I'll come to the Canadian part in a moment, but my answer to the hypothesis of China turning to soft power and the United States turning to hard power is that it's too early to say. That would be my gentle push-back.
I think that going back to my remarks on what “America first” means, we don't really know how much hard power versus soft power the U.S. is going to use, because they haven't filled out what “America first” means.
Likewise, China has embarked upon the ventures that you have mentioned—the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the one belt, one road policy—as well as many others in Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America. Particularly on the economic development side, I think it's debatable whether those programs are soft power. They come with a lot of money and not many conditions. I suppose the outcome is intended to be the same, but the overall sense of what last week was certainly considered to be the most important bilateral relationship in the world, that of the United States and China, I think, is that it's a work in progress.
To come to the second part of your question, how Canada fits in, a lot of people in our building spend a lot of time thinking about it. Obviously the world is changing in ways that, frankly, were not fully anticipated before the election of President Trump, and we're having to think through, both long term and on a daily basis, where Canada's interests fall. It is certainly with respect to that key relationship that you mentioned—the U.S. and China—but it is very much as well on the commercial side, in free trade agreements, and on the strategic side, in where Canada's interests fall, given the rapidly changing dynamic in the Middle East.
It feels like a moment in international relations, and when you reach those moments you have to look at all potential scenarios.