canadian Arctic. Commentators often make a false correlation by conflating Arctic issues, those threats emerging in and from the region itself, with global, grand strategic issues that may have an Arctic nexus but are appropriately dealt with at a global rather than narrowly regional level. In my view, this must be reflected in official Canadian policy, or the policy itself may create the very misperceptions that build mistrust and create conflict.
In short, Canada and Russia will find themselves on different sides in an era of renewed great power rivalry, but I do not think that this general state of competition portends Arctic conflict. Instead, there is still room for substantive co-operation and collaboration in the circumpolar world in areas of common interest, which I am happy to discuss, based on respect for each Arctic state's sovereignty and sovereign rights, as long as circumpolar co-operation is not held political hostage to broader geostrategic rivalries.
Although some media and academic commentators point to China as an emerging military competitor or sovereignty threat in the Arctic, I have argued in a recently co-authored book that this is based on speculation and I don't think it has any basis in verifiable evidence. Accordingly, I would suggest to you that alleged Chinese threats to Canadian Arctic sovereignty are a red herring that should not deflect attention or resources from more important issues.
Now, lest I be accused of being naive about China's Arctic interests, I'd like to qualify that statement by explaining that there are security and safety issues that arise from the activities of China and other non-Arctic states in our Arctic. These could include espionage, resource development or shipping activities that harm the environment, and even the loss of Canadian economic sovereignty. I would argue, however, that these are not “Arctic sovereignty” issues as we typically discuss them, and are best considered in the broader context of Canada's relationship with China as an emerging global actor.
Finally, I'll offer a series of suggestions that I'd be happy to elaborate upon during the question and answer period.
While references to Arctic sovereignty and security have been conspicuously absent from official Government of Canada statements on the Arctic since November 2015, public opinion polls conducted over the last decade have demonstrated that these concepts resonate with Canadian audiences. Accordingly, it's important for official Canadian statements to refer to sovereignty and security, but to be very clear about how these concepts are being used.
Accordingly, I recommend that the Government of Canada adopt a legal definition of sovereignty in its public messaging to avoid confusion, particularly when it comes to international audiences. A state-based definition used with international audiences should then be complemented by messaging explaining how Canada exercises its sovereignty in partnership with its indigenous peoples as rights holders within our country who also have particular rights internationally.
Second, Arctic coastal states hold, under international law, specific interests and responsibilities in the Arctic Ocean region. In exercising these rights, Canada should undertake full consultations with its domestic stakeholders—provinces, territories, indigenous governments and organizations—prior to international meetings and negotiations. This does not change the legal reality that the delineation of the outer limits of the Arctic continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is a process that is conducted by states.
Given the UNCLOS article 76 process, Canada's ongoing research to delineate the limits of its continental shelf is aimed at fulfilling its obligations as a coastal state. The rights to a continental shelf are already ours as a party to UNCLOS and have nothing to do with historic rights, occupation or usage. Presuming that the science supports our case, our continental shelf will overlap that claimed by our Arctic Ocean neighbours. Efforts to foster dialogue with all our coastal state neighbours, including Russia, should be encouraged, as the eventual resolution of this critical issue for Canada will necessarily involve negotiations between all the concerned parties. This is not a cause for alarm but a process that can serve the national interests of all the Arctic coastal states.
Finally, we cannot solve the Northwest Passage issue with the United States bilaterally. This is a pipe dream. Instead, I urge you to recall an important point made by Professor Lalonde last week that the difference of opinion on the legal status of transit rights through Canada's Arctic waters is an international one, not a bilateral one. Countries like China are playing their cards close to their chests, as she explained to you. There is no simple solution to this long-standing issue, and anyone offering one, I would argue, is ignorant of history and of evolving international political realities.
Nevertheless, our legal position is not in jeopardy. We should operate from a position of confidence. Our Arctic foreign policy should reiterate, wherever possible, that Canada welcomes navigation in our waters in the Arctic as we do elsewhere, provided that ships respect Canadian regulations related to safety, security, protection of the environment and Inuit interests. This includes vessels from countries like China and Russia, whether research icebreakers or cruise ships, that comply with Canadian regulations. This approach also means having robust capabilities to maintain vigilance in ensuring that these vessels are not undertaking activities that are against Canadian laws or counter to our national interests.
Finally, we need to embrace the benefits of working with our allies and circumpolar partners to maintain a rules-based order in the Arctic. This does not require amplifying safety and security issues into so-called sovereignty threats that seldom warrant a long-term investment of resources, both material and intellectual. Instead, I would argue, we need to convince Canadians across the country that we already have Arctic sovereignty. We just need the national will to help northerners realize their dreams for the region as fellow Canadians.
Thank you.