Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 7th, 2019

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

I call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, as we continue our study on Canada's support for international democratic development.

I understand that our second witness, Thomas Axworthy, is still getting through security. In the meantime, I want to welcome, from the International Development Research Centre, Arjan de Haan, who studies inclusive economies.

Mr. de Haan, maybe I can ask you to start to provide your testimony and then we can loop in Thomas Axworthy when he arrives. Then we'll go to members for their questions. Please take 10 minutes. You're free to proceed.

[Arjan de Haan, Director, Inclusive Economies, International Development Research Centre]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, committee members.

My name is Arjan de Haan and I am the director of the Inclusive Economies program, which includes the Governance and Justice program, at the International Development Research Centre.

We are honoured to appear before the foreign affairs committee today, as we did in 2007, to provide testimony for an updated democratic development study.

IDRC is a Crown corporation that plays a key role in Canada's foreign affairs and international development efforts. Our approach to democratic development is based on the belief that researchers and policy-makers should be empowered to address the barriers to democracy in their own country with tools and solutions rooted in local realities.

An ongoing illustration of this approach is an initiative with Global Affairs called Knowledge for Democracy Myanmar. This supports democratic transition through policy research. The intent is to nurture a new generation of state and non-state actors who will engage in open public debate, generate sound research to support evidence-based decision-making and encourage the voices of women and other vulnerable groups in government.

Besides the initiative in Myanmar, I'd like to share three examples that demonstrate how IDRC supports research that bolsters the building blocks for democracy. The first example is how reliable sources of information contribute to democratic processes. Fake news and misinformation are alarmingly commonplace around the world. Just last week, in anticipation of this year's election here, Canada announced $7 million for literacy programming to improve Canadians' ability to critically analyze online news and reporting.

Rumours of false information can be dangerous. They prevent people from making informed decisions; they stoke hostilities and generate suspicion; and at their worst they cause violence and conflict. For example, in southeast Kenya in 2012, false rumours about clashes or imminent attacks fuelled violent conflicts between two ethnic groups. As many as 170 people were killed and 40,000 people were displaced.

IDRC teamed up with a Toronto-based NGO called The Sentinel Project to determine how these rumours were being spread and how they could be eliminated. The lack of reliable information in the region was primarily to blame. In response, a mobile phone app called Una Hakika was launched to help restore peace. It's a simple concept. When a worrying rumour is making the rounds, subscribers report it to the service for verification. Community volunteers and local police investigate the rumour and report back via text message, voice calls and Facebook. In only two years, an estimated 45,000 people were regularly using the free daily service for accurate information. Word spread, and in 2017 Una Hakika services were used to reduce tensions during Kenya's general and presidential elections.

Today, this crucial service is reaching an additional 250,000 people in Kenya, and it's also being scaled to a similar extent in Myanmar where a sister project is dispelling anti-Muslim rumours. Its popularity continues to grow, and now our partners will be adapting the service to local contexts in seven countries in Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

The second example I'd like to share is about encouraging women's voices in government. Even though women's perspectives are crucial in the development of truly democratic societies and governments, they still aren't being appropriately represented. In parliaments worldwide, women's participation has been stagnant at only 24%. The international group called the Open Government Partnership promotes accountable and responsive government, yet even among their 3,000 commitments, women were the focus of only 1%.

This is why IDRC is supporting the new feminist open government initiative. It builds on these existing commitments to help women raise their voices in government. It will support research that investigates the social and cultural factors that limit women's political involvement, and it will identify solutions to increase their participation. The goal of the feminist open government initiative is to ensure that by the end of 2019, 30% of the 79 member countries will take concrete actions, policies and practices to raise the level of women's political participation.

The third example I'd like to share is how improving crucial services can help to stabilize the lives of refugees and the host countries that welcome them. Stability is key to developing democracy, of course, but with more than 68 million people on the move worldwide, it is difficult to achieve. Of these people, 25 million have had to flee their country and are considered refugees. Developing countries host 85% of internationally displaced people, but they have limited capacity to support and integrate them. The social and economic burden of this is heavy. Citizens often perceive new arrivals as a threat to their well-being. This stokes tensions and breeds populist movements that can destabilize countries and indeed entire regions.

In Lebanon, a country that itself had to rebuild after the war, one in six people is a refugee. There, IDRC supports research to develop an understanding of how to make the best use of precious limited resources in health care and other services. Poor-quality health data makes it difficult for decision-makers to accurately assess needs and provide services. For example, refugees often have distinct mental health needs.

The research we support is identifying where resources are needed most and how to use them in the most efficient, effective and equitable way. This support helps to ease the health care burden and stabilize the situation in Lebanon while improving care and services for the refugees who desperately need this.

In conclusion, IDRC thinks about research as a long-term investment that builds evidence and promotes informed decisions. It also identifies opportunities to create societies that are supportive of equality, equity, diversity and prosperity. IDRC believes that this can be achieved, as I hope I have illustrated, by providing reliable sources of information to contribute to democratic processes, to encourage women's voices in government and to address the factors that could destabilize already vulnerable states.

As I hope our testimony illustrates, multisectoral research can help to promote democratic development. Our approach focuses on supporting the building blocks for democracy by equipping local researchers and policy-makers with research data and tools to generate the evidence that can help build prosperous and democratic societies. We think that research, with the right care, can help to usher in a new era of hope and change.

In closing, I'd like to sincerely thank the committee for having invited the IDRC to testify on this key study.

I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have on our work and to provide further information to your offices.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

Welcome now to Thomas Axworthy, public policy chair at Massey College, University of Toronto.

Professor Axworthy, if you would like to give us your 10 minutes of testimony, we'll then immediately open this up to questions from MPs.

[Thomas S. Axworthy, Public Policy Chair, Massey College, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

That's good. Thank you, Chair.

Thank you for inviting me.

I have written a paper that I'd be happy to distribute to the clerk once it's properly formatted. I'll speak to that paper extemporaneously and it will be a more substantial offering that you're free to peruse in your own time.

I'm delighted that the Foreign Affairs committee is picking up the standard of the 2007 Foreign Affairs committee and its landmark report. I want to comment on some of the recommendations of that 2007 report, why I think they are still valid and to make some comments on what has changed in the decade since that report and urge this committee to return to the central findings of your predecessors for Canada at this critical time in the world to make a very clear statement not only about its values but also by creating agencies and institutions to give them effect.

The first point and the absolute centrality of the 2007 report is that democratic development is a crucial part of overall development. It is hard to reduce poverty. It is hard to increase life chances if governments are authoritarian, corrupt, and are working to create division as opposed to creating opportunity. Beginning in the early 1990s, the World Bank made that fairly obvious point, but it was a breakthrough at that time to state that governance had to be considered part of the overall development approach.

The committee in 2007 argued for the centrality of democratic development and that it should become a major priority and motivating force in Canadian foreign policy. It had always been part of Canadian foreign policy—I'll speak in a moment about Mr. Pearson—but it had never been central. It had been part of the overall approach, with more than lip service, but never was a motivating or guiding force for either resources or the activities of the men and women who made up Global Affairs and our foreign policy infrastructure. Your predecessor committee said that it should be. They did so for two reasons, both of which I think continue to apply today.

First was the critical issue of morality, that freedom, liberty and equality of opportunity are central to Canada's identity and our traditions. But it is not enough for democrats here to enjoy their liberty. It is equally important to try to do our best to ensure that others in the world are in a position to do so. This important finding is that it's not enough to talk about our values; one has to act on them and put the power of government and civil society behind them.

Second, in 2007, the committee argued that not only was democratization a moral issue, but that it also had definite security implications. We know there are very few laws or semi-laws in international relations. One of them is that democracies very rarely, if ever, fight against each other, that if one brings citizens into the decision-making, the appetite for adventurism, certainly against another democracy, is very much diminished. There are also security dimensions to improving democracy and human rights around the world.

We know through international relations that the best policy by far is to prevent crises from occurring rather than dealing with their aftermath. That's what human rights and democratic development do, if they succeed. By creating a culture of liberty and pluralism, the system itself allows dissent. Dissent, therefore, does not have to inch over into civil war and violence. Therefore, as well as a moral argument, there is a security argument why democratization should be at the centrepiece of our foreign policy. That was the argument in 2007.

Does it apply today? When the committee made its report more than a decade ago—if we look at the various waves of democracy—it really made its report at one of the high points. There was definite progress on governance and democracy on virtually every index that measures international relations. It was the high noon of the democracy movement.

What has happened since? Ladies and gentlemen, it's all straight down. For 13 consecutive years, according to Freedom House, on all of its indices of democracy and freedom, there have been declines. Its 2019 report came out a couple of days ago. In 2018 it reported that about 39% of the world's population was free, 37% was in authoritarian repressive societies, and another 37% was partly free.

We have nearly 40% of the world living under authoritarianism. By the various indices we see, for example, in the last year that Turkey declined by 35%; Venezuela by 27%; the Central African Republic by 30%, and the list goes on and on. The point I'm trying to make to you is that if democratization was a useful and important initiative in 2007, it is desperately needed now. Never has the need been greater. We've had more than a decade of tremendous difficulties in that area.

In terms of the security dimension, I hardly need to tell you that this week in Ottawa we had the meeting of nations on Venezuela. That is just the latest in the crises to show what happens when authoritarianism grows and takes hold of a society with conflict arising. Three million Venezuelans have fled—almost 10% of the country. A million of them are now in Colombia, another country that has tried hard to move democracy along and is having tremendous difficulties in coping with the refugee crisis. In Syria, we know that there have been six million refugees and hundreds of thousands of lives lost. It is a destabilizing conflict not only in the Middle East but is having an impact across Europe. Both those dimensions are more important today than they have ever been.

What has caused this tremendous decline in the last decade? I'll address that and then wrap up on what Canada can do about it by endorsing some of those central recommendations in the 2007 report.

What has happened? One of the first and critical elements is the new self-confidence of authoritarian states. Russia is now a great disrupter. Helping that disruption is another aspect that is different from the situation 2007, namely, the efficiency of the tools of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare. It costs virtually nothing to have a series of analysts get together to destabilize a country, to create emotion, to use Facebook. These tools are very supple and are being used by people who do not share our value system.

China has a belt and road initiative, the largest economic development plan since the Marshall Plan—maybe a trillion dollars. It has many good aspects. It's certainly fair to say that human rights and democracy are not among the many goals of the belt and road initiative. As China increases its sway in the world, the authoritarian camp is ever more strengthened.

Second, there has been an ebb tide in democratic support. When we look at those who led the democratic effort for many years—but also in the mid-2000s when the report was made—we see now that Europe is convulsed with the impacts of the debates over refugees and immigration, in part resulting from the Syrian crisis.

Populist nationalism is making many countries turn inward. The outward-looking goal of improving others has declined as nations are fighting to maintain their democratic standards at home.

Then, of course, we have the example of the United States, which created the National Endowment for Democracy in the early eighties, but now has a president who gives, if not support, at least acknowledgement, to authoritarians around the world while he attacks many of the institutions of democracy, such as a free press and a free media.

Thomas Carothers, the great democratic theorist, says that with the United States now, there is an “autocratic relief syndrome” for dictators, given the oral abuse by the president. But suffice it to say that those who used to support democracy have declined. We have a bigger problem and we have less support. It's very different from 2007.

Lastly, Chair—and not to take up too much time—what can Canada do? We've already started to do some things. We have a long tradition. In 1949, when NATO was created, one of the great initiatives of Canadian foreign policy, with Mr. Pearson and a variety of others.... We should never forget that it was Mr. Pearson who put in article 2, which committed the NATO nations to strengthen their freedom-loving institutions. So, right from the start, when we began to build the post-war world in Canada, freedom and those institutions were at the heart of it.

We then moved along with the Mulroney government, which responded very favourably to the joint Senate-Commons committee by creating the Rights and Democracy agency, a very welcome initiative by that government in 1988.

What I'm trying to say here is that support for liberty and democracy and economic opportunity is a multipartisan commitment in Canada. Nobody is opposed to this. We have many examples of when we have moved. There's the Pearson initiative, there's the Mulroney initiative. In the mid-1990s, Mr. Chrétien brought out a handbook on democratic governance to be one of the themes of CIDA. Over the next 10 years, he dispensed something like $1.5 billion or so to 900 projects with democratic governance at their heart. So, we began to use some substantial moneys in CIDA.

Then, with Mr. Harper's government—

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Dr. Axworthy, if I could just—

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Because I want to have time to get a round of questions in, perhaps I could get you to just—

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

It's this sentence right here—

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

There we go.

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

Mr. Harper's government responded very favourably to the 2007 report. The Speech from the Throne called for creating the kinds of institutions that the 2007 report had recommended and, indeed, created a panel to give a specific blueprint on how it could be implemented.

All that work is done, ladies and gentlemen. I commend to you that the rationale of the 2007 report is as important as ever. There have been decades of work on this issue. The need is now. We need you to pick up that banner your predecessors unfurled.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

Let's go straight into questions. We're going to go to a guest on the committee today. We have MP Kusie for the first one, please.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thought I would be second and the government side would go first, but that's fine by me.

Monsieur Axworthy and Monsieur de Haan, thank you both so much for being here today. It really is a pleasure for me.

Monsieur de Haan, I was actually in Kenya this summer. Their work at devolution has really been something for their democratic processes there. They are moving government closer to the people as they devolve.

Prior to being a member of Parliament, I was at Global Affairs Canada for 15 years as a foreign service officer. I had an incredible career abroad, largely based in Latin America. I served as a deputy head of mission twice. Certainly democracy was a big part of that.

Most recently, and the reason I'm here today subbing for our shadow minister for foreign affairs, Erin O'Toole—who I think has done a wonderful job of truly standing for democracy for the official opposition and Canadians—as the shadow minister for democratic institutions.

Mr. Axworthy—and, as well, Monsieur de Haan—you touched on technology, and specifically cyber-dispersement. Of course it is a great concern to me as we go towards the 2019 election that we guard our electoral processes from negative foreign influences, which we saw in previous elections. In fact, the Communications Security Establishment has indicated that they believe a significant increase will occur in 2019 from the level in 2015. Of course, we certainly saw this in both Brexit and the United States' democratic process, with their president.

As well, I am very proud to be a member of the Trilateral Commission, along with Madame Laverdière here. At our recent meeting in Silicon Valley, they did indicate that they thought 2018 was really known in the world as a time when democracy took a turn for the worse.

With that, it's very interesting, Mr. Axworthy, that you said that actions speak louder words. We are here, of course, as the official opposition Conservatives.

I want to comment, first of all, the government for bringing forward this Conservative, Harper-era initiative, when the government at the time I believe absolutely stood for democracy abroad. I think of my predecessors, Jason Kenney, whom I followed in my own riding, and John Baird, for whom my husband worked for a significant amount of time. These were people who took a strong stand for democracy both at home and abroad.

With that, we talk about action speaking louder than words. However, isn't it the actions and the words of our greatest leaders that have the greatest impact on democracy abroad?

Mr. Axworthy, you mentioned all of the falling democracies in the world right now. Who, ultimately, is responsible for Venezuela? It's Maduro, on the heels of Chavez. It's a big part of that. In Russia, it is Putin who holds the keys to democracy—or not. In Turkey, it's Erdogan.

As I mentioned, I'm very proud of the history we have as Conservatives, with leaders who truly stood for democracy. Therefore, I would like to pose the question—perhaps to you, Mr. Axworthy. Do you think that when our current Prime Minister does things like praising China's dictatorship that it perhaps has a significant negative influence when it is heard internationally? Perhaps it could even possible negate an incredible initiative such as this.

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

Leaders of many words make many statements. With regard to the statement you referred to about China, I could also produce hundreds of press releases lauding a democracy, human rights and values. One of the strengths of the history that I'm describing is in fact that it hasn't been partisan. All parties agreed with these values, and the role of parliamentarians and the government is to find an effective means to bring them about.

I can mention, for example, my own work in democratic development as a volunteer for NDI and others in Ukraine and other places. There, we had former NDP, Conservative, Liberal, local councillors, men and women who fought bitterly in the partisan way when they were in Parliament or their provincial legislatures. However, when they were abroad, they worked to bring more equality for women to enter parliaments, and supported parties. There we find everything that unites us and you find the Canadian core of advisers from different parties as an internal democracy caucus within the various organizations that we work in.

I don't deny that words are as important as actions. There is an enormous consensus in this country and in the foreign policy community that this is important, and what divides us politically in Canada unites us when we go abroad.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Vandenbeld.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you very much to both of you.

My particular questions are for Professor Axworthy. Our first conversation about this was when I was working for the first minister for democratic reform when Paul Martin was Prime Minister and the minister at the time was looking at this. I think you had a proposal called Democracy Canada.

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

I did.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

This was very similar to some of the 2007 recommendations. Is it still relevant? You've answered that question very clearly that, absolutely, it is.

The next question would be on some of the specifics of what you call the blueprint for this institution. We've heard testimony that it should be something under Parliament. It should be something that is well-funded and that could really mobilize some of the expertise and NGOs that we already have.

Could you elaborate on that and on what was proposed in your 2009 advisory panel? Is that blueprint still relevant? I believe you recommended something along the lines of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Could you elaborate a little bit on that?

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

We just had a discussion a moment ago about the good work that Global Affairs has done for many years on this file. The argument of the 2007 report, and the 2009 panel report, is that in addition to that work and that background, a new and more flexible instrument was needed, namely, a standalone agency that would report to Parliament but would independent from the government. It's another tool that can be added to the kit bag when one is trying to promote a democracy and human rights. Ambassadors are very busy people. They have a host of activities. They have to, yes, we hope, promote democracy and human rights, but they also are promoting trade, they're also dealing with a series of consular activities. They're very busy folks. What one needs is an instrument that is working daily on the kinds of issues we've enunciated.

I would call the Venezuela issue high politics or high democratic politics. It's engaging the foreign minister and the Prime Minister. However, most of what you do in democratic development is low politics. You're building democracy brick by brick by working on judicial systems, by working in villages. Therefore, you need an instrument with men and women who can speak to opposition leaders who may not be in favour with the government, who can talk with civil society.

There are things that an independent instrument can do that ambassadors cannot. As I'm sure your committee has heard—I know that NDI and the International Republican Institute spoke to you—we have tremendous capacity in Canada. Canadians everywhere are advising on a charter of rights, on the court system, on federalism, on party development. The whole world is employing Canadians on this except Canada. We haven't brought them together in a dedicated instrument to work. It's something that we have lost by not having such a flexible instrument. So that's important.

How does one then do that? Yes, it should report to Parliament. It should have a board, a relatively small board, but be advised by a much larger advisory group. I would call that a democracy council, where you would bring in practitioners. The board should not just include Canadians, but others who are the recipients of the program, from the countries we are trying to help. The members of the board should be the result of multi-party consultations. Everybody should be consulted about who should make up the board.

In our panel report we actually did alternative budgets at differing levels to show what could be achieved with a $30-million annual appropriation, and a $50-million and a $70-million one. If we look at NDI and some of the European foundations, they are at about $100 million to $125 million. They are substantial when they're in the $100-million range. We recommended that we start at $30 million, build to $50 million and get to $70 million over a multi-year period.

We have models on how this can work. One of its cores should be working locally. You can't make democracy work by having consultants come in and out. You really need people on the ground. For that to happen, we recommended that there be field offices in countries of particular importance that would do the daily work that ambassadors can't do. However, field offices cost between $3 million and $5 million to keep them going. So depending on the number of field offices you have, as well as the program side and donations to other organizations, that mix determines how large your budget is.

We actually did the blueprints for budgets for three different kinds of funding, with specific suggestions on the structure of the board, the membership of the democracy council and the programs the centre should undertake on evaluation, research and so on.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

You mentioned there are Canadians all over the world doing this work except for Canada. Especially in today's world, where we see a bit of a retreat from this area by the Americans, who have always led this effort, what is Canada's unique position in this? What is our niche? Is this something that Canada could really make central to our identity in the world and our foreign policy?

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

Right.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Dr. Axworthy, we're out of time on this question, but maybe there will be an opportunity to address that later.

With that, I'm going to move to MP Laverdière.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you both of you for your presentation this morning.

Mr. Axworthy, you described the situation in a way that reminds me of an expression I like to use:

democratic development is not only the right thing, but it's the wise thing to do.

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

Yes.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

However, I am not entirely in agreement as to the non-partisan aspect of the commitment to democracy of the type of institution you describe. You spoke about the organization Rights and Democracy, which had non-partisan roots but was shut down and eliminated by the Harper government. We have to remember that and learn from the lessons of the past.

I'd like to get back to the matter of China.

Indeed, in the case of China, there is more involved than the new silk roads. We were also talking about Venezuela. We know that the Chinese have a very strong presence there. The basic tool China uses is, of course, money. The Chinese arrive and invest everywhere.

In the meantime, in Canada, we make these nice speeches on the promotion of democracy and all of that, but we are somewhat like the class dunces when it comes to development and investment in international development, including democratic development.

Do you think it would be a good idea to set a deadline with regard to reaching the 0.7% objective we committed to?

[Thomas S. Axworthy]

That's your centre.