I would say that education, integration, and media all have a very important role to play in this. I would say the Baltic countries to varying degrees have worked harder or less hard to actually integrate these communities and trust them more and less. The less they're trusted and the less they're integrated the more they will turn to Russian sources of information and Russian media because they don't have domestic sources of media and information.
This said, a lot of these folks travel to Russia or they have family in Russia that they talk to. They know what it's like to live in Russia and they know what it's like to live in Europe. They understand at some level that they are better off. I am very hesitant about parallels between Ukraine and the Baltics as these are very different cases, but I would say that an interesting thing about what's happening in eastern Ukraine is that in places like Kharkiv a lot of the population that had thought of itself as Russian now thinks of itself as Ukrainian as a result of all these events. Maybe early on in the crisis, back in 2014, they thought maybe it wouldn't be so bad if they had closer ties with Russia as a lot of their economic prosperity, they felt, was dependent on the Russians, but this has shifted. It's shifted because of Russian policy, not because of very much of anything Ukraine has done other than fight back.
I think it's a mistake to view ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries as a fifth column. I think it is very important to continue with programs of integration and outreach. It's also important to look at this generationally. If younger or urban people tend to be more integrated then I worry less than I do if I see real moves towards affinity and idealization of Russia among the younger generation. Again, this varies from country to country. The Baltics are also not a monolith. It's incumbent on those governments to do more to integrate those populations.