Foreign Affairs Committee on March 21st, 2017

[Olga Oliker]

I think we make a mistake if we blame the Russians for exploiting our weaknesses. Our problem is the weakness, not the Russian exploitation of the weakness.

Speaking as an American, let me say that if we have a system that can be so easily.... Look, I don't think the Russians got Donald Trump elected in the United States. I think the Americans got Donald Trump elected in the United States. The Russians were extremely pleased and we can find evidence of Russian interference, but that's different from saying that Russian interference did this. I think that's an important line to draw.

The danger is that the Russians may think they were responsible and, therefore, can do it elsewhere and will become emboldened and do more. I don't know that this makes them more effective. I do know that it worsens prospects for getting on with any sort of better relationship between east and west.

I also think that we face a crisis of liberal democracy. We face opposition to it at home. We face uncertainty about it in Europe, in the United States, and I think actually to a lesser extent among you all in Canada. You and the Germans may be left with the best chance. We'll all be moving.

I think there is a challenge for those who believe in it to defend it and to sell it better. I've been very impressed by American civil society and by America's courts in utilizing the institutions. It is about utilizing the institutions to defend them—utilizing the freedoms, utilizing the balances of power.

I also think it is about strengthening the media, as both a variety of voices and as a check and balance in and of itself—you know, the “fourth estate” model. We still have much to do to figure out how this works in the information age. I don't claim to have good answers to that.

Again, I still think that Russia isn't a problem. Russia is exploiting the problem.

[Michael Levitt, Liberal, York Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Levitt.

Mr. Kmiec.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

I'm glad the questioning went in that direction, talking about the weaknesses that the Russian government is exploiting.

I want to refer to a European Commission survey, the Special Eurobarometer 451 on the future of Europe. Many countries in central and eastern Europe, such as Croatia, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Poland—all those populations—see, according to the survey, anyway, their number one issue as the standard of living of EU citizens. They had choices, such as the good relationship between EU member states, and economic and industrial trading power. Their focus was on living standards in eastern Europe and central Europe. When you look further into it, the study talks about the number one issue identified by these populations. The majority of the states, 16 out of 28, said that unemployment is the number one issue. Only one said that terrorism and security issues were their primary concern, and that was the Netherlands.

Can you comment on this weakness that we see? The polling that even the European Commission does indicates that people's primary focus, even in countries much closer to the conflict along the borders with the Russian Federation, is the economy and their personal individual situation. Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, people are still, even in those regions very close to the conflict, focused on “my living standard”, “my family”, and how they can improve their personal livelihood. Can you comment on that?

Is it true, then, that the weakness is economic? If it is economic, in which parts of the economy is the continuing weakness? As you've mentioned, it's not as if the Russian Federation is offering a really high living standard comparable to what the European Union can or may be able to provide.

[Olga Oliker]

That's a great point. I think the perceptions and the actuality of economic difficulties do tend to be a breeding ground for various forms of populism, those kinds of easy answers. That's why these sorts of parties are growing in strength in Ukraine. That's why there is an appeal of these sorts of solutions in the United States, and obviously in Europe. There are people who come and say....

There are different kinds of easy answers. The problem with all of them is that they don't actually answer the question. They don't solve the problem, and the problem is that even when you have economic growth year on year, if you look at it over time, people are living worse than prior generations did. People's buying power has gone down, though not in all places. Eastern Europe is different, because prior generations lived under communism, so they've had only 25 years of this new liberal democracy. It's an interesting question to ask how those expectations are different from, say, expectations in the Netherlands, which has a different economic history.

Economics is not my primary area of expertise. I am a political scientist. I think that many of us have served our populations poorly in this context. Globalization does have its costs, and they have not been addressed to the extent that perhaps they should have been. I'm probably going to lean towards one set of solutions, and other people will lean towards others. I think that in democratic systems it is a matter of public policy to fight that out and to try to find ways to support those who feel hurt by economic downturns, and ensure that bolstering them does not in turn weaken others. It's not a matter of propping up the previously privileged in the face of the newly privileged, but a matter of rising tides that lift all boats.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Can I just interrupt you for a second? While you were speaking, you gave me a question to ask you.

The same survey, further down, talks about something you mentioned. Fifty-six per cent believe that their children's generation will have a worse future than they did. That's true for people in eastern, central, and western Europe. It's almost a constant. Is it the same case in Russia? Do Russian parents believe their children's generation will be worse off?

You said their capacity for hardship is perhaps higher than that in Europe. They are able to sustain that for longer, or there is a perception that they may be able to do so. In the Russian context, do they believe that their current government will lead them to a better economic future, with less unemployment, less social inequity, and fewer migration issues?

[Olga Oliker]

That's a fantastic question. I'm not sure that I've seen good polling. First of all, it's hard to do good polling in Russia, for a lot of reasons. I will go and check to see whether anyone is asking that question of Russians and what kinds of answers they get.

My guess is that most Russians don't think their children will live better than they do. That would be my first guess. Whether they think their children are going to live worse, I don't know. I also think that the expectation of each generation living better doesn't exist in Russia in the way that it does in the west.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Kmiec.

Mr. Saini, go ahead, please.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

I just have one final question.

A lot of western scholars and analysts have said that the nuclear strategy of Russia is one of “escalating to de-escalate” and that there is an attempt to lower the nuclear threshold.

I know that you have differing views on this, but I'm just wondering what you think, in the context of the higher defence spending in the United States right now. Even in the national nuclear strategy that Russia produced in 2015, its policy toward a nuclear strategy was, you had written, stronger than it had been in the past. I'm just wondering, with the highlights of what the western analysts are saying and against the background of higher U.S. defence spending, what do you feel the future of the Russian nuclear strategy is?

[Olga Oliker]

Russia doesn't want to rely on its nuclear weapons entirely for deterrence. As I said, they kept the threshold for nuclear use in their official doctrine high. Nuclear use is only allowable in case of a threat to the existence of the state—an existential threat to Russia. We can argue about what that might mean.

Other people argue that Russia does allow for small-scale nuclear use. They tend to draw on things that were written in the late nineties, which is the point where Russian doctrine did come to allow for small-scale nuclear use. They draw on Russia's deployment of dual-use capabilities, of systems that you can put either a nuclear or conventional weapon on, and a certain tendency on the part of the Russian government to talk that up.

I argue that the Russian government starts talking those things up only after western pundits and officials start publicly worrying about it. I would say that what the Russians are doing is identifying things that make westerners nervous and poking at them.

I think Russia is going to keep brandishing its nuclear capability because it makes the west nervous and because it reminds everybody that Russia is one of the great nuclear powers. I think they would prefer to build up their conventional capabilities. Most of the money is going to go to their conventional capabilities.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

To follow up on that, if they're touting the superiority or the provision of their nuclear weapons systems, is that not fundamentally subsuming or diminishing what their conventional strategy is capable of?

[Olga Oliker]

They're not touting their superiority. They're just quietly pointing out that by the way they're a nuclear power, and “Look at these systems”.They talk about their systems capacities to defeat missile defences. Well, of course, their systems are capable of defeating missile defences. The missile defences don't exist to defeat their systems. I mean, existing missile defences can't defeat any currently existing systems. They talk about new technologies, but that's for things in the future. They talk about modernization, but so does the United States.

A lot of it is about reminding everyone that Russia is a nuclear power, and some of it comes from a fear of western conventional capabilities. They do continue to see NATO conventional capabilities as head and shoulders above anything they have. They get nervous about it, and then they point out that they have nuclear weapons too.

[Raj Saini, Liberal, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you, Mr. Saini.

Mr. Sidhu, please.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Oliker, for your testimony.

My question would be toward the security and the safety issue in that region. Do you think the Islamic State and other terrorist groups are active in that region? If they are, how serious is it to security, or do you think that the governments in that region are using that to increase security on their borders?

[Olga Oliker]

It's a little different in different parts of the region.

The Islamic State, Daesh, is in Russia. There was a local group, the Caucasus Emirate, that was very active for a number of years. They fell apart recently, in part due to Russian government pressure, in part due to internal pressure. Daesh has pretty much picked up their goal, and they are definitely the violent radical Islamist game in town in Russia, although other groups also come and go.

In central Asia, the affiliations aren't as clear. I think what's interesting about central Asia is that a decent number of the folks who end up radicalized and potentially going to Syria do it by first migrating as labour migrants to Russia and then becoming radicalized in Russia.

I think all of these countries play up the threat and indeed perceive the threat as greater than it actually is. If you dig into it, we're talking about really small numbers of people. They do carry out the occasional attack. You can also get, particularly in Russia—the case that I know best—situations where things are termed radical Islamist violent attacks when in fact they might be something else, because it's an easy way to make sure you get rid of these folks.

The problem is there. The problem is probably smaller than it appears to officials, and it's smaller than it's built up to be. I think in some ways that actually helps it to grow, because when you crack down on every observant Muslim, you might then force more people into more radical and potentially more violent tendencies than they might have had if they were allowed to worship peacefully.

[Jati Sidhu, Liberal, Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much, Mr. Sidhu.

Ms. Oliker, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you very much. We could probably spend another hour on this. I'm very interested in the Russian communication structure and machine. They intend to do a very good job of convincing us that there is a crisis. I found your comments to be quite helpful in our study of the relationship between Russia and its influence around the eastern bloc in particular. On behalf of the committee, I want to thank you for your presentation today.

[Olga Oliker]

Thank you for having me. If there are follow-up questions, or things I could provide more detail on, please let me know and I'll do my best.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bob Nault]

Thank you very much, Ms. Oliker.

Colleagues, in wrapping up I want to remind you that on Thursday we will have the Ukrainian Canadian Congress with two witnesses. In the latter part of our meeting on Thursday, we'll have the Latvian minister of foreign affairs who will be coming before the committee to speak to us about his views on Latvia. If there is any time left, we'll talk a little bit about our future business as I mentioned to you at the beginning of the meeting today.

Thank you very much for a job well done on our report. I'm looking forward to it being tabled in the House in early April.

This meeting is adjourned.