Thank you very much for the question. It's actually a good segue back to respond to your question on the risk management frameworks, if I may.
As with any regulatory program, we have relatively limited resources for the number of permits and applications we have to assess. The government makes decisions on export permits based on broad assessments of the likelihood of risks being realized in certain jurisdictions. We also have to keep in mind that the nature of the Canadian defence and security industry is that in Canada, we primarily manufacture parts and components. We are integrated into global supply chains of other major prime contractors, which we call “original equipment manufacturers”, all over the world.
Take NATO as an example. Some of you have referred to the export controls website. We outline there that we have certain countries that by policy we consider “open policy” countries. We assess those countries based on their export control regimes and their approach to how they assess their exports. The Canadian part or component going to a NATO country, for example, has a different level of scrutiny attached to it than a Canadian export that would be going directly to, for example, a country at risk or in conflict, such as in Africa or elsewhere.
Similarly, with our exports to the United States, we have assessed the risks that could be posed by particular exports to the U.S.—to NATO, to Australia, to Japan, and others—and we've assessed those risks as fairly low given the nature of their export regimes and the requirement for onward permits from those jurisdictions to then go to third countries.