I'm going to speak actually from both my Hill experience and the executive branch. One of the tools that we used in the U.S, at least—I'm not as familiar with the Canadian provisions—was the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. That provides very broad authority for the president to respond to any kind of emergency emanating outside the United States to the national security and foreign policy or economy of the U.S. Our OFAC and our treasury department actually use that for a number of measures to designate individuals subject to sanctions. I think that broad authority is actually very important. I don't know the degree to which the Canadian.... Again, you're focusing on two pieces of legislation, but they become a complex picture because they are a patchwork quilt, if you will, that has grown up over time. Sometimes it's a good thing to take a step back and look at what the ultimate objectives are, and to try to reframe them.
The other is that you do have differing standards. There's a reason why we don't have serious sanctions by the UN. There are limits to what we can do in the context of the Security Council. We always tend toward trying to make them as multilateral as possible, because more countries are following. It's very important because a number of countries, if they are not UN, can't implement them. They are based specifically on the UN.
In the particular case in terms of corrupt officials, that is not a UN measure. Now, it may be that like-minded states will be able to change the standards. To some extent, catch-all categories can be useful to governments in doing that.