Evidence of meeting #93 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was region.
A recording is available from Parliament.
5 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bob Nault
Thank you very much, Mr. Manicom. Thank you to the other two witnesses.
We're going to go right to Mr. Aboultaif, please. Ziad.
5 p.m.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
Thank you very much.
We have three high-calibre witnesses today. I think the topic is very rich, and I wish we had more time.
I will go to Mr. Manicom and, if there is enough time, to the other two witnesses with a question about the disputes in Southeast Asia and the South Asia sea, the expansion of China's islands—the artificial islands within the region—and the nine-dashed line and what that means to China, the international community, and the United Nations. That whole dispute is leaving a lot of unanswered questions about how far China will go in the region.
Specifically, when we think of that region, we think of Japan as the strongest country among all the countries involved in that basin out there, so here's the question. First of all, how would you describe the relationship between China and Japan? How far would China go in its expansion? What do you see in the future for the region and for the conflict?
Mr. Manicom, you've just mentioned that the presence of the United States there is quite crucial to maintaining such a balance of power between China and the rest of the countries out there.
Any participation from the three of you in the short time we have would be greatly appreciated.
5 p.m.
As an Individual
I'm just looking at the clock to see how long I have to answer this. There's a lot there.
The China-Japan relationship turns on a lot of things. They have a territorial dispute between the two of them. Japan, as a user of the South China Sea, is very worried about what the Chinese policy in the South China Sea is, but that relationship turns on a lot more, right? As a consequence of whatever the trade conflict is right now, you actually see China and Japan talking more closely about trade. Japan understands that a China-U.S. trade dispute is not good for them. It's a relationship that has a lot of baggage to it and a lot of security concerns, but both of those countries are capable of being very pragmatic in their bilateral relationship.
As for the South China Sea and where China will go, I think China's end game is a world where it can sail the South China Sea without the United States sailing through there freely—and that takes time. To date, no country of strength has pushed back against China's reclamation activities to make that harder for them to do.
I think part of the reason is that ultimately the South China Sea just isn't that important, frankly, to any country of strength. It's very important to the Southeast Asian countries. It's very important to Japan and the United States as a sea lane, but reclamation activities do not pose an existential threat to the United States—or at least American policy-makers do not accept that they do. I'm sure there are many who would argue that having a missile battery in the South China Sea within range of an aircraft carrier is a big threat, and it is, but the U.S. political elite does not seem to accept that it is an issue in the totality of the U.S.-China relationship. Also, accepting that progress in global climate change is part of that relationship, it hasn't seemed to date that it is an issue upon which they're going to let their relationship collapse, right?
I think China will continue to go as far as any country lets it, and even then, what do you do? If China is occupying an island that it claims as its own, trying to remove the Chinese forces would start a conflict.
5:05 p.m.
Conservative
5:05 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
First of all, I think the Chinese attitude right now is more or less that possession is nine-tenths of the law. Secondly, China has now proclaimed itself to be a maritime power. It is the world's largest exporter. It basically sees the South China Sea as its home waters as a maritime great power.
From the Chinese point of view, this is not an expansion: it is historical. We can take that seriously in the sense that, on the one hand, China is in some ways flouting UNCLOS on this. On the other hand, the nine-dashed line should be seen as a limit in terms of territorial disputes.
China certainly does have, and will have over the years, a further desire to be a maritime great power. Basically, the Chinese look at the world map and see that all the islands of the world in the oceans are now occupied by what were 19th century imperial powers: Britain, France, the United States in some cases, and a residual few for other colonial powers. China says that's simply not fair, that it is now a maritime power, and that the one place it can claim is this one.
In some sense, that's the explanation of the South China Sea and “why now”, but we should be aware of the fact that China does intend to be a maritime great power. It now has a base in Djibouti on the west coast of Africa. It is the first overseas Chinese base in history. I think that as the world's number one exporter, with the largest commercial fleet in the world, China is here to stay.
5:05 p.m.
CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs, As an Individual
I would like to say that I agree with virtually everything my colleagues have said today, except about the South China Sea. I see the South China Sea very differently. Most people have not noticed that since the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling came down in favour of the Philippines in 2016, China has abided by it to the letter. Even though it said it did not accept jurisdiction and did not recognize the outcome, China has been very careful not to do anything that's inconsistent with that ruling.
For example, since then, China has not once mentioned the nine-dashed line; that has disappeared. It has stopped talking about threats to its sovereignty in the South China Sea, and it complains about American freedom of navigation operations in the language of “threats to stability” and “threats to peace and security”. China was in the unfortunate position of claiming all of the islands and features in the South China Sea but actually possessing relatively few of them, and in the Spratly Islands possessing low-quality islands. The Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, ironically, actually possess the best natural islands in the South China Sea.
The island-building campaign that China embarked upon was designed to assert its claims, of course, but primarily to be able to enforce an air defence identification zone, which was on their to-do list. What we're seeing now is the completion of those artificial islands. They are not building new ones. They have stopped dredging. All of the equipment they're now putting on those artificial islands is part of a plan developed five to seven years ago, before the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling came down.
China is actually keeping its nose very clean on the South China Sea at the moment. They are a signatory to UNCLOS and feel bound by its provisions, so they're in a uncomfortable position, where they cannot look weak to the domestic audience but at the same time they can't afford to alienate the international audience. They're walking that tightrope very effectively.
I'm actually very optimistic that the South China Sea is not an issue that will be with us for very long.
5:05 p.m.
Liberal
Jati Sidhu Liberal Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC
Thanks, Mr. Chair, and thanks to all three of you for your testimony today.
Mr. Paltiel, if I heard you correctly, you're saying that we're not doing a hard enough job at trading with India. In the tour the Prime Minister took to India, extending his hand to strengthen ties with that country, signing a billion-dollar deal, and bringing in 5,800 jobs to our country, do you think we were not doing a good enough job in that area?
5:10 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
My expertise is not.... I read the same newspapers that you do, but also, I'm a scholar and have worked on this previously. The issue of which communities we reach out to and whether we reach into some communities at the expense of the Indian state is not a matter of this government alone. It goes back to previous governments as well. We were already on notice from the Indian government that they like to be engaged as the Republic of India, as an important power, and not just as certain parts of the country, certain regions, and certain populations.
This has now hurt us in our relationship with India. Yes, we've signed some deals, but you know what...? I mean, I'm sorry, but I've been in this business a long time. Going back to the Team Canada visits way back when, we signed all kinds of pieces of paper, but our trade performance slipped in the region.
We should be looking toward managing both trade and politics together, building trust with governments, and working together with governments to make sure that our trade interests are well looked after. That's a difficult process. It's a continuous process. It doesn't happen over one visit that you can go and sign agreements in some places and come back. Often, if you ask what has happened five years later, after many of those deals have been signed, many of them remain deals on paper. It's a deep and abiding presence that's required in all of these kinds of things.
April 19th, 2018 / 5:10 p.m.
Liberal
Jati Sidhu Liberal Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC
It's been an ongoing effort to do trade and business with India. About six or seven years ago I went with the B.C. government to hand a $12-million cheque to TOIFA, the equivalent of the Grammy awards in L.A. They come to Toronto, and we wanted them to come to British Columbia. We did a study before we handed out that cheque; the public wasn't too happy, actually, with that. It was a $100-million turnaround: they came, and it was very successful.
It's not that we haven't tried, but every now and then I hear from Indian officials who say that Canada needs India more than India needs Canada. How do you do business with that? Being a businessman myself, I'll say that when you're sitting at a negotiating table, it has to be equal and has to be good. You commented that we should not sign any deal but a good deal, so I think you're contradictory in your comments when you say we aren't doing well enough but then also saying that the other party is not sitting at the table.
5:10 p.m.
Professor, Department of Political Science, Carleton University, As an Individual
I think we could do better. All I'm saying is that we could do better. We could do better precisely, as I tried to say, if we coordinated our action with other like-minded players, and not going it alone. I think the problem is that as an ally of the United States, and often relying on that, we were able to work under the shadow of the United States, but the United States is not always leading now. We need to find other partners with whom we can leverage our relationship, and we have to do it sooner rather than later.
5:10 p.m.
Liberal
Jati Sidhu Liberal Mission—Matsqui—Fraser Canyon, BC
I fully understand. What's happening south of the border gives us the opportunity to explore a different part of the world. We've been shipping pulses, lentils, and potash to India, but last year they came out with a 50% tariff on lentils and pulses. You tell me how to go forward. We love to do business with other parts of the world, but we're only 36 million people, compared to their 1.2 billion people. They have the market.
By the same token, I'd like to hear your perspective on shipping crude oil to China. As the government, we approved the Kinder Morgan pipeline. We understand that we have to take our resources to tidewater. But would just crude oil alone balance the deficit with China?
5:15 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bob Nault
I think we're going to have to hold off on the answer to that because the time is up. You can build in your response as you give your answers to some of the other colleagues.
I'm going to Madam Laverdière.
5:15 p.m.
NDP
Hélène Laverdière NDP Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My thanks to the three witnesses for their presentations.
I was struck by a theme that we have often heard during this study, that is, the lack of a coherent strategy that considers all the various facets of the issues. I was also struck by Dr. Welch's comment that you have to be at a number of tables, not just one, to be heard in the region. You also mentioned CSCAP, from which Canada is completely absent. We are also the only absent country.
Can you tell us a little more about exactly what that organization does?
5:15 p.m.
CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs, As an Individual
As I said, Canada was a founding member of CSCAP. It's a track 2 dialogue, but with a lot of track 1.2 participants. In some cases, it's scholars who are member-country delegates. In others, it's the retired diplomats who are member-country delegates.
CSCAP provides an opportunity for the countries in the region to discuss a range of issues that leaders cannot discuss because these issues are too sensitive and too complicated. It's an exchange of information and ideas. Delegations usually go back to their home governments after meetings and working groups, and report the findings. In many cases, there's a significant effect on the policies of member-country governments.
As I said, Canada has lapsed twice. There was a three-year window when Canada was back in business in CSCAP, which just ended last year. I was the Canadian co-chair for the CSCAP Canada delegation.
To give you an example, my research team from the Centre for International Governance Innovation did the only study existing in the world on air defence identification zones: what they are; how they operate; what their implications are for aviation safety, security, legal matters, and territorial and maritime disputes. I briefed that to the CSCAP members, and they took it home. I subsequently got a message from a colleague in the foreign ministry in China thanking me for the very helpful Canadian contribution. It had been very useful in helping persuade people in Beijing not to implement another air defence identification zone in the South China Sea. In other words, that was a win for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in China, which understood that it was a bad idea, over the People's Liberation Army, which was enthusiastic about it.
So, that's the kind of thing that can happen through an organization such as CSCAP, and it's very inexpensive. For $100,000 a year, Canada could be a full participant in all CSCAP activities, but at the moment, there is no funding. In fact, we're in arrears. Frankly, it's embarrassing, and it's a missed opportunity for Canada, as well as for the organization.
5:15 p.m.
NDP
Hélène Laverdière NDP Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
Yes, because it works both ways. It helps create links and understanding both ways.
5:15 p.m.
CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs, As an Individual
Very much so.
5:15 p.m.
NDP
Hélène Laverdière NDP Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
Speaking of links and understanding, I think you're working with a group, trying to look at how we can improve our co-operation with Japan. Am I mistaken?
5:15 p.m.
CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs, As an Individual
Yes, that's right.
5:15 p.m.
NDP
Hélène Laverdière NDP Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC
Could you tell us a little about what you're doing on that front?
5:15 p.m.
CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs, As an Individual
We were very lucky here in Canada to get a gift from the Government of Japan, $5 million U.S., to endow a professorship and a new Centre for the Study of Global Japan at the University of Toronto.
I'm no longer at the University of Toronto. I was for 20 years. I'm now at the University of Waterloo, but I very enthusiastically helped my alma mater to try to secure this gift. At the moment, I'm the acting chair on a pro bono basis while a search is being conducted for a long-term chair.
This is the first time that the Japanese government has invested this kind of money outside of the United States. The hope here is that we can make Canada a vital hub in the study of Japan, in looking at the range of problems that Japan is confronting now and in the future, problems that we will also be dealing with just a little later in the timetable. It has really shown that there's a significant opportunity for Canada and Japan to enhance their co-operation on a wide range of issues. I think that's something people have appreciated for a long time, but there always seems to be a gap between the level of participation, the level of co-operation, and the potential for co-operation between our two countries.
5:20 p.m.
Liberal
Raj Saini Liberal Kitchener Centre, ON
Good afternoon, gentlemen. It's a treat to have all three of you here.
I have five hours' worth of questions, but I think only five minutes of time.
All of you indirectly or directly have talked about maritime power, which brings my attention back to Admiral Alfred Mahan, who said that military power had to be balanced by economic power and that any country who wants to have national greatness must be associated with the sea.
I think we've gone through the military aspect over the last hour or so. Mr. Welch has mentioned the air defence identification zone.
Mr. Paltiel, you've written about the exclusive economic zones and how China has the ability and the sovereign right under UNCLOS to inspect all traffic.
One thing we didn't get into—and I don't think we have enough time—is the fact that there are a lot of resources in the South China Sea. It's just not a waterway where $5 trillion worth of traffic goes, because there are also barrels of oil at an estimated $11 billion, and an estimated 190 million cubic feet of natural gas. So there are minerals there also.
Looking at the military side of it, you mentioned that in terms of the encroachment on the islands and things like that. However, I want to get to the economic side, because I think that's the other part of Mahan's equation. Right now what you see is a regional comprehensive economic partnership that is currently being negotiated, and I don't think there is a lot of dialogue on that. When you look at that comprehensive agreement, you're talking about ASEAN+6, accounting for $49.5 trillion and 39% of the world's GDP.
You have the military bases in Southeast Asia, and now you're having the economic bases. How is that going to affect the dynamics in the region?
Mr. Welch, you mentioned that after the recent arbitration between the Philippines and China, the latter has not done anything. However, as you know, China's politics is also about patience. I'm wondering how this is all tying together. How do you think the RCEP will affect regional stability? Will it help on the military side to calm the tensions in the South China Sea, or is this another attempt to sort of further encroach into south China, but, on top of that, also help the one belt, one road initiative?