Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today.
I want to continue on the human rights path, although on a different tack. Richard, perhaps the first question is for you.
Generally, the realm of sanctions, whether unilateral or multilateral, has been reserved for areas of high politics, nuclear interests, interests where the behaviour of an actor in question to be sanctioned has threatened international peace and security. The migration towards sanctioning individuals and not states on the basis of a level of human rights violation that is deemed to be intolerable generally answers to a call to condemn based on a moral imperative, as Mr. Levitt alluded to.
I'm wondering what the limits to that approach are intellectually, and even from an idealist perspective. We have disagreements with our closest ally as to the death penalty. We have disagreements with the way certain European countries behave. I'm not talking about a relativist moral slippery slope. I'm simply talking about where we draw the line. Effectiveness is one argument, but it doesn't necessarily counter the moral imperative.
There is also a beauty in freezing someone's assets that are situated here where they have committed a gross indecent act. It would be reprehensible to let them derive gain from those assets.
I'd like you to take a few minutes to reflect on that sort of tension that we're facing, from a geopolitical and trade perspective.
Thanks.