Thank you very much for the invitation.
In terms of my own credentials with respect to Asia-Pacific, I've had five postings to the region, including as ambassador to Vietnam and to North and South Korea concurrently. Somewhere in-between, I was also the director for Southeast Asia. With respect to security issues, I was the ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, dealing with refugees, human rights, humanitarian relief, and the entire gamut that Stewart referred to. Also, I was the ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. My last assignment before retiring was to the Department of National Defence, as the director general for international security policy.
With the eight minutes allotted to me, I'd just like to make a few observations regarding Canada's engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. Your goal is to identify areas where Canada can deepen its engagement in the region, and that's a good goal. Ensuring that Canada's engagement is coherent and consistent is the big challenge, and I note that the last extensive foreign policy review of Canada and Asia-Pacific was done by the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs back in 1998. It was called “The importance of the Asia Pacific region for Canada”. The Senate also did an update on Southeast Asia in 2015. They are still good documents to read.
My first observation is in the global context, where I believe that there is a new great game being played out between an ascendant China and a United States in retreat. I would argue that the U.S. and now China are Canada's two most important bilateral relationships—for different reasons, but they are the top two in my eyes. However, Canada must be prepared for more global turbulence as these two powers compete in trade, hard power, and soft power in order to establish what could be a new modus vivendi between them, or even perhaps a new global order. In this new great game, China is being assisted by its junior partner, Russia.
Since your visit to Beijing, Xi Jinping, of course, has enacted constitutional amendments, a very important one, and as The Economist put it recently, “China stepped from autocracy into dictatorship”.
My second observation is about the Asian paradox. It refers to the ironic situation whereby, despite Asia's growing economic interdependence, the level of political and security co-operation there remains low. Despite incentives for even greater prosperity within a predictable and peaceful environment, the potential military conflict can certainly jeopardize Asia's economic successes, with global implications. You're well aware of the security issues: South China Sea, the East China Sea, India, Pakistan, and Taiwan. Perhaps most pressing right now is North Korea.
Canadian trade commercial interests remain at the top of the Asia-Pacific foreign policy agenda, but I believe there is a need to pay attention to Asia's security dimension, and for Canada to contribute to a robust Asia-Pacific security architecture, if only out of self-interest. Singapore's defence minister just talked about the security architecture yesterday at an ASEAN conference.
Of course, I would suggest that Canada's contribution would be regularly showing the flag in the region, regular high-level political-military talks, and perhaps resuscitating Canada's role in track two discussions, where Canada was front and centre in the 1990s and early 2000s. Certainly Canada can also play a role in terms of the human rights dimension, whether we're talking North Korea, the Rohingya, China writ large, or about extrajudicial killings in the Phillippines.
My third observation is on North Korea. You're aware that there's a frenzy of related summits about to take place in the next few months. Prime Minister Abe is meeting President Trump today, and North Korea is high on the agenda.
I am in the school that believes that Kim Jong-un will not negotiate away his nuclear weapons, and that there's not going to be a really fundamental change in the situation until China admits that North Korea is a strategic liability for China's global ambitions.
Canada has been, unfortunately, a marginal player on the North Korea file ever since the Harper government decided back in 2010 that it would have a short-sighted policy of “controlled engagement”. The Trudeau government has allowed that policy drift with respect to North Korea to continue even as the geopolitical landscape is rapidly changing but remains highly dangerous and unpredictable.
I understand that you will be going to Japan and South Korea next, both of whom are strategic partners for Canada. I think you will find the Japanese very wary of what is happening on the Korean peninsula, and perhaps the South Koreans overly optimistic. You may wish to ask both hosts if there is a role for Canada, but you will have to dig beyond the usual politesse to get some straight answers from both of your hosts.
One obvious starting point for Canada is for Canada's ambassador to Seoul to once again be cross-accredited to Pyongyang. You have to be there. You have to know what's going on. You can't rely on somebody else telling you what's going on.
My fourth observation is on Canada and ASEAN. You have already travelled to Indonesia. You met the secretary general of ASEAN. You know the history of Canada's dialogue partnerships in 1977 and our being one of the partners of the ASEAN Regional Forum. But when ASEAN inaugurated the first East Asia Summit back in 2005, Canada was not invited. When ASEAN decided to expand their defence ministers' meeting to include EAS members, again Canada was not there. Prime Minister Trudeau certainly asked, and almost pleaded, in Manila to join, but this has been a message from Canada for a long time. I believe ASEAN is not quite convinced of Canada's commitment to Southeast Asia, or to Asia for that matter, but our ASEAN friends, whom I know very well, I believe, are too polite to tell us.
Canada certainly must demonstrate a serious long-term track record of participation in ASEAN's strategic security problem priorities, but the Asian way requires frequent and consistent face time. Personal relations are very important.
Back in 1995, Foreign Minister André Ouellet actually consulted them. He invited all ASEAN foreign ministers to Vancouver in preparation for the G7 Halifax Summit. I thought that was a pretty good idea, but I don't think any Canadian G7 hosts subsequently, including for the G7 Summit coming up very shortly, have asked ASEAN its opinions.
One caveat, and Jim has mentioned it, is that ASEAN, I believe, is drifting further into a club of authoritarian regimes. In this context, it will be important, I believe, to strengthen relations with both Indonesia and Singapore.
As a last observation, and as my bottom line, I'll say that Canada is already a strong economic player in the Asia-Pacific region. It could certainly be stronger, but it's there. It has deep social, cultural, and historic roots there, but it must not really demonstrate a stronger, more-consistent commitment to Asia-Pacific stability and security. I think it is in Canada's interest to do so.
Thank you.