It depends entirely on what the problem is at a country-by-country level. As I mentioned, you have some countries that know about the sanctions regime and have no interest in complying with it. There are countries in the Middle East and Africa, for example, that are doing completely illicit business with North Korea. They know it, have been told about it, and have very little desire to actually change course.
Now what we do in respect of those countries is a very different story than what we do toward countries that are ignorant of the sanctions regime, for example, that simply don't pay very much attention to the nuances and whether or not certain types of coal trade is allowed or isn't, or certain types of military co-operation is allowed or isn't. Ignorance is a different problem in terms of the solution. Then you simply have countries that are attentive to the fact, but their domestic legal frameworks mean that the fact of the matter on the ground and in practice is that the measures are not effective. That's where our technical assistance role comes in.
You move in the space anywhere from strong political pressure and, to an extent, public shaming for those who don't care about North Korea sanctions and flout restrictions quite openly, to an education role for those who are ignorant of the sanctions regime and need a bit of a push to understand that they're part of this North Korean global threat picture and they need to take it as seriously as anyone else, to a technical assistance function for states which really do need some help crafting export control arrangements or legislative frameworks to be able to take action in the event that they do get passed information that North Korean activity is touching their jurisdiction in some way.