Foreign Affairs Committee on March 21st, 2017

[The Chair (Hon. Robert Nault (Kenora, Lib.)), Liberal, Bob Nault]

We are proceeding now with our discussion on a notice of motion presented by Mr. Kmiec. I want Tom to present his notice of motion, read it out for the committee, and then give us his analysis—if he so wishes. Then we will get into a discussion, and, as is normal, we will direct through the committee from the chair where we'll go with it.

Tom, the floor is yours.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm just going to read the motion. It states:

That, pursuant to standing orders 110 and 111, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development invite the Honourable Stéphane Dion and the Honourable John McCallum to appear before the Committee to discuss their Order in Council appointments before May 15th, the last day prescribed by the Standing Orders for the Committee to consider these appointments.

I got this information—as you all did—by the order in council from Foreign Affairs, and I got an email sent to me February 28, 2017. It reads:

...the Committee may consider an Order in Council appointment during a period not to exceed thirty sitting days following the tabling date in order to examine the qualifications and competence of the appointee to perform the duties of the post to which he or she has been appointed.

I also have copies of the orders in council in question that appointed them as, I believe, special advisers to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and not as full ambassadors.

I'm interested in moving this motion, obviously, and in having them appear before the committee because I'd like to know how they see their roles developing going forward. China is not normally a destination for politically connected ambassadors or special advisers, and there is no G7 country that has ever split an appointment with another G7 country. I'm interested in hearing from them how they see their roles and what they bring to the roles, particularly because of this reality that in the European context, it has never happened that we've split the roles in two. We don't do that with G7 countries.

There have also been media reports saying that there would be a second order in council appointing them as full ambassadors later on, so I'm wondering what they are doing in the interim. There have been other media reports saying that they are getting either diplomatic training or something called “other advisory capacities”.

I'm also interested in finding out how they use their qualifications and competence to fulfill their roles as special advisers, as opposed to ambassadors, I guess.

I've looked at other order in council appointments that Foreign Affairs has done for other ambassadors, and I haven't found anything similar to what has been done in the case of Mr. McCallum and Mr. Dion. I'm interested in understanding what their roles have been thus far, what kinds of qualifications they've brought to those roles, what exactly they received in terms of training, and how that set them up for the roles they're going to have in the future.

It's very simple. I'm just taking the opportunity. We have the chance to do it as a committee, and I think it would be very valuable to bring them before us to hear from them on how they see their roles and the qualifications they bring.

It's really just that simple.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Just for information's sake, Mr. McCallum has now had his credentials approved, so he is an ambassador. I understand that Mr. Dion should probably be in the same category within a week. There is still, obviously, merit to a discussion of the structure. I know what the structure is, but I'd rather not get into that with you today.

All that to say, generally—and Mr. Kent knows this very well—when you appoint someone who's already a public servant, there is no need to have him be a special adviser or anything of that nature. When you retire as a member of Parliament, there's a gap in your employment, and if you want to give these individuals documents that are considered to be of a security nature, you have to give them an order in council that allows them to look at them. That's the rationale for that, just so you know, and that's what they'll tell you, because that's exactly the way it works. That's why cabinet had to present their certification as they waited to become full ambassadors.

The other piece of information, just to inform the discussion, is that Mr. McCallum is already in China. What I want to consider, if we do call these gentlemen forward, is that we do it through video conferencing. Otherwise, it would be a very expensive matter to bring Mr. McCallum back from China, which we have the right to request, as you well know. I wanted to bring that to your attention as we have this discussion.

Is there any further discussion?

Peter.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Mr. Chair, it's my understanding that such matters are usually dealt with in the agenda and procedure subcommittee. At least, I would propose that idea.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

There are two ways to do this. We can vote yea or nay to the request, or we can send it to our subcommittee, have a discussion about the parameters of how we want to do this, and then come back with a recommendation to the full committee. It's either-or.

As you know, I've been suggesting to our committee from day one that when we get notices of motion, we get a chance to have a little bit of a subcommittee discussion in camera, because these are always not in camera, to make sure that everybody's on the same page. It's up to you as a committee to decide how you want to do that.

We have on occasion—and Hélène's was a good example of that—dealt with her request of a notice of motion to have a study right here in full committee, so it's not like it doesn't happen.

Hélène.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

I would bring up a point regarding what Mr. Fragiskatos just said.

I remember that, in my previous life, people appointed as ambassadors, for example, were called to appear before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development. It strikes me as the most relevant committee for these types of things, since we talk about foreign policy and our representatives abroad.

In general, I support the motion moved by my colleague. If the former minister McCallum is already in China and if he did indeed receive his credentials, I imagine that we should proceed on the basis of the other order, namely, the order appointing him as ambassador, rather than the order appointing him as special advisor. I think that, in both cases, it can work.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Hélène, I'm not sure I'm following you. You want to proceed on the order in council that was a special adviser versus.... That's the way the motion reads, no? It just doesn't say that at all, so really, you can pursue that in your questioning of Mr. McCallum and Mr. Dion.

For the sake of the committee, I'll give you my own personal view as the chair and as a parliamentarian. This committee should take the opportunity with high-profile appointments of the government, no matter who's in power, to proceed with some questions to them. I have no difficulty supporting the idea that both Mr. McCallum and Mr. Dion should come before the committee. They're very seasoned veterans who know their way around and have been in front of committees many times over the last two decades, so I really don't see that as an issue.

I want to make sure that we have support for the idea of video conferencing, because it's pretty hard to expect Mr. McCallum to come all the way back to Canada when he just got to China. If we agree with that, if my colleagues agree with that, we could put out the invitation and proceed with the motion, unless there's some other reason. Before we even get to having them in front of the committee, I suspect Mr. Dion will be an ambassador as well, and he'll be able to speak to the structure. I know what the structure is, but for the record, it will be up to him to tell you how that all works.

Peter, do you have some comments?

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Just to clarify, when I said that the matter should be referred to agenda and procedure, I'm not talking about the discussions being in agenda and procedure. I'm saying that the matter should be dealt with, this particular matter should be looked at, in agenda and procedure, and discussed there. That's my view on that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

You're referring to our subcommittee, right?

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

The subcommittee, yes, exactly.

Is there a view on that? If not, if we're insistent on discussing it here, of course, we ought to speak to Mr. McCallum and Mr. Dion. Both individuals have CVs that would fill up this room, quite frankly, in terms of their achievements, and we would like to get a sense of the direction that they wish to go in their posts. However, prescribing a date is problematic, from my perspective, because we as a committee have so much on the agenda coming up. I'm not opposed at all, once again, to having them come in, but by a certain date is problematic.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Yes. Again I'll go back to what we said earlier. The date is prescribed by standing order, so we would have to set some business aside to deal with it, Peter. That's the standing order, that's the procedure, and we have no way around that. The only way we go around that is if we defeat the motion. Otherwise, we will have a meeting within the prescribed 30 days. That's for your information.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

In a committee that just approved a controversial report unanimously, I wonder if we could work together to deal with the matter in the following way. Rather than setting a firm date, recognizing again all the work that we need to do in the coming weeks and months, could we not agree by consensus that Mr. Dion and Mr. McCallum appear at some point in the near future rather than putting in place a firm date?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thanks, Peter, for your comments.

Peter.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Chair, I think referring it to subcommittee is a waste of time. The window is short, the practice is traditional that a request would go out and the committee within that window of availability would probably accept the time most convenient for the two individuals, but I think we should have a vote today. This is a practice that we haven't taken up in the first 18 months of this government, but it is a fairly routine practice and the standing orders are there for us to take advantage of them. I think with these two significant appointments, there is much to be learned. If Germany has issued this agrément for Mr. Dion, he will be an ambassador by then. That's what they're waiting on: is Germany saying they'll accept it?

But one way or the other, I think we should examine and explore their vision for the jobs to which they've been appointed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Just for the committee's information, May 9 is available, and the whole first week of May may be available if we don't travel, so we have enough time to give our colleagues a heads-up, and we could easily set it up. Generally, I think it's an hour at max and I think that fits.

Okay, I think we've had a pretty good discussion. Tom, are you going to wrap it up, or Hélène? Then we're going to go to a vote.

Hélène first, please.

[Hélène Laverdière, NDP, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

I just want to specify, for the record, that we think all the motions should be discussed in public.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

They always are.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

You said what I was going to say. If we don't travel to the United States, then we have extra committee time. As you said, they are seasoned politicians. I remember Mr. Dion used to live in Quebec, and I survived the 1995 referendum. I remember him being on TV all the time, so he's not just a seasoned politician but he's just great at debates, he understands how life works, and he brings a wealth of experience. If we're going to be travelling to other countries in the future and doing other committee reports, these are two individuals who have a wealth of both public and private sector experience. I think they bring a lot of interesting viewpoints that the committee could gain from.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Okay.

I think we've had a good discussion. I'm going to present the motion and then we'll vote with the objective of meeting the requirements under the Standing Orders.

The motion reads:

That, pursuant to standing orders 110 and 111, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development invite the Honourable Stéphane Dion and the Honourable John McCallum to appear before the Committee to discuss their Order in Council appointments before May 15th, the last day prescribed by the Standing Orders for the Committee to consider these appointments.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Mr. Chair, can we have a recorded vote on that?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Okay, but we may not need one. We'll see how it goes.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Can we have one?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Yes, we can.

(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

All right. It's unanimous. We will follow through. Thanks for that discussion.

Now we'll take a couple of minutes and set up for our next witness. We'll suspend for five.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Colleagues, we'll carry on with our study.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying the situation in eastern Europe and central Asia 25 years after the end of the Cold War. Our witness today, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is Olga Oliker, senior adviser and director of the Russia and Eurasia program. Ms. Oliker is on video conference out of Washington.

Thank you for appearing today, and for your patience.

As is normal, colleagues, I will turn the floor over to our witness and give her an opportunity to make a presentation. Then we'll go right to questions.

Ms. Oliker, the floor is yours.

[Olga Oliker, Senior Adviser and Director, Russia and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies]

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and honourable members of the committee, for having me here.

With I think seven minutes at my disposal, I will focus my remarks on Russia and Ukraine, where I've recently travelled, but I'm happy to take broader questions.

I will start with Russia. In a global sense, I would say that Russian foreign policy has long been one of seeking prestige, prestige being seen as a valuable asset in and of itself, one that provides the influence and capacity to attain goals, even before those goals have been made clear.

That said, in the region in question, that of the other post-Soviet states, Russia's goals have long been quite clear. Russia has always had a proprietary view of these countries, which were part and parcel of the Russian empire before the Soviet Union came along. Unlike the countries of the Warsaw Pact, such as Poland and Romania, these countries, or these regions at the time, were integrated into the U.S.S.R. and ruled from Moscow. The Baltic countries are a somewhat different issue, which we can discuss.

Over the 25 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the so-called west have seen themselves as working together to, among other things, spread liberal democracy into the countries that used be part of the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact. While there was debate about the enlargement of NATO and the European Union, among the strongest arguments for the acceptance of new members into the institutions was the view that it would incentivize the reforms that in turn would enable these countries to free their polities and their economies.

This was seen as good for the states in question, which at least in principle wanted reforms but had a difficult time implementing them for political reasons. It was seen as good for the west and good for the world, in part because it was believed by many that it would increase peace and stability, based in large part on the hypothesis that democratic states are less likely to go to war with one another.

Russia, initially a comparatively willing participant in these processes, soon came to see them as antagonistic, aimed at limiting Moscow's influence in its neighbourhood, and thus limiting the very prestige it felt it was due. While the Kremlin accepted what it saw as the loss of the former Warsaw Pact states, and even the Baltics, it remained neuralgic about the other post-Soviet countries, which Dmitry Medvedev, now the Prime Minister and then the president, described as being in the zone of privileged interests for Moscow in 2008, at the time of Russia's war with Georgia.

Ukraine, in that context, has always been a particularly tendentious case. For many in Russia, the idea of an independent Ukraine is confusing at best. The similarities between the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the very limited historical experience of Ukrainian independence, and the closeness of the two populations over the years have fed a consistent Russian narrative of Ukraine as part of Russia. I would note that even Russian liberals, who speak out against the annexation of Crimea, see Ukraine as a model of what can be done in Russia by people who are basically, in their eyes, just like Russians.

Russia's actions of 2014 seem to many outside that country as highly disproportionate to any risk that the EU association agreement plans that sparked the crisis really presented. In turn, both the western and Ukrainian responses surprised Russia, and I believe constrained it, in that the Kremlin was forced to recognize the limits of any natural influence it felt it had over Ukraine and recognize the prospect of substantial resistance, as well as increased international pressure, should it push too far.

At the same time, Russia soon found benefits to the standoff that emerged with the United States. These took the form of increased global prestige and a bit of a “gloves off” environment for taking other actions, from Syria to election meddling, one presented as standing up to the United States. Some of this might have happened anyway, but I think a good bit probably would not have.

I would say that today the mood in Russia is one of increasingly cautious optimism. While most in Russia did not actually expect the election of Donald Trump, his statements of support for Vladimir Putin did play very well with the Russian media and public, and indeed outside of Russia in some of the other post-Soviet countries where the Russian media is prevalent.

The expert community, for its part, is concerned about the lack of a clear policy from the White House, and speculates that any honeymoons between Trump and Putin will be brief. This said, many specialists remain hopeful of rapprochement, though whether the Kremlin thinks that is in its interests or not, and under what conditions, remain quite unclear.

On a visit to Moscow last October and November, most Russians I spoke with saw the eastern Ukrainian adventure as a mistake. More recently, this past February, just about a month ago, I heard very little discussion of the situation in Ukraine and far more speculation about U.S. policy writ large. That's not a surprise.

As fighting in Avdiivka broke out just as I was in Russia, Russians speculated that Ukrainians had started it and were seeking attention. In Ukraine, where I was shortly after I was in Moscow, there was again, not surprisingly, a very different narrative. In regard to Avdiivka, Ukrainians emphasized the rapid and effective humanitarian response that they put together for the crisis as well as Russian perfidy.

Ukrainians are also speculating on what a Trump presidency in the United States means for them and remain very nervous about possible deals with Russia, but Ukraine is facing substantial challenges at home. Several Ukrainian and western officials spoke of “reform fatigue” and noted that, while some rapid and effective changes had been possible when the crisis was new, vested interests were now precluding the implementation of key components of economic, security sector, and energy reforms, from gas metering to delineating the roles and responsibilities of Ukraine's domestic intelligence security agency, the SBU.

Less reformist movements in parties are gaining in popularity, and the failure of the EU to grant Ukraine a promised visa-free travel regime has fed growing frustration. While few publicly argue that the occupied portions of the Donbas aren't worth fighting for, the recent resolution of the blockade of trains travelling to and from those territories with coal speaks to the conflicted attitude of Ukrainians as the crisis goes into its third or fourth year. After refusing protestors' demands for weeks, the government abruptly switched the position, decided to take their side, and cut off trade with the occupied territories. This is particularly interesting in light of its failure to give in to other protester demands, such as progress on reforms.

I would say Ukraine's history over the last quarter century is a repetitive one, as a genuine commitment to and impetus for reform run aground on corruption and cynicism. This has happened multiple times in every sphere of governance, leaving many who work with the Ukrainians to burn out, then creating room for those who haven't had that experience of disappointment to repeat their efforts.

It's also what brought us to where we are today. If reform had been more successful previously, the current crisis would not have taken place. Ukraine needs reform regardless of western policy, but insofar as the west wants to help, I'd argue that the answers lie in conditionality and informed assistance, which I can speak to more in questions and answers. I would say that, for all the importance of Ukraine's success, not least what message it sends to Russia, trying to prop up a Ukraine that is not viable or not doing its part is perhaps one of the worst and most dangerous ways forward.

I think I've taken the time allotted to me, and I'm happy to take questions and have a conversation.