First and foremost, we do see sanctions as an exceptional tool because of the restrictions we are inherently applying to what are otherwise completely legal activities, as well as because of the risks associated with the use of sanctions. The way we look at their effectiveness is an interesting one insofar as effectiveness, in terms of persuading a change of behaviour and a policy shift, is a very difficult thing to attribute results to, in an international context.
Sanctions are a complementary instrument. We use them, generally, when other mechanisms or other steps that have been taken and tried have failed. Because we do that as part of a broader suite of interventions—whether that's negotiations, participation in peace processes, or international advocacy activities—it is difficult to know what the tipping point is.
What complicates it even further is that we tend to use this instrument, importantly, along with other countries. We harmonize our approach with other countries, which means that the relative weight of Canada's intervention, versus the relative weight of the European Union, the United States, or what have you, is difficult to discern in that context.
As I mentioned, we tend to view them as most effective when they are a selective complement linked to a clear policy outcome or a desired shift in policy and behaviour on the part of a foreign country, when they are applied universally, and when they are tailored—or “smart”, to use our internal jargon—insofar as they are focused on key decision-makers and their associates.