Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee, for the kind invitation to speak today. I'm speaking to you from the unceded Coast Salish territories here in Victoria.
I hope I can be of assistance today in answering any questions you may have. By way of background, besides writing and providing commentary on Turkish and Middle Eastern issues, I also served in the Canadian Armed Forces for 36 years, including time as commanding officer of 4th Air Defence Regiment, so I have a fairly good understanding of air defence, air warfare and the use of drones. I also served in Afghanistan for one year, and between July 2011 and July 2014, in the rank of colonel, I was Canadian defence attaché to Turkey with cross-accreditation to Azerbaijan. I retired from the Canadian Armed Forces in September 2014. I was last in Turkey in November 2019.
To prepare for today, I had a chance to look at all the documentation that you had, especially as it relates to the Wescam surveillance and target acquisition pods that are used on the Bayraktar TB2 drones.
There's no question that after decades of on-again, off-again arms embargoes placed on Turkey by many of its NATO allies, the country has built up a significant indigenous arms industry. Much of it is overseen by the government's Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and the Presidency of Defense Industries, which are both—and this is really important, I think—directly controlled by Turkey's president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Turkey's recent military assistance to Azerbaijan, in the recapture of Armenian-held Azeri territory, is just one example of how far their indigenous arms industry has come. I would argue that use of the Bayraktar drones arguably contributed to Azerbaijan's success more than any other capability in their inventory.
When it comes to Turkey, I can't think of any armed forces anywhere in the world that is currently involved in so many armed conflicts, either directly or indirectly, other than Russia. Russia, for example, has recently warned Turkey to stop selling drones to Ukraine, no doubt worried they might tip the military balance in Ukraine's favour.
Returning to Turkey, it does have a well-trained and capable military, but it's military is beset with many internal issues, with the extensive and ongoing purges following a failed military coup attempt in July 2016. I would also add that the entire country—politically, economically and from a human rights perspective—is also facing numerous challenges. Nevertheless, the Turkish government would undoubtedly point out, if it were not for their intervention in Libya, the United Nations-recognized government would have fallen to General Haftar's forces. This is not to downplay or to suggest we excuse Turkey's regional activities that have brought on our arms embargo, but it is quite often a perspective missing in the wider picture. Based on reports from last year, I understand that Aselsan has developed its own targeting pod and may no longer need the Wescam pods in the future.
In closing, as deadly as they can be, drones do come equipped with these advanced electro-optical systems and if they're flown by well-trained operators following lawful rules of engagement, their use should arguably prevent or at least reduce civilian casualties in conflict zones.
Thank you very much.
I look forward to your questions.