Foreign Affairs Committee on Nov. 14th, 2016

[Andrei Sannikov,, As an Individual]

Hello everybody, and good afternoon. It's quite late here in Warsaw.

I presume that you want to hear about the effectiveness of the policy of sanctions on individuals responsible for the violation of international law as well as domestic law. I can tell you that from my experience, this policy is very effective when implemented. Why is that so? In a country like Belarus where there is a dictatorial regime, especially the regime that has been in place for so many years, and there is no judiciary, the main factor that supports repression against—and I'm not talking political opposition—mass media and human rights defenders is impunity.

Since we don't have the benefit of the judiciary...and this is not just my words. It's the conclusion that was made by UN special rapporteur on the independence of the judiciary as far back as 2000, when he came and studied the situation in Belarus. He presented this report with a very negative assessment of the judiciary system, and it has only become worse since then.

The only hope we can have to support very legitimate demands for upholding democratic principles, which again are not theoretical but have been subscribed to and signed by the authorities of Belarus on many occasions, including the OSCE documents, the Paris charter, and others, is the international assessment of the situation in such countries as Belarus, and international solidarity on the basis of the principle of respect for human rights and support for the legitimate demands of the people in Belarus. Again, I must stress, it's not only the politicians but also the ordinary people, because the repressive system affects all layers, all the professions, and all walks of life within such a situation as Belarus.

I will be more than happy to answer specific questions. I do understand that you might need some specific views of the situation in my country, but not only in my country.

The only thing I must stress is that we need some kind of international instrument. The most effective, in my view, would be the global Magnitsky law, which is the law of a new era. That could address the challenges that we all face in the democratic community, both in democratic countries and within pro-democracy activities in countries like Belarus.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much.

I'll go straight to Mr. Kent, please.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Ambassador, thank you for your testimony today and for making yourself available.

We've heard from any number of witnesses about the ineffectiveness of general sanctions against countries. In the case of Russia, the post-Crimea, post-Ukraine invasion, we know that Vladimir Putin's intention, attitude, and behaviour have not changed.

We have also been told that targeted sanctions against some of his criminal associates, some of the oligarchs dealing in money laundering and so forth, do feel the impact of isolation, of being named and shamed, of being ostracized, of being unable in some circumstances, when they're on these various national lists, to travel freely and enjoy their ill-gotten gains in other parts of the world.

I'm just wondering, from your experience and observation, whether you think that targeted sanctions do continue to play an effective role, if not in changing renegade presidents like Vladimir Putin, in discouraging those around him from behaving in a way that might lead to their isolation.

[Andrei Sannikov]

Thank you for the question.

I would say that both general sanctions and targeted sanctions are effective. With general sanctions, there are an assessment and the attitude of the international community toward the situation of the abuse of human rights, both in Russian and Belarus, and in other places in the former Soviet Union. I am the living proof of the effectiveness of both general and targeted sanctions, because I was released only due to the fact that for the first time the European Union introduced economic sanctions against the businessmen that were close to Lukashenko and close to and supportive of the regime. Only this made them release me.

When these sanctions started to be contemplated—again, it was done for the first time in Belarus—we had what I call the “visa ban tourist sanctions”, which were not sanctions but a very mild instrument. After the crackdown in 2010, when many of us were in jail, me included, the attitude in jail was very difficult.... There was a horrendous attitude on the part of the authorities.

Then, after the condemnation statements from different states, including Canada—for which I am very grateful because without that solidarity and support it would not have been possible to survive in there—they started to contemplate targeted economic sanctions on businessmen. Even when they had just started to do this in Brussels, already I felt the attitude changing inside the prison where I was. They were becoming not so aggressive and not so arrogant, because they were afraid of being included. Even some of the wardens who I saw told me openly—confidentially, of course—that they were afraid that they or their families would be included in the blacklist. Then the targeted sanctions followed, and two businessmen close to the dictator were targeted by the sanctions. Immediately, they started the procedure for my release and the release of my friend, the manager of my presidential campaign.

I would say that it's the combination, because we need first of all to feel the attitude of the international democratic community towards the atrocities in a country, and then, of course, there are the targeted sanctions. What I want also to stress and is sometimes underestimated is that all the oppression and all the abuse of human rights and basic freedoms that we see now in Russia were tested in Belarus. Lukashenko's model existed long before Putin came into power, and believe me, they do watch each other, these dictators. They also watch the attitude of the west towards their policies. When the west becomes soft on Lukashenko, it first of all gives Putin a lesson and the false idea that he can go ahead in Ukraine and elsewhere in Russia.

I've always supported sanctions, even in prison when it was difficult for me to publicly state that I was in favour of sanctions because it immediately brought repercussions for me and my life in prison. I've always supported that. Unfortunately, they're the only instrument that is effective, and that is soft power.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

You seem to be saying that sanctions and targeted sanctions are more effective against lesser powers than we have seen them being against Russia.

[Andrei Sannikov]

I would say that in lesser powers, as you say—

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

In Belarus compared to Russia, in smaller countries—

[Andrei Sannikov]

—they could be more effective, yes.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

We've been considering and hearing advice that were we to go the route of the global Magnitsky law we should perhaps consider including violations of human rights, gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. What are your thoughts on that, sir?

[Andrei Sannikov]

I am strongly in favour of the global Magnitsky law. Those who commit crimes against their own citizens, those who abuse human rights grossly and regularly, for a long time, enjoy immunity because they're high officials and no international law makes it possible to bring charges against high officials of the state, no matter how bad it is. Impunity is a driving force of further repression, so the global Magnitsky law of course will be a very powerful instrument.

I know the attitude of the officials around Lukashenko. Those in his government, those who are close to him, are very much afraid to be banned from, let's say, the niceties of the life that they would like to at least visit. In terms of the freezing of assets, that perhaps is not so significant, because there are not so many assets, and not many people have assets abroad. But the international condemnation by the democratic countries will have consequences in terms of preventing them from enjoying the life that ordinary people, who did not commit any crimes, can enjoy all over the world. That's a powerful instrument.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Kent.

I'll go to Mr. Saini, please.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Good afternoon, Mr. Sannikov—or good evening, I guess, depending on where you are in the world. Thank you very much for agreeing to testify today.

I have a quick question for you. This is just a generality, nothing specific. In February of this year, the European Council withdrew some of the sanctions against 170 people and three companies. I find that with targeted sanctions, if there's no alignment between the European Union, the United States, and the United Nations, it gets very difficult for those sanctions to be effective. Can you just explain why the European Council decided to remove the sanctions against those individuals? What was the belief behind that?

[Andrei Sannikov]

What I hear is that the rationale behind it was that the geopolitical situation is changing and probably Belarus is not as supportive of Putin's regime as before, especially regarding the war in Ukraine, but this is presumptuous. Unfortunately, I must say, I was very critical of this decision. Why? Because Brussels demonstrated weakness at that time, because they set their own conditions. There were three conditions put forward for lifting sanctions or for softening sanctions. Only one was partly met, which was the release of political prisoners, and also only partly because the condition was the release and rehabilitation of political prisoners. None of us is rehabilitated to this time.

In this way the European Union demonstrated its weakness and that gave a false impression to the regime inside Belarus. Again, Russia was watching very closely. Even after the very strong reactions to the crackdown and atrocities in Minsk in 2010 and the following statements and strengthening of sanctions, this period was very short. They started to lift sanctions last year, when the dictator and those who were guilty of those crimes were actually acquitted by the international community. That's what I'm talking about.

We don't have an independent judiciary. That's why it's so important to have a moral condemnation of what's going on in such regimes as Belarus. It was an unfortunate decision that led us nowhere, because the system is trying to be nice to the west, not because they want to change but because they badly need money. That's the whole purpose of their rhetoric today.

Unfortunately, I must say that Canada also followed this example by lifting those restrictions that were in place in May this year. Again, I want to stress it sends the wrong signal, not only to us in Belarus who work as the freedom fighters, the human rights defenders, civil society, but also to the regime in the Kremlin. If the lesser regime, so less evil, as they call them, could escape the sanctions that's the pattern to follow in Russia. They can continue their politics, especially in Ukraine, and know for sure that there will be a period of fatigue in the west of its policy of sanctioning or strengthening these sanctions, and Russia will escape responsibility for its acts.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Do you believe, then, it's a fair statement to say that, if sanctions are going to be effective, there has to be greater participation, not only from the EU but the United States and the United Nations? They all to work together and if one entity does not—

[Andrei Sannikov]

Absolutely.

Do you know what is also important? If sanctions are discussed, it is important not to demonstrate the differences that the western democratic countries have on the issue of sanctions. It's better maybe to do less but in a coordinated, consolidated manner, than to show that there are some loopholes that Russia, or regimes like in the Kremlin and Minsk, could use. That is also something to take into account, because they are looking for these kinds of fractious intentions inside the western community on sanctions, and they're using them.

Why am I telling you this? Because that was the case in Belarus, as I said, when the sanctions were introduced to businessmen. There was a leak of information that there were probably three more businessmen who would be targeted by the sanctions. But then nothing happened and the rest of the political prisoners stayed in prison. If it happened, they would have been released, I'm sure about that. But there was the leak of this information, that there would be three more persons quite close to Lukashenko who would be shortly, in two months' time, targeted for sanctions by the European Union, and then nothing happened and the people suffered for three more years in prison.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Ms. Laverdière, you have the floor.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Sannikov, thank you for your very interesting presentation.

You said that the Europeans have lifted at least part of their sanctions, that some people were in a way acquitted. Do you consider it necessary to continue to apply sanctions even after there has been a change in behaviour?

[Andrei Sannikov]

I'm sorry...to look for what?

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

When there is a change in behaviour or the situation is being resolved, should extending the sanctions be considered in some cases to ensure that people do not get off easily, despite what they have done?

[Andrei Sannikov]

Absolutely. Again, let's take the example of Belarus. The people who escaped the sanctions because Brussels lifted them were the top officials of KGB, which is the secret police. In Belarus it still bears the name of the KGB as in the Soviet Union and they perform the same functions. They politically persecute not only the opponents of the regime but those who are not loyal to the regime. Those people committed crimes by any law, even by Lukashenko's law, by the laws that exist in Belarus but which were not implemented.

All of a sudden they were condemned by the international community and then all of a sudden they were pardoned. That's an absence of logic, because of course they have to be on the list of those who committed the crimes, because in a free Belarus definitely they will be responsible for the crimes they committed. But we need this kind of support today, international support, to—let's put it in very simple words—show them this evil and that evil eventually will be punished.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

You raised another interesting point. To offer somewhat of a caricature, because I think you used this example, the idea of targeting prison guards or low-level public servants, for example, might be of limited success because these people in many cases do not travel and do not have foreign assets in an event.

Moreover, targeting heads of state or very high-level representatives is difficult. It creates problems. Business people are not necessarily protected and might have an interest in travelling and owning foreign assets. In your opinion, how can we address these complications and difficulties when we establish sanctions?

[Andrei Sannikov]

First of all, I cannot say whether they do have assets abroad or not because, as you may know, many of the power structures, both in Russia and Belarus and other parts of the former Soviet Union are very closely involved in business schemes, and mostly in criminal business schemes, that presuppose the withdrawal of money or storing the money or keeping the money outside, preferably in the western world.

When those businessmen were targeted in Belarus they panicked. I forgot to mention one other factor. The consolidated position on targeting businesses that supported the regime—and these were facts, not just speculation—created a different attitude inside the business community because they started to think about whether they were right to continue to finance this kind of repressive regime, and maybe they could do something to help the changes and not make the mistake of extraordinary or violent changes. We're talking only about the evolutions and the changes inside the country, peaceful changes.

I think it is very important to use this instrument because you never know how important it is to have assets, or to have access to assets outside the country. As for the top officials, I think it was mentioned here that, rightfully, the oligarchs and those who are close to the Kremlin were targeted. It does create a different attitude and it should continue. Once you've started this policy, there should not be any slack because this is not a policy of one or two days. When you embark on the policy of sanctions you have to allow some period for them to be effective.

I'm very often asked if that could be a strategy. Of course not. That is not a strategy for a relationship between countries in general, but this is the necessary instrument to change the behaviour of oppression and what's more, especially I'm thinking very personally, it's a very necessary and effective instrument to save people's lives.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Madame Laverdière.

Borys, please.

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Sir, you just said that sanctions are an important instrument to save people's lives. Mr. Magnitsky was killed while incarcerated in Russia. After the imposition of the Magnitsky act by the United States, although Mr. Putin continued to incarcerate people he thought may be opponents—oligarchs, business people, potential political opponents, people who worked for them—none were murdered. None had their deaths caused as a result of being incarcerated. In fact, some were released.

Would it be fair to assume, perhaps as a consequence of these Magnitsky laws, that for the people Mr. Putin incarcerates, people he views as opponents, in fact, their lives are being saved by the imposition of these targeted sanctions?