What about sub-national entities? If we're going to approach places such as India or Peru, being able to move that needle would necessitate working at the sub-national level.
To come back to the fragile state question, I think the fundamental problem in places such as Haiti and Afghanistan is that the business and political elite benefits to some extent from the status quo—at least enough of them do—so that in terms of simply doing good projects as part of a regional approach—good projects that trickle into countries here and there—without being involved in the backroom conversations around individual investments, individual reformers, and rising technocrats in different ministries, it's impossible, I think, to change the dynamics of those elite interests.
Of course, trying to do so is perhaps a bit of a challenge. In my work in Liberia, there was only one country that was able to have those conversations, and that was the United States, for historical reasons and of course for reasons of size. They were present in the entire spectrum of Liberia's development challenges. Not coincidentally, they were also the ones able to respond most vigorously to Ebola, which came completely out of left field. They had the credibility and the relationships, including at the social level between the ambassador and the president, to be able to tackle the challenges of a relatively weak state. Even with the presence of Ebola, it has seen fairly sustained economic growth.