I'll stick with the last five years. That's what I've been looking most intensely at on the ground, to some degree.
To answer, again equally bluntly, I think that politically there have been improvements. I think the overall trend towards creating and supporting federal member states to give some sort of a political arena for grievances on that level is a good thing.
I think you've seen an increasing maturity of the federal government in terms of its ability to, for example, create a budget, act like a government, engage with donors and act a little more maturely on the international stage. There have been institutional improvements and improvements in terms of the quality of individuals in the governments you see around Somalia. Politically, I think there have been steps forward, and certainly in the last five years.
In fact, I think it was in 2009 that the national budget was scribbled on the back of a napkin. Now you have the World Bank and a financial management system implemented by the World Bank. I think those are improvements.
I think the security situation has not improved. The fundamental problem in Somalia is al Shabaab's integration into society and the inability to uproot its mafia—it's been compared by many others to the Mafia—and eliminate it from the fabric of society. That hasn't changed.
In terms of the military situation on the ground, in the last few years it has gotten worse in terms of AMISOM retrenching, cutting budgets, not actively patrolling, not actively engaging in the society and essentially sitting in barracks mode. In that sense, as I said before, I think al Shabaab is winning the stalemate. I think that time is not on the side of those who are trying to stabilize Somalia.
Now, with the Gulf crisis, you see basically a proxy war being fought at a political level that threatens to divide and subsume the progress that has been made between the federal and regional levels.