Evidence of meeting #46 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was european.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

MPs speaking

Also speaking

Joan DeBardeleben  Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual
Margaret Skok  Senior Fellow, Global Security and Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation

9:50 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bob Nault

Yes. It does. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Saini.

I'll go to Mr. Kmiec, please.

9:50 a.m.

Conservative

Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB

I want to go back to something Mr. Sidhu brought up and something you had said, Madam DeBardeleben, about the European Union and who we are supposed to be talking to. You and Mr. Sidhu had mentioned that Europe is very much divided over whether it wants to co-operate with Russia or whether it wants to be western.

I call myself eastern European. I came here from eastern Europe. My family fled here. However, when I talk to people like Marcin Bosacki, the former ambassador of Poland to Canada, he calls himself a central European, so that's moved over time. That's when I talk to these better educated, very much westernized Europeans. In general, they have an opinion on where their interests lie, yet when you talk to the average person my age or younger in what I call eastern Europe, they will say Russia's not so bad. The Soviet Union wasn't so bad.

Who are we supposed to be talking to so that we can determine the best interests of the European Union, and Europe in general? Are there any civil society organizations? We've talked about the European Union and the OSCE. What about civil society organizations that have cachet with populations in different countries that Canada could engage with, both to better understand European interests, whatever those are, and to understand civil society, considering the return of populist movements in western Europe? In eastern Europe, a lot of the very pro-Russian groups are socialists, in Moldova, in Bulgaria, in Poland, in Serbia, so who is it that we're supposed to be talking to?

I have a question that comes after that, once you've answered this question.

9:50 a.m.

Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual

Prof. Joan DeBardeleben

That's a really large question.

Just on the terminology, yes, I would use the term “central Europe” to refer to Poland normally. I've picked up your committee's language here with “eastern Europe”, which I would usually use for Belarus, Ukraine, and possibly Russia, but I don't know. We can discuss that. However, yes, it depends on the issue, of course. If we're talking about who we talk to in terms of policy toward Russia, what has evolved is that, although this is temporary—or maybe not temporary—at this moment there's unity in Europe on the sanctions. It could break down.

We also know that the Normandy format, with the leading role of France and Germany in terms of the Minsk II accords, for example, is very important. In terms of high political issues relating to Russia and relating to the overall geopolitical situation in Europe, I think we have to speak to Federica Mogherini, who's the high representative for foreign policy of the EU. We have to speak to the German leaders, probably to the French, and probably to the Poles. Although the Poles were not included in the Normandy format, they certainly have a vital interest and are the largest of the new member states. They also border Russia and therefore represent a somewhat different view.

I would say those could be the key interlocutors there.

9:50 a.m.

Conservative

Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB

Maybe I can just interrupt you, then. When President Duda visited Canada, there was a luncheon where there were a few members of the Canada-Poland group in attendance. I remember being there when he was speaking in Polish, and he said he had come here basically to ensure that NATO would fulfill its military obligations and that the military equilibrium that he was looking for between the European Union, NATO, and Russia was very important. He flat out said he wanted combat troops. He didn't want these rotations necessarily. He wanted actual combat troops because he felt an existential threat to the Republic of Poland. That was widely shared, certainly by his staff as well, and others. Parliamentarians from Poland I've spoken to share the same type of concern regardless of the party to which they belong.

However, with a lot of this Russian aggression in Ukraine, and Georgia, these break-away republics that they support such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, when you look at them and then look at NATO's response, and NATO's ability to respond, there are a lot of eastern Europeans, central Europeans, or whatever you want to call them, who say, “Well, the past 20 years have been great for an economic relationship for us with the west, but our future, especially when you look at the military equilibrium, no longer rests with the west because you can't count on them.”

In Canada, I think we can accuse ourselves also. We haven't been spending the 2% that we're supposed to be spending to ensure we have that military capability. Can you talk a bit about that?

9:55 a.m.

Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual

Prof. Joan DeBardeleben

There are differences within the European Union and within NATO in regard to how hard a line one should take with Russia, how much it should be a military focus, and how much a diplomatic focus. I think there's a unity around the security guarantee. No one knows what would actually happen if there was an attack on one of these countries, but I suspect that NATO would stand up to an actual attack.

The larger risk, as I've said, is not a military attack in that region, and frankly, to focus on that is a bit misguided. The statement has to be strong that the guarantee stands because that's the best kind of deterrent, but in reality the larger problem is whether there's the possibility of internal destabilization. I don't think it's a very realistic likelihood in Poland, but I think in some of the Baltic states that would be the bigger problem.

9:55 a.m.

Conservative

Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB

If I could just interrupt, the parliamentarians I've spoken to from the Baltic states and many in central Europe, and people just in civil society, journalists and professors from the region, would say they no longer trust that security guarantee—

9:55 a.m.

Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual

Prof. Joan DeBardeleben

I understand that.

9:55 a.m.

Conservative

Tom Kmiec Conservative Calgary Shepard, AB

—and it's not against a hard military response from Russia.

I think some communities have alluded to a soft military response, so a political party financed by Russia, which scores really well in an election, makes expectations saying, no, we want power-sharing with another party, a coalition government, where they then have significant influence over policy-making in a country within NATO.

The concern isn't so much that in a hard military scenario NATO wouldn't respond. It probably would, and it has in the past, but it would be more so about what happens if there's a soft....

9:55 a.m.

Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual

Prof. Joan DeBardeleben

The soft kind of intrusion is very hard to respond to because you can't respond to it very easily militarily. That's exactly the problem, and that's why the tool of NATO, while it's an important one in terms of the security commitment, is not the only tool needed. That's why, ultimately, it depends on the integration of the population in the political structures of the country involved to build the best defence against that kind of intrusion, and that's something we can try to contribute to.

We can make as strong statements as possible on the hard security guarantee, and it's important because of the ambiguity that's been bred by some of the discourse in the American campaign. But on the other issue, it's hard to say how the Russian population in the Baltic states is responding to the situation. From what I've read, they identify as Estonians, as Latvians. They see their future there, but they also have a different understanding of Russia. They're less distrustful. They hear Russian media because it's in their own language. Of course, the leaders of those countries are aware of this, but this is why, I think, a continuing discussion about how better to respond to these challenges in integrating minority population groups is very important.

I don't know if we can contribute to it, but I think dialogue is very important in terms of sharing experience and trying to push that forward.

I don't know what else can be done about it, frankly, because you can't respond to that with an army. It just can't be done. I don't see how you can make a military response to that kind of a risk.

10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bob Nault

Thank you, Mr. Kmiec.

Colleagues, the bells have just started, so we have half an hour.

Mr. Levitt, do you want to wrap it up and ask a question so we'll be out of here in five minutes?

10 a.m.

Liberal

Michael Levitt Liberal York Centre, ON

Sure.

10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bob Nault

I just want to prep the witnesses to keep the answers fairly short because we're going to have to run off and do our duty at the House of Commons.

Mr. Levitt.

February 14th, 2017 / 10 a.m.

Liberal

Michael Levitt Liberal York Centre, ON

Absolutely.

Thank you for your testimony.

I have a comment. It's your reaction to my colleague MP McKay's portrayal of Russia as a kleptocracy. I want to add some scope to that because I think you pushed back on that a little. But I have to tell you that we had Boris Nemtsov's daughter, Zhanna Nemtsova, along with Vladimir Kara-Murza present to us, at the beginning of this committee about a year ago, about their plight and the challenges faced by other individuals who have pushed back against the Putin regime. Sergei Magnitsky is another example.

It's discomforting to see the individuals who sat before us: one who's father had been murdered, and another who had been poisoned and who recently ended up being poisoned again. It seems that pushing back and being in favour of democratic reform and being an opposing voice to the current regime in Russia comes with a lot of risk. Again, I don't want to belabour the point, but I think there's certainly a perspective there that comments on the regime and its current actions and those that seem to oppose it.

10 a.m.

Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual

Prof. Joan DeBardeleben

There's no doubt that the system has moved in an authoritarian direction and that there's a heavy repression of forces that try to oppose the structure of power. That does not necessarily lead, though, to conclusions about how we deal with that country in a foreign policy sphere. We have to balance our capacity to actually influence that internal situation, which is extremely limited, with our own security interests which also lie in the direction of avoiding an escalation of conflict in a very unpredictable and precarious direction.

It's not a simple situation. I don't disagree with you.

10 a.m.

Liberal

Michael Levitt Liberal York Centre, ON

Agreed.

Just quickly, because we probably have about a minute and a half left, this is on human rights, particularly in central Asia. In Canada, we consider ourselves a country that promotes and messages out and seeks to develop human rights around the world. There are challenges— impunity, corruption—but there are also opportunities. Can you give us a bit of your thoughts on how Canada can play a role?

What is the current situation? It varies by country in central Asia, but just speaking more broadly, how do you feel about this?

10 a.m.

Senior Fellow, Global Security and Politics, Centre for International Governance Innovation

Margaret Skok

I want to again reiterate what my colleague said. Engagement is critical. Russia cannot be trusted. A quote from Lenin says that you must always probe with a bayonet. That tells us that we have to do our homework as well. It's not a bad line.

In terms of human rights and corruption, those are legacy issues. They go hand in hand. The countries that were their traditional partners continue to import and export that. These are autocracies from the beginning. As for Russia, in 2013 there was an Economist article on Putin that said the Kremlin is but a facade. He surrounds himself with billionaire cronies and all dissension is criminalized.

We're seeing a bit of the movement away from kratocracies in central Asia, in Uzbekistan and in Kurdistan, where there's a devolution of presidential power to government and parliament. Is that democracy? It is a beginning.

That's why our engagements on governance issues, as well as the economy, as well as jobs, and as well as export financing, are really extremely important. If we do not engage in these regions, Russia and China will move in to fill the vacuum in countries which they believe to be theirs.

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk carved up Europe, the Eastern bloc, after World War I. As for the Yalta agreement, which everybody loves, Poland hates it because it carved up Poland again. The Baltic states, like central Asia, are not all the same; they're all very different. Lithuania has a completely different history. These are regions that Russia has a continued interest in—the empire strikes back.

10 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Bob Nault

We'll have to leave it there because of the vote.

To both of our witnesses, thank you very much for your time. It's much appreciated.

Colleagues, the last hour will be cancelled, of course, so we'll see you on Thursday. Mr. Allison will be your chair.

Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.