Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 26th, 2018

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Good afternoon, and a very warm welcome to all of you.

I wanted to pick up on this point, because it is a hot topic and I think it's very important. I want you to give me an understanding of the region, especially with what has transpired over the last two days in terms of the Kerch Strait, the Azov sea and Ukraine.

I have observed over the last few years that there have been many more military exercises than in the past. The Russians have done a huge military exercise with operation ZAPAD in 2017. The Swedes did Exercise Aurora in 2017. You have indicated that you would like to do your own military exercise in conjunction with NATO, probably by 2020.

Given the Russian influence that's there, especially in Belarus and in the Kaliningrad oblast, the imposition of missiles there, what is the feeling in the Nordic countries in terms of their own security?

[Pertti Salolainen]

I think it's important that we also do exercises. We are having a lot of exercises with NATO troops. I can tell you that the number of exercises where we are participating—mainly NATO, Nordic and the Baltic Sea area exercises—is about 40 per year, if not more. It's more than some NATO countries have.

That shows that we are very active. We are willing in terms of preparedness to give and receive military help. This is the legislation that we changed just some time ago—that we must be ready to receive and give assistance. This is a fundamental change in the thinking.

I would also like to add that we are also fully following to the letter the sanctions of the west towards Russia. This is also a very important aspect that is not generally that well known.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

The reason I asked that question is that since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1995 Finland joined the EU, and they have become an enhanced opportunity partner with NATO, but that does not include the protection of article 5 in NATO's charter.

Outside of that, leaving that aside for a second, right now we see disinformation and misinformation in a lot of the countries that border Russia. In terms of your long border with Russia, one of the things I've read is that Finland has done a better job than other countries have in preventing disinformation and misinformation from interceding or imposing itself in your daily life. What is your tactic or your approach to making sure that any type of disinformation or misinformation does not befall the population?

[Pertti Salolainen]

As you probably know, we have established in Helsinki the hybrid centre, in which Canada is also now participating. You are also participating, and the idea is to reveal all the methods that are being used against us, such as false information and efforts to influence our industry and that sort of thing. It's a very wide area of things.

We have been alerted to these kinds of changes in the world, and we are also preparing our society for those sorts of changes, but it's a very difficult area. I was just participating in a panel discussion where everybody agreed that it is not always easy to know who is doing this and that. It's a big problem, but I hope that this kind of centre that we have now established will give us more information. Also, as I said, you are also there.

[Ilkka Kanerva]

To add to my colleague's comments, it's good to mention that it has been established by the EU and NATO together.

[Pertti Salolainen]

Exactly, yes.

[Paavo Arhinmäki]

I have a very short answer to the question. It's education. With education, the people in Finland have been going through what news you can believe and how to be critical of all the information to better stop the spread of fake news. I suppose it is one of our strengths that we have very highly educated people in Finland. As well, we have the cultural background, because for decades we have been more or less used to critically looking through the information that we are getting from outside of our borders.

[Tom Packalén]

If I can continue on the question of the educational level, one of our biggest supports in this question is also language. The Finnish language is quite a difficult language, and for Russians, for example, it's not that easy to handle these massive information campaigns in the Finnish language.

On your first question about the security in the region, our problem in Finland is the military reform after 2010 in Russia. Before that, we were laughing a bit about it...well, not laughing, but they wouldn't have had too much of a chance with Finland with conventional weapons. After 2010, that changed. Their missiles are more accurate, especially in the Iskander and Kalibr missile systems, so they can strike strategic targets with very highly accurate weapons. Also, with the number of special forces they have nowadays, their army is not a joke anymore.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

I have one final question. I want to ask a pragmatic question, in a way.

In 2017 you celebrated your 100th anniversary of independence. You've had this amazing ability, over the course of 100 years, to maintain your strength and also your neutrality. Another time we can get into how you were able to do that, but seeing what recently happened in Ukraine, looking at the Russian militarization or the Russian advancement of its interests in the former republics, looking at its control of the Baltic Sea, especially with Kaliningrad right there, philosophically....

I know that in 1995 Finland tilted toward the west by joining the EU, but you have not fully joined NATO. The last country to join NATO was Montenegro. Outside of that, going forward for the next 100 years, when you see the geopolitical landscape changing in such a dramatic manner, do you think Finland is thinking differently, in terms of the next 100 years, on whether it should either join NATO as a full partner or maintain its element of neutrality, as it is now? And is that the right course of action for your country?

[Pertti Salolainen]

One point is this: We are not alone in this position. You know that Sweden is also in the same situation as we are. We think there is a kind of balance there now. If Sweden or Finland joined alone, that would break the balance there, the very delicate balance. We have many times thought that if we one day joined NATO, we would do it together with the Swedes—if that day came. It's not there yet.

I would like to tell you that this is not a big issue at the moment. We are not debating this issue every day. One could say that we are now as close to NATO as you can be without being a member.

[Simon Elo]

If I may, Chair, it's important to note that Finland is not neutral. We are members of the European Union. We are in an enhanced partnership with NATO. Russia doesn't see us as neutral. They certainly see us as part of the west. Of course, the difference with some other countries is the membership in NATO. We are not full members, as you said, so article 5 doesn't apply to us.

I also want to add that after 2014, the perception changed a bit. People feel that being a member of the EU is even more important than it used to be. When we joined in 1995, as you mentioned, security was a big reason why we joined. Now it's even more important. If you think about Ukraine, it's a neighbouring country to Russia, without EU or NATO membership. We don't necessarily ever want to be like Ukraine. It's a neighbouring country to Russia and it's not a member of the EU or NATO. Finns know pretty well what our geopolitical standpoint is right now.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Just before you answer the question—

[Pertti Salolainen]

I have one point. The Lisbon treaty of the EU is even tougher than article 5 of NATO, because it says that if one is being attacked, we all must assist and defend with all possible means the one who has been attacked. Of course, we have no troops, but neither has NATO any troops. NATO has only national troops.

[Maarit Feldt-Ranta, Member, Parliament of the Republic of Finland]

Mr. Chair, may I perhaps balance it out a little bit?

[The Chair]

Please.

[Maarit Feldt-Ranta]

We have been talking quite a lot about military expressions, but I would say that diplomacy has been the best tool for Finland in creating this balance over those 100 years. I think Finns and also Swedes, our neighbours, think this will be our way over the next 100 years. Public opinion also supports that very strongly.

[The Chair]

Thank you very much.

We have one more question—

[Paavo Arhinmäki]

Sorry. I must add one thing.

[The Chair]

Please do.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

I have to add one thing too.

[The Chair]

He gets to add and you don't.

[Voices]

Oh, oh!

[Paavo Arhinmäki]

The issue is that when you ask us a question, you'll get from every party a different kind of answer.

The only thing I want to add is that a wide majority of Finnish people are against NATO membership. You could say that the strange thing is that even what happened in Ukraine didn't have any effect. The figures stay almost the same all the time, with 50% to 60% against it and 25% for it.

This is probably the idea, as well, that a better way to keep the peace in Finland, people think, is not through a military alliance. It's more through having a good relationship with their neighbour. People don't see the Finnish situation as being the same as Ukraine. Everybody can see there's such a different history behind it.

[The Chair]

Thank you.

We're going to do one question, because we want to make sure we leave time at the end to do a group photograph.

The last question is going to go to MP Blaikie, please.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Thank you very much.

On the question of diplomacy, I think it's fair to say one of the things that we've heard in our study on our Canadian Arctic sovereignty so far is that the diplomacy that happens within the Arctic Council and around Arctic states is running a parallel path. Notwithstanding what countries are doing in the rest of the world, there's been a pretty good sense of co-operation at the Arctic Council.

I'm wondering about two things. First, I know you mentioned in your opening remarks that you feel there's a role for the Arctic Council to expand its mandate—I don't want to put words in your mouth—to go beyond just the central, original issues of the environment. I'm wondering if you want to say a little bit more about what those opportunities are.

Secondly, in the kind of diplomacy that goes into that with Russia being an Arctic state, are there any means of co-operation that you think are diplomatically important to Finland in terms of managing that relationship with Russia? Understanding that we're not talking about any kind of militarization of the Arctic Council or its issues, what kind of issues do you think the Arctic Council can be a forum for to take up that would help you manage that relationship with Russia?