Professor, you raised something very interesting. You talked about Russia trying to seek markets, and you also mentioned the One Belt, One Road and central Asia. We know that the One Belt, One Road goes through three central Asian cities. You talked about rapprochement with Hungary, and I would say that even the Visegrad nations are now tilting in that direction. Let's talk about realpolitik and bring it down to the economic point.
The GDP of Russia right now is equivalent to that of New York. You talked about trade and partnering, and you talked about central Asia and other countries. But the trade and partnering they're doing is not with rich countries, not with stable countries. To some extent, these countries may not have the ability to pay for and buy Russian goods, whether it be oil or gas.
If we take a step back and go back 15 years, do you not believe that it was a miscalculation on Russia's part, because Russia feared NATO more than the insurgents of the European Union, that they didn't really think,“Well, okay, let these countries become part of the European Union. That's not important for us, the economic argument. The more important thing is the military argument”?
Now, as you mentioned, it's a revisionist history. Now they're going back and suggesting to hold on for a second. Now they're part of the European Union, and a lot of these Baltic states, from what I understand, are tilting their purchasing power and their economy towards Europe, whether it be electricity, natural gas, or oil. I don't know how Russia is going to survive, when the Baltics and other countries—the satellite states, or whatever you want to call them—are now titling their focus because either they are fearful and want to join the European Union, or they want to improve their own economies. How does Russia maintain that, when its own economy is not that stable?