Foreign Affairs Committee on April 9th, 2019

[Dr. William Galston]

The member may very well be right. I am not stating my position with any confidence, but I would say this. There is a difference between mutually agreed adjustments to borders on the one hand and the seizure of territory on the other.

In the case of Russia and Crimea, there was no negotiation. There was no agreement. It was brute force, and similarly in the Donbass.

I would distinguish between what nations have done throughout history, and that is to say, look for ways of accommodating one another's interests at a price they think is worth paying, on the one hand, and what the Russians are doing on the other, which is a flat contravention of the basic principles of the post-World War II international order.

However—

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you, Dr. Galston. We have to keep moving as the time is up on that question.

With that, we're going to move to MP Kusie, please.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Dr. Galston, I mentioned Stephen Harper's book. Another book I've read recently which I've had a great interest in relative to this subject is How Democracies Die. I'm sure you're familiar with the authors there, as well: Mr. Levitsky and Mr. Ziblatt.

In that book, they talk a lot about forbearance. This was something that our previous witnesses mentioned significantly, the erosion of democracy over time. It's unfortunate for me to say, but I think we might be seeing this in Canada as well with this recent government, where we go from a full democracy to a flawed democracy, referencing The Economist Intelligence Unit's 2018 democracy index, and not only with that, but I'm sure you might have read the recent articles in the New York Times indicating the same thing, which I believe the Brookings Institution might possibly support as well.

Perhaps you could discuss the presence of forbearance in these European countries we are discussing here today and what we can do, as Canada, to discourage this forbearance, to discourage the erosion of the rule of law and the erosion of these historic customs that preserve democracy, not only in Canada but in all established democracies and evolving democracies throughout the world.

[Dr. William Galston]

The member's question raises very important theoretical and practical issues. As you anticipated, I'm well acquainted with the Levitsky–Ziblatt book. It is one of the foundational books in the recent spate of analytical books about the future of liberal democracy.

You've put your finger on the central argument of the book; namely, that if we look only at institutions and laws, and not at democratic norms that shape the way people actually behave within democratic orders, we will have missed something very significant.

There is a serious question, certainly serious in the United States, of what happens when all parties are determined to press their legal and political advantages to the hilt, to give no quarter to the opposition.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

That's a good question.

[Dr. William Galston]

This has happened in the United States as polarization based on differences over issues has morphed into something much more dangerous, what the scholars call affective polarization where each political party comes to see the other as a fundamental threat to the democratic order and to the principles they hold dear. Under those circumstances, compromise becomes a form of betrayal, and compromise is one of the major practical expressions of this idea of forbearance.

This argument or this discussion of norms is embedded in a much more serious historical development in the United States and elsewhere; namely, the polarization of the major parties, the disappearance of the centre, the increased difficulty of reaching compromises and honourable agreements on just about anything, so everything becomes a matter of partisan warfare where no quarter is given. This is not the formula for a healthy democracy.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

That brings me back to your previous comment in regard to moral credibility. I was hoping you could expand upon what your definition of that would be. I believe we in the opposition see moral credibility as standing for democracy, justice, the rule of law, whereas perhaps the government at present might see moral credibility as different from this, and perhaps from a historical perspective from Canada moral credibility would be seen more as this honest broker.

Could you further define what you mean by moral credibility to help us better understand it in an attempt to preserve it as you understand it?

[Dr. William Galston]

It would be inappropriate for me to intervene in internal Canadian partisan differences. I'm sure you understand why I'm not going to do that.

I think that Canada is seen as a successful model, not always untroubled, but a successful model of a multi-ethnic democracy that has managed an enormous diversification of its population over the past few generations with a policy of economic and social integration that, I believe, enjoys the world's respect. Canada is seen as a strong democracy. I'm not going to get embroiled in controversies as to whether it deserves that reputation or not, but that's the way it is seen, and I believe that Canada is seen as a force for good on the international stage. Sometimes that will involve serving as a mediator, but some issues can't be mediated because they're issues of right and wrong, and in those circumstances, obviously, a country like Canada that seeks to remain true to itself will stand up for the right.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Ms. Kusie.

MP Vandenbeld, please.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

Thank you.

I'd like to go back to what you were saying about the role of the great powers. In particular, you look at the Balkans. One of the things we know is that one of Russia's goals is destabilization, not just of the post-transition countries, but also of established democracies. We've seen that in multiple areas.

One of my concerns in the rejigging of borders in that area is that as soon as you start, you get the domino effect. Then you have Republika Srpska, North Macedonia, the Albanians. I wonder how much of that might be a destabilization effort. More importantly, I'm interested in this intersection between authoritarianism and nationalism, because particularly in transition countries, for example in the former Yugoslavia, there is a nostalgia for the good old days of Tito, because he kept nationalists in check, because there was prosperity. There is this looking back to an authoritarian past through rose-coloured glasses, because of what are seen as the failings of democracy and the promise of democracy that hasn't necessarily panned out. You mentioned youth unemployment and other issues like that.

Where is that intersection? We talked about nationalism, but in some ways nationalism was kept in check by authoritarianism. Obviously, we want to see democracies thrive. We don't want to see destabilization.

[Dr. William Galston]

The member has posed a very challenging question, which is fair enough. If nationalism can be held in check only by authoritarianism, that tells you something quite important. It tells you that there are genuine, indigenous, popular sentiments that are being suppressed forcibly, and I don't think anybody's in favour of that. The old Soviet Union had its nationalities policy, a great preoccupation of both Lenin and Stalin, and there was every effort to repress national sentiments, which ultimately failed. It turned out they were not suppressed so much as cryogenically frozen, and as soon as the post-1989 thaw occurred, there were the same old divisions.

Identification with one's nation is an important source of identity for many people. It can be a source of unity among an otherwise disparate people. There is no contradiction between nationalism and liberal democracy. As a matter of fact, in the 19th century, the two were twinned. If you remember thinkers and actors like Mazzini, for example, the whole idea was that liberal democracy and national liberation would go hand in hand.

Can nationalism lead to excesses? Of course it can, and it has, but the suppression of nationalism can also lead to excesses, and it has. There is no simple formula for managing this force, but it is there. It can't be denied, and therefore, a far-sighted defence of liberal democracy of the liberal international order will do its best to make peace with nationalism and not pretend that it doesn't exist or that it's going away, because it isn't.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

To what extent can a civic identity based in equality before the law as opposed to national identities be a means to ensure that pluralism and liberal democracy are able to thrive?

[Dr. William Galston]

This is an issue that has been much debated in the United States in recent years. To the American civic identity, defined by crucial founding and refounding documents like the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Gettysburg Address and the “I have a dream” speech, this is foundational. I can't imagine an American nationalism that I would associate myself with that did not have that kind of civic foundation.

However, people who've looked profoundly at the United States have never believed that the civic definition of our unity would be sufficient. It was necessary, but not sufficient, so throughout our history, there has also been an appeal to other kinds of commonalities, including the joint efforts that we have made.

In Abraham Lincoln's first address, when he pleaded with the south not to leave the union, he invoked the mystic chords of memory, not principle. Lincoln, above all, knew what the principle of America was, but in appealing to the south, he wasn't talking about the principle of America; he was talking about the memory of shared struggle and shared sacrifice.

I would say that civic identity and national identity at their best can work together to produce a strong country.

[Anita Vandenbeld, Liberal, Ottawa West—Nepean, ON]

I think that's my time. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Kusie, we have about two minutes left, because there may be votes coming up, I understand.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

Okay. Thank you, Chair.

My first question is in regard to hawkish versus diplomatic. When we look at places like Venezuela.... Again, I apologize that I'm referring to this in a European context here, but I say that because one reason it has been so difficult for the free world to intervene is the strong presence of Russia and China there in terms of resources.

As such, we're left to deal with the great powers not as the U.S., but as Canada. I'm asking for your advice—again, as a nation, as Canada—in regard to what you think would be the most successful approach to deal with these other great powers, as I guess the U.S. is now referring to them, but I apologize—there was a term I learned at the Trilateral Commission that escapes me now. What is the best attitude and approach for Canada to take in regard to these other two, I'll say, great emerging powers, two-way [Technical difficulty—Editor] internationally?

[Dr. William Galston]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will necessarily be brief in my answer: clear-eyed realism.

I think it has taken the United States, for example, a long time to wake up to the fact that China is not a status quo power. It has no intention of integrating its economy into the western rules-based economic order. It wants to change that order. Similarly, it does not accept liberal democracy as the template for good government everywhere. In his address to the 19th party congress, Chairman Xi Jinping made it very clear that he regarded the Chinese model as preferable and exportable.

I think Russia is a failed state that has proved remarkably effective in mobilizing meagre military resources on behalf of mischief. It may be that Mr. Putin is now seeking to replay in Venezuela the low-cost success that he achieved in Syria. That's genuinely worrisome.

As for what to do in Venezuela, I honestly don't think that military intervention is the key. I'm not sure that we can do it, and I'm not sure that we can get away with it.

[Stephanie Kusie, Conservative, Calgary Midnapore, AB]

It's huge.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

Thank you very much. You've given us a lot to think about.

I want to thank you, Dr. Galston, and also our first panel of witnesses, for kicking off our study on threats to liberal democracy in Europe.

[Dr. William Galston]

It's my pleasure.

[The Chair, Liberal, Michael Levitt]

With that, members, we shall adjourn.