Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 14th, 2017

[The Chair (Hon. Robert Nault (Kenora, Lib.)), Liberal, Bob Nault]

Colleagues, I'll bring this committee meeting to order.

We are waiting for Margaret Skok, but we'll get started with our first witness simply because, as you know, we have an hour and 15 minutes, and I want to make sure we get to use it all. As I understand it, the bells will ring at 10, and a vote at 10:30 is what we've been told. We'll go until 10 with the two witnesses we have, and then I've suggested to the other two witnesses that, through the clerk, we will postpone their video conference to another day.

I understand that Professor DeBardeleben has a class to teach and will have to leave us around 9:30.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben, Chancellor’s Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual]

I have to leave here by 10, so that's okay.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Okay, so that will work. Thank you.

She is a chancellor's professor in the department of political science and the institute of European, Russian and Eurasian studies at Carleton University. She also holds the Jean Monnet chair on European neighbourhood policy.

Welcome to the committee. I will turn the floor over to you for your opening comments, and by then I am absolutely confident that Margaret Skok will be here.

Joan, go ahead.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

Thank you very much, committee members, for giving me this opportunity to speak to you today about these issues.

There are many issues on the list of questions that were provided to me and I won't be able to deal with all of them, given the time limitation, but I'm happy to give you further input if you request it.

My own expertise lies in the area of Russian politics and relations between the European Union and Russia, and also in the context of the Ukraine crisis and the EU-Russian shared neighbourhood. I won't be addressing issues related to central Asia specifically today.

Before considering Canadian responses, it's important to understand Russia's main priorities and interests in eastern Europe. I would identify three.

The first are status concerns. Here, Russia seeks to achieve equal status and recognition with other actors that it sees as its point of reference—namely, the European Union and the United States. This has been a recurring theme of Russian foreign policy under Mr. Putin. In relation to the U.S., Russian leaders object to what they call the “unipolar” global power system and to U.S. appropriation of the right to act unilaterally and to violate international law at will. In relation to the EU, Russia has objected to the latter's claim to define the meaning of European values and to establish itself as the source of continental regulatory norms.

Second are security concerns, especially objections to NATO expansion in its neighbourhood, combined with the sense of exclusion from effective influence on European security arrangements.

Third are Russian regional geopolitical objectives—namely, Russia's desire to retain a special sphere of influence in the non-EU, post-Soviet space. Ukraine has been seen by Russia as a very pivotal element of this priority. Russia's actions in 2013 and 2014 in relation to Ukraine and Crimea, in my view, reflected Russia's failure to achieve this objective by other means.

Unfortunately, these Russian priorities have brought Russia into conflict both with the EU and the west more broadly in the context of the Ukraine crisis. Nonetheless, I believe that Russia would prefer to be integrated into the European security and economic framework if this could be achieved in compatibility with these three objectives.

Given the uncertainty and the unpredictability of the Trump administration's positions on these issues, I believe that Canada should pursue a policy of alignment and co-operation with the EU in its policies toward eastern Europe and Russia. In my view, the EU's long-term objectives are consistent with Canadian interests. These include a path toward reopening dialogue with Russia on issues of shared concern, such as the Arctic, the environment, and shared security concerns, while strongly defending the territorial integrity and the right of countries that lie between the EU and Russia to pursue their own foreign policy preferences, as well as support for democratic governance and rule of law. However, the path to realizing these longer-term objectives, which I think are shared by Canada and the EU, is difficult and unclear.

I would suggest three steps or intermediary priorities. First would be measures to bolster the democratic stability and political reform processes in east European countries, including both EU member states that border Russia—the Baltic states and Poland—and post-Soviet states that are not part of the EU, particularly Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, which have recently signed association and free trade agreements with the EU.

To this end, I would advocate for stronger Canadian engagement in promoting good governance and rule-of-law reforms in these countries, in tandem with the EU. Of particular value to countries such as Ukraine and the Baltic states would be programs to share best practices in realizing accommodation in multi-ethnic societies. Russian population groups in several of these countries may be vulnerable to Russian propaganda. Ukraine in particular is struggling with finding an adequate model for devolving some power to regional authorities to meet the conditions of the Minsk II agreement, which still offers the best avenue for resolving the impasse over Ukraine, weak as this agreement may be. Canada, as a successful federation with a multi-ethnic society, should endeavour to offer assistance and service in addressing this problem. Given the many internal challenges facing the EU at this point in time, leaving such development assistance efforts primarily to the EU would, in my view, be a mistake.

Also, in the Baltic states, Canada should accompany its NATO commitment in Latvia by diplomatic engagement on a civilian basis to assess whether Canada can provide support in other arenas to help bolster the resilience of domestic civil society in the face of potential soft-power influence from Russia.

Second, Canada should continue to take a strong position in support of the inviolability of post-World War II and post-Cold War borders in Europe. While it is difficult to foresee a scenario under which Russia's annexation of Crimea could be reversed, insistence on the territorial sovereignty of European nations should remain a key security commitment of Canada based in our alliance system, and importantly, in recognition that violations of this order can open a Pandora's box of instability, ethnic conflict, and territorial claims.

Third, Canada needs to recognize the dangers of the current escalation of tensions with Russia. Russia and the west face a classic security dilemma. A security dilemma is a dynamic where efforts by one side to ensure security can elicit reactions that further endanger that security. On the other hand, the failure to take those measures is perceived to undermine security. This is the dilemma. A failure to escape this logic may create a paradigm shift where threats of escalation, increasing militarization, brinkmanship, competing spheres of influence, reduced economic and energy interaction, and a broad securitization of the relationship can take on a long-lasting character.

It is not clear or easy how to escape this logic while rejecting Russian revisionism in relation to post-war and post-Soviet borders. In this context, the minimalist objective is to stabilize the situation; that is, to re-establish a geostrategic and security balance and some level of predictability. From there, perhaps the foundation can be laid for efforts to rebuild trust.

To this end, I believe that Canada should support the initiation of a cross-European, transatlantic security dialogue, perhaps in the context of the OSCE, to engage in an open consideration of how the existing security architecture might be revised to take account both of Russia's security concerns, which it feels NATO expansion has undermined, as well as the security and sovereignty concerns of small and medium-sized European countries that feel threatened by Russia. While the U.S. is at the moment an unpredictable and therefore potentially unreliable partner in undertaking such an initiative, I believe that Canada should work with the EU and the OSCE in that direction.

Thank you very much. I'm happy to respond to any questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much.

I'll go to Mr. Kent, please.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Thank you very much.

Thank you for being with us here today.

You spoke of encouraging better governance, and I guess democratization in a number of the east European post-Soviet states. What about encouragement at the same time? Aside from Crimea and the Donbass invasion, what about encouraging better governance within Russia itself?

Mr. Putin doesn't show any signs of receiving such encouragement very positively. I'm just wondering what your thoughts might be.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

My view is that it would be very difficult to have a positive influence on the domestic situation inside of Russia. There are several reasons for that.

First, past experience hasn't proven that to be a very successful approach. In fact, in some cases it can backfire.

As you probably know, the Russian government is very wary of western interference. It claims there has been heavy interference in the Ukraine and other parts of its neighbourhood. Certainly it has taken defensive measures to prevent what it perceives to be potential interference domestically, including the foreign agents law, which basically prevents organizations, NGOs within Russia, that have arguably any kind of political activity, from receiving any foreign funding. This is a very punitive action for these NGOs. It basically disempowers them. This shows the willingness of the Putin regime to act assertively to reject efforts to try to promote, as you might say, democracy internally.

Furthermore, because I do believe Putin genuinely has a high level of popular support, those ratings that you read from the various public opinion surveys may not be exact. Based on my experience and my interaction in Russia, I believe that the Russian population generally stands behind Mr. Putin in terms of his primary approach.

Part of that is because a sense of humiliation occurred in relation to what happened in the 1990s in Russia. There was an economic decline, which was perceived by many people to be based on a kind of western model. From the perception of many Russians, that was a great failure of Russian policy, to accept western advice in that context with those consequences. There would be quite a strong popular receptiveness to any interpretation put out by the Russian government in relation to attempts by the west to influence domestic arrangements inside Russia.

The other problem is that when you take that path, you don't know what the outcome may be. It can be very unpredictable. You might end up with a stronger nationalist government in place, a more unpredictable one. The outcome could easily be worse than what we have now. I would recommend against that approach.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

On the committee's January visit to a number of countries in eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, Latvia, and Poland, we heard concern—and I hope I'm reflecting the concern that I think we heard—from a number of sources about the ponderings that if the west were to give up on Crimea, there might be some advancement towards normalization and a pullback from eastern Ukraine.

Particularly in Latvia, though, we heard voices asking if that were to happen, what's next? Would it be an encroachment on Latvia, similar to that on eastern Ukraine, or to the Baltics generally and in Poland?

They're seeing the fatigue, if you will, in some parts of Europe with regard to the Crimea-eastern Ukraine position so that we're now talking bargaining chips.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

Yes. I think the bargaining chip kind of discourse can be quite dangerous. There definitely can be the risk—and given the uncertainty in Washington right now, I think one has to consider this even more seriously—of some kind of what I call a “great power” bargain being struck between some of the more powerful countries at the expense of some of the less strong countries that lie between the EU and Russia. I think that's a very risky path to go down, because it can encourage actions or misunderstandings on the part of the Russian side as to what position the west would take in terms of defending certain parts of the alliance.

In terms of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, I think one does have to make a distinction. As I said, realistically it's hard to foresee a scenario in which Crimea would be returned to Ukraine. That's not only because of the Russian determination to keep it, but it's also because probably the majority of the population.... I don't know, but it's at least possible that the majority of the population in Crimea would prefer the current situation.

That's not to say that the referendum that occurred there was legitimate. I don't think it was a legitimate referendum, but I can't easily see how that situation would be reversed.

That doesn't mean that rhetorically one accepts it. The principle involved in achieving it is still objectionable, particularly because of the Budapest memorandums of the early 1990s, where Ukraine was given a guarantee of its territorial sovereignty by Russia, by western countries, in exchange for its giving up its nuclear weapons. I think it would set a very bad precedent to accept that this was done with legitimacy. That means, however, that although rhetorically one has to continue objecting to it, one has to be a bit realistic about what the outcome of that rhetorical objection is likely to be.

The situation in eastern Ukraine is quite different. There it's a truly unresolved situation. I think it looks more and more like it may turn into a so-called frozen conflict, an unresolved conflict with no clear exit path, but I don't think we should accept that outcome, at least not yet. That's why I would advocate to at least make some more attempts to try to break the deadlock.

There are some very clear issues at stake there that have to do with.... I guess it does depend, to a certain degree, on how you interpret Russian motives. If you interpret Russian motives as being to destabilize Ukraine and ultimately force Ukraine back into its orbit, then there would seem to be very dismal prospects for any kind of resolution. I'm not sure I accept that kind of logic. I don't think Russia necessarily wants an unstable neighbour. It would be a constant risk to Russia from a security perspective.

I think the outcome we should strive for in the broader scope—then maybe from there we can go back to thinking about how to resolve the east Ukraine problem—is an acceptance on Russia's part that Ukraine could have a relationship with both the west and Russia, perhaps in exchange for some other kinds of...I don't like to use the word “concessions”, but by responding to some other concerns. I think this is the desirable outcome.

As you may know, currently, since the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement between the EU and Ukraine was put into force at the beginning of 2016, Russia has unilaterally excluded Ukraine from the CIS Free Trade Agreement. That has in part—that and the war—led to a dramatic decline in trade between Ukraine and Russia. That's detrimental to both partners. I don't think it serves our interests either.

What we should be pushing for broadly in that context is that the relationship between Ukraine and Russia be restored in terms of trade and those kinds of very practical and pragmatic interactions. At the same time, Ukraine would retain its right to pursue its own choice in terms of its relationship with the European Union and western partners.

I'm not convinced that's against the Russian interests. Because we've gotten into this level of high distrust, I think that it has become difficult to get there but we should continue to work toward getting there. Part of that would be to try to unravel the knotty problems of the Minsk II agreement, which one moment people seem to have given up on and the next moment they say out of the other side of their mouths that it's the only possible solution. To me, this is kind of a perplexing situation.

There are two issues there that need to be resolved, if one accepts the premise that there's a long-term solution one might work toward. First, there needs to be a devolution of power within Ukraine, which Ukraine is blocked on at the moment. Second, of course, Russia needs to give back control of the borders between Russia and Ukraine to Ukraine. There's a sequence issue there.

I think we should try to work on that first issue, if possible. We should put in what we can to try to help look for solutions to that first issue of devolving some power in a way that doesn't compromise Ukraine's sovereignty.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Kent.

We'll go to Mr. McKay, please.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you for coming here.

Garry Kasparov appeared before this committee a few months ago. I don't know whether he said it publicly, but he certainly said privately to me that the approach of the west and other nations is like everyone playing chess while Putin is playing poker. Until you understand that he's playing poker, you're probably not going to understand how he approaches this.

It makes perfectly good sense in the sense that Russia is nothing other than an organized kleptocracy, with Putin at the centre and spreading out through the oligarchs. To wit your comment that all the NGOs are defunded and therefore there is no alternative voice, indeed, anybody who purports to provide an alternative voice ends up in hospital, or worse.

In light of its being, if you will, a criminal organization, how is it that you can expect your proposals of dialogue and security arrangements, etc., to work unless you have a very robust western reaction to what Mr. Putin is doing?

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

I think that depiction of Russia is a bit too extreme. I wouldn't characterize it quite that way. There is, of course, a lot of corruption and there is a certain element of criminality in certain aspects of Russian society, but to describe the whole system in that manner would be a vast oversimplification.

If we look at the broad trajectory of how Russian foreign policy has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly since the enlargement of the EU, we see there's been a consistent expression of certain types of concerns that have come out from the Russian leadership under both Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev, who many see as a somewhat more moderate leader. They're reflected in those three points that I addressed.

If you look at speeches going back, the 2007 Munich speech by Putin is often cited as a very clear expression of this, and it continues as themes that show a kind of logic and rationality to the way these issues are viewed in Russian policy circles. I think those concerns have to be taken seriously. That's not to condone the abuse of power that no doubt occurs in Russia, and the suppression of some elements of civil society, particularly those that are critical of the basic structure of power. But if we want to avoid the other risks I was talking about, which are the risks of escalation into a paradigm that is even worse than the Cold War because it's more unpredictable and it doesn't have the same structures of balance we had then, we have to—

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Isn't the flaw in your analysis that in order for Russia to, if you will, stabilize its borders, it has to expand? This was a kind of Catherine the Great approach to Russia, that it actually has to keep encroaching on its neighbours in order to stabilize, if you will, the inner Russia. There's the inner Russia, and then there's the outer Russia. As long as you're pushing the borders on the outer Russia, destabilizing the rest of that part of the world, that's the only logic that makes any kind of sense to Putin or anyone who might succeed Putin.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

I wouldn't say it's an imperialist strategy in that sense. I think Russia wishes to have a sphere of influence, a sphere around it where it has a certain level of significant influence. That's not unique to Russia. Historically in other large countries, this has been a fairly common desire, for reasons of security. In the Russian case, it also is augmented by the sense of loss of, you could call it, empire, or the loss of superpower status, which requires some time to adapt to. This is true of many empires, actually. Adapting to the loss of empire is something that requires some time. The desire to have influence in the neighbourhood is not equated, in my mind, to a simple expansionist imperialist scenario.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

This is a desire to have influence. Doesn't that inevitably lead to destabilization? The Baltic states are worried sick that they're next, and it makes perfectly good sense given their history, given the attitude of the Kremlin that inevitably the expansion of the Russian sphere of influence means them.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

We have an alliance with the Baltic states, and with Poland. I think we should definitely support that alliance and the security guarantees that are provided, and that's being done. I would totally support that position.

I think it's unlikely that there would be an overt attack on those countries. I think the greater danger would be of domestic division. That's why I recommended in my first intermediary point that it's important for us to pay attention not only to sending our support mission to Latvia in a military sense but also, if it's desired on the part of those countries, to engage in thinking together about how minorities can be better integrated. Because really that's the key to internal stabilization, integrating your own population and building loyalty among your own population, including the Russian minority.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

I think your point about hybrid warfare is right on. The key ethnic group is the Russians in the eastern part of those Baltic countries.

Before my fearless leader here cuts me off—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Very quickly, please.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

You didn't raise any issue with respect to the role of the Russian Orthodox church vis-à-vis the Ukrainian Orthodox church. I'd be interested in your thoughts on that.

[Prof. Joan DeBardeleben]

I don't have any particular thought about that issue. It's not something I really looked into, so rather than make a comment based on an impression I won't answer that question.

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. McKay.

It is now over to you, Ms. Laverdière.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you.

First off, Mr. Chair, I feel compelled to acknowledge the arrival of a second woman on the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Welcome, Ms. Mendès.

[Alexandra Mendes, Liberal, Brossard—Saint-Lambert, QC]

Thank you.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

I am delighted to have you join us. Little by little, we'll get there.

Secondly, thank you, Ms. DeBardeleben, for that excellent presentation. I was fascinated by what you told us. It was extremely informative.

I share two points of view with you. First, by expanding our military presence, we risk an endless escalation, which will never lead to a solution. Second, it is necessary to work with our partners in the EU. We may be a bit too focused on what is happening south of the border right now, so we are probably not paying enough attention to key partners such as the European Union. That worries me.

You indicated that it would be advisable to work with the European Union. Perhaps our new ambassador could forget about Germany and devote all his time to the EU. The idea would be to work with the EU and OSCE on reviewing the security structure.

Could you elaborate on that for us?