No, sir.
That is more important to them than the fact that when they open their fridge, it's not as full as it was around 2007 or 2008 and they don't see the prospect of it filling up any time soon.
The wild card now, I would suggest, which everyone who follows Russia will be following closely going forward, and which I don't have a definitive answer to right now—no one does, I think—is indeed the meaning and the longer-term legacy of the protests that we just saw. This really is arguably.... Specifically, when you drill down and compare this round to the last one, the last time we saw big protests in Russia was in 2011-12, and a lot of the untoward turns we have seen in Putin's approaches, both domestically and internationally, stemmed from his approach to those initial 2011-12 protests.
Whereas that phenomenon in 2011-12 was very much a phenomenon of the disappointed middle classes who had benefited from the first 10 years of Putinism—I'm being simplistic here—and were disappointed that the economic gains they had been reaping...because growth had been very good, with oil high and what have you, for that first decade of Putin's rule. They were disappointed with his brazen decision in 2011 that Medvedev—no suspense—wasn't going to run for president but that he was going to run for president again. That's what sparked these protests. It seemed that it was largely in Moscow and St. Petersburg, largely by middle-aged professionals—