It's worth remembering that the RCEP was a Japanese idea, not a Chinese one. It's not necessarily a tool of Chinese hegemony. There's nothing necessarily inconsistent with RCEP and CPTPP or any other multilateral agreement, so it could be a good thing.
On the CPTPP by the way, I think that turned out to be a best-of-all-worlds story. President Trump stepping back meant that the other countries could go ahead and agree to take away all of the key provisions that provided asymmetrical benefits to the United States to the detriment of the other signatories, particularly on intellectual property and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. With luck, the United States will come back to the CPTPP on the revised terms. That would be the best of all possible worlds for Canada, and I think for the other members.
On the South China Sea and economic assets, there are hydrocarbon deposits in the South China Sea. Most of them are not exploitable because nobody will insure against the risks, in view of the maritime and territorial disputes. China is the only country that can socialize the insurance costs of exploration. China recently has been talking about joint development with Vietnam, another signal that perhaps it's willing to be much more moderate in its claims and its [Technical difficulty—Editor].
Also those hydrocarbon assets are going to be increasingly stranded as we try to decarbonize the global economy. I don't think they're a very big deal. What is a very big deal is the fisheries. The South China Sea has an extremely rich fishery, and all of the countries in the region depend upon it. That's something that has to be managed multilaterally. That fishery is already over-exploited, and I think China is beginning to appreciate that to play nice with the neighbours in the South China Sea is the most effective way to make sure there is a sustainable fishery in that sea, which people depend on for their livelihood.