Thank you very much.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak to the committee as you continue your deliberations and as you get ready for a trip to Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.
I'm going to take a slightly different cut into the matter of Canada's engagement, by moving it from some of our bilateral issues alone into the context of the changing geostrategic context. I think we're in a moment where this is not business as usual in Asia and Asia-Pacific. It is a moment of power shift. It's a moment of strategic turbulence, uncertainties about some of the premises of a regional order that have largely been in place for two or three generations.
Let me talk about two disturbing factors, or two factors that are shaking the situation up, a little bit about Asian reactions, and prescriptions then for Canada. The key point, and I agree with Professor Potter, is that we are now dealing with Xi Jinping's China, which is on a somewhat different trajectory than the People's Republic as we saw it in the Deng Xiaoping era.
This is a new era with new characteristics, not just in terms of the scale, size, and ambition of many of the economic projects, the growth figures—that's something I'm sure the committee is very familiar with—but I think there are a couple of other things in play in Xi Jinping's era. One of those is domestic repression. China is not moving forward on political and human rights. There is every sign that in fact it is tightening. This represents the party strengthening its control, not only over Chinese citizens but also over the state apparatus itself, the government.
Related is that we have a more assertive China internationally, in its region, but also globally. Chinese diplomacy is more self-confident and moving in forceful ways. I don't mean militarily forceful, but in some new ways to define and defend its core interests. I think a phrase we can accurately now use is that China, in many ways, is behaving like a great power. It might have some distinctive characteristics to what a great power is, but its intentions, its role, are changing.
At the same time, China is also becoming a key global player. In the issues we are all facing— climate change, peacekeeping, from a Canadian side, counterterrorism—the new era of Xi Jinping's China involves a bigger global role. I think we have to, as a result, see areas within that where we have common interests and concerns.
I take a little more positive view of Xi Jinping's China on its compliance with treaties and activities that it has already agreed to. It is not perfect, but superpowers rarely are.
We're dealing with a new China, but we all have to see that we're also dealing with a new United States. Asians certainly realize that. The unpredictability of Donald Trump's “America first” is shaking the region. While the United States continues strong and visible support for its alliances and its military role, it is inconsistent on trade policy; it is inconsistent on what it is promoting in terms of human rights and democratic governance principles. It has negative and very little support for multilateral institutions in the region.
I think, more importantly, there is deep doubt about the future of American leadership in the region. America isn't disappearing from Asia, but it seems to be positioned in a spot that is now contested for primacy—contested by China—and is deeply disturbing and shaking its friends, allies, and opponents in the region, not just because of Donald Trump, but because of a feeling that America may be stepping back irreversibly from the kinds of roles it has played in the past.
America isn't disappearing, but America is not going to play the primary role going forward.
The reactions to those twin forces are much bigger than Asia, but in Asia—as you'll be seeing—there is an arms buildup under way. Most countries are increasing their defence spending considerably. There is a repositioning—not the abandonment of alliances, but a reshaping of those alliances and a starting to hedge on different futures in which China is going to be more important.
Also, there is deeper economic integration and connectivity. It's been fascinating how Asian countries—most of them—have been pushing very hard in recent months for new kinds of multilateral trade agreements. Japan's interest in the trans-Pacific partnership is just one indicator of that, as is the intensification in the intra-Asian projects.
I would say that in general terms the Asian reactions to this changing geostrategic setting are a fear of further deterioration in U.S.-China relations. Those countries don't want to have to make a China choice any more than Australia or Canada does. However, in general there is a view that history is tilting against the United States and toward China in power terms, at least in this chapter, and that is causing a lot of rethinking.
On perceptions of Canada, I'd suggest that we are mainly seen by almost all of the key players in Asia as reactive, on the sidelines, playing on the margins. We garner very little attention, except in occasional negativity. In east Asia and Southeast Asia, I am asked over and over again what Canada thinks, what its interests are, and what its strategy is in this new “business not as normal” environment.
Let me conclude with three suggestions for how we start answering some of those questions, and your investigations can be a part of this.
First, we need an Asia strategy, and China has to be the central component of that Asia strategy. We need to work with ASEAN and fellow middle powers in trying to reassert and strengthen, wherever we can, multilateralism and the elements of rule of law, as we see them, taking into account what “rule of law” means—as Professor Potter mentions—but also how we're going to have to make some adjustments and accommodation to a new balance of forces. In terms of our bilateral relationship with China, our government is going to have to create a new narrative of living with China, rather than expecting to change China or thinking that economic openness will produce political liberalization. China, for the moment—and likely into the future—is on a different path.
With China we have to find out how to co-operate where we can and must on common global issues. On peacekeeping, climate change, and a range of other things, we have no option except to try to work with China, and on balance they can be a constructive force.
Part of an Asia strategy is deeper commercial relations along the lines we have been discussing with other witnesses.
I want to add another element, and that is providing new assurances to Canada and Canadians about the protection of our values, institutions, and strategic industries at home. China is a global player. It is on our doorsteps in ways that are positive in many respects, but we're facing some new threats. Public opinion polling we've been doing recently sees these concerns about Canadian values and institutions being challenged by elements of Chinese power. It's something Canadians know. When we look at takeovers of Canadian companies, acquisitions, and investments, I think we have to be able to give new assurances to Canadians that these things are in our interests.
A second general prescription is to double down on bilateral and multilateral FTAs. We do it not only because there will be an immediate commercial value to the country but also because we have to be part of the new intra-Asian game that is unfolding. That is going to involve the trans-Pacific partnership and, I think, framing our progressive agenda with a little bit more precision than we have so far, and in attractive ways, on matters including labour and gender.
Finally, let me speak about opening North Korea. You're going at an extraordinary moment. For the first time in a generation there may be an open window for Canada to reintroduce itself into northeast Asian questions, and not just around maximization of pressure on North Korea, or diplomacy. We may have an opening to deepen humanitarian assistance, educational exchanges, and capacity building in North Korea.
We're not there yet; the moment is not right for us to introduce specific actions. Your committee, however, could in Korea come up with some very useful ideas, when that sun shines a little bit brighter, on what we can do, and start preparing for it now.
Thank you.