Foreign Affairs Committee on May 11th, 2021

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Colleagues, welcome to the 33rd ^x meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

The committee is resuming its study on the granting of arms export permits, with a particular focus on permits granted for exports to Turkey.

As always, to ensure an orderly meeting, I encourage all participants to remain muted when they're not speaking. When you have 30 seconds left in your questioning or testimony time, I will signal you manually with this piece of paper.

Interpretation services are available through the globe icon at the bottom of your screens.

We are this afternoon, colleagues, challenged both by the clock and the substance of our agenda, so I ask for your co-operation with respect to timing.

Welcome to the witnesses who are in the first panel.

We have with us today Pierre Jolicoeur, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada, and Jean-Christophe Boucher, Assistant Professor at the University of Calgary.

Professor Jolicoeur, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Pierre Jolicoeur, Professor, Department of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada , As an Individual]

Good afternoon, everyone.

Mr. Chair, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before your committee today. This is a first for me.

I want to start by emphasizing that I am not an expert on weapons, armament or arms exports. I work at the Royal Military College of Canada, but I am not a military member. I am a civilian who is interested more in geopolitics and strategic studies more broadly. I'm also an expert on the former USSR and the Caucasus region.

Since we're talking about the Caucasus here, a major 44-day conflict took place in the fall of 2020. It was a war between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, a secessionist territory that had won de facto independence through armed conflict in the early 1990s. In other words, it seized its independence by military force. However, no state in the international community recognized that independence, unlike in similar cases such as those of Kosovo, South Ossetia and other de facto states.

That conflict nevertheless resulted in a significant, and likely lasting, shift in the geopolitical balance in the region. The consequences of that very recent conflict will become apparent in the coming months and years. All military analysts seem to agree that the use of military drones was a factor that enabled Azerbaijan to reclaim a significant part of its secessionist territory. During the operations, drones were a crucially important weapon used in the developments observed during the fall.

Many of those drones were used by Azerbaijan; some had been purchased from Israel, others from Turkey. Turkey supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones, which are of Turkish design but include parts and equipment from Canada, the United States, Germany and other countries. Canadian equipment includes the L3Harris WESCAM surveillance and targeting system. These components are used to guide and navigate the drones, which are also equipped with propulsion systems built by Bombardier. Canadian components are used in these drones, which Turkey sold to Azerbaijan and which were successfully deployed in the military operation a few months ago.

We can focus on the technical aspect of the operations, but I think the dominant issue here is the drones themselves. An essential feature of the conflict is that Turkey used equipment supplied by Canada to alter the status of a "frozen conflict" in the region and to destabilize that region, thus jeopardizing international peace and security.

Turkey has been more and more active in the region for years now and has adopted increasingly destabilizing behaviour. The conflict in the Caucasus is just one telling example among many of the impact of Turkey's return to the international stage and its new, more aggressive stance.

For example, Turkey has deployed its navy in the western Mediterranean to assert its claims to oilfields and oil resources near Cyprus, territories also claimed by Greece and Cyprus. It has also intervened in Libya, where the same drones are suspected of having been used.

Once again, we suspect that Canadian equipment has been used in this theatre of war despite the fact that there has been an embargo on arms shipments to Syria for a number of years. Turkey also intervenes regularly in Syria.

We can see that Turkey is a source of insecurity, particularly as a result of its increasingly erratic conduct and the fact that Turkish power appears to be concentrated in the hands of President Erdogan, a trend that has been apparent for many years. Indeed, power in Ankara seems to have coalesced around the president since the failed coup d'état in 2016.

We have also observed a shift toward authoritarianism in the country. The government increasingly uses arms to oppress its population, imprison dissidents and violate human rights, particularly those of minorities, including the Kurds.

These are all reasons to doubt the reliability of our partnership with Turkey. Turkey is one of Canada's NATO partners, but it has become an increasing concern for various reasons.

I will close by saying that Turkey has just acquired an antimissile defence system from Russia, despite warnings from NATO member countries, the United States in particular. As a consequence, Turkey has been excluded from the F-35 fighter program.

The reaction of the United States and other Canadian partners is a sign that Turkey is a cause for concern. In fact, we may well wonder whether it shares the same democratic values as NATO. Even though we are partners, and we must assist our allies—Turkey, in this instance—we can justifiably question the reliability and seriousness of our relationship with Turkey.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor Jolicoeur.

Now we will hear from Professor Boucher.

Professor Boucher, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Jean-Christophe Boucher, Assistant Professor, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Good afternoon, everyone.

Thank you very much for your invitation to appear before the committee.

As somebody who grew up in Aylmer, Quebec, I can switch between French and English. I'll try to do my talk in French, but we can talk in English afterwards.

Since my colleague has focused on the geopolitical issues, and I agree with him to a large extent, I won't revisit the question of Turkey and its role in the region. We can discuss that again later on.

I would like to focus on the national aspects and considerations associated with the granting of arms export permits and on thinking about this issue in Canada.

I think, to a large extent, that the Canadian government has lacked transparency on this subject for some time now. We must try to strike a balance between a dynamic defence industry and respect for human rights.

My thinking on the subject is based on two points. First, my research team at the University of Calgary has spent a lot of time surveying Canadians on defence issues, and we have collected data on the way Canadians perceive arms exports. I think that information is important. Second, members of my research team have also conducted comparative analyses on how other countries similar to Canada, including Australia and the Netherlands, achieve a balance between the two interests, which, in their minds, are a concern for human rights and a desire to have a dynamic defence industry.

First, from an economic standpoint, I believe that, in considering how it will regulate the granting of arms export permits, the Canadian government should find a way to promote development of a viable and dynamic defence industry in Canada, for several reasons: the defence industry is a major economic sector that creates high-quality jobs across Canada, particularly in Ontario and Quebec. On average, workers earn better salaries in this leading innovative sector.

Second, most of the studies conducted on other countries, such as Israel, the United States and Great Britain, generally show that every innovation in the defence sector tends to pollinate other sectors of the economy. The Canadian defence industry improves Canada's economy and competitiveness to a large degree.

Third, the Canadian defence industry must export in order to survive. Exports are thus an essential part of that industry. More than 60% of what it produces is exported, to the United States in particular.

There is also a connection between the size of businesses and their ability to innovate. The bigger they are, the more money they can invest in research and development. We have a vested interest in finding a way to preserve these companies so they can remain viable.

Fourth, the Canadian defence industry doesn't really exist. We are completely integrated into the American industry and, in a way, the European industry. Most Canadian defence companies are actually subsidiaries of American companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin, L3Harris and Raytheon. Consequently, all legislation will have a significant impact on Canada-U.S. relations. The current trend among defence companies is toward acquiring civilian companies. As a result, the division between defence companies and civilian companies is increasingly unclear, and it will therefore become more and more difficult to distinguish between the two.

I think we should find a way to encourage these companies to survive and grow in Canada. Then, with respect to human rights, we must recognize that arms exports are a major political and normative issue in Canada. In the past, the Canadian government has lacked transparency, and I think that lack of transparency has caused confusion and helped politicize the issue.

In September 2020, we asked Canadians what they thought was the most important issue associated with equipment sales. Thirty-one percent said it was human rights, while 22% felt it was international rights; only 23% said we should promote local jobs in Canada, and 10% cited good relations with our allies.

This means that we can neither conceal nor rule out normative issues in this matter, and I think any discussion should focus on how to balance Canada's economic interests with human rights concerns.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor Boucher.

Colleagues, we have a minor change to our agenda.

One of our witnesses from the second panel has to leave relatively shortly. He is an important witness, so we have invited him into the room to hear his opening remarks now.

With your consent, we will ask Mr. Jacques Maire, Member of the National Assembly of the French Republic, to deliver his five-minute opening remarks.

Mr. Maire, since you are online and are using a microphone, it would help the interpreters if you raised your microphone slightly, if possible.

You now have the floor for five minutes.

[Jacques Maire, Member, National Assembly of the French Republic]

Good evening. It's after 10 p.m. here. I'm in my bedroom with my wife, and I can only impose so far.

Colleagues, I would simply like to make a few general remarks.

First of all, the French armament industry is a major industry in our country, both economically and from a strategic autonomy standpoint. Although there's a strong consensus that the armament industry should be protected as a constituent part of our sovereignty and diplomacy, our parliament plays a very minor role in the sector. I would say it has no major process, dialogue or control, although we do have an annual report and statistics.

I don't know whether these matters are of interest to you, but we would obviously like to have more dialogue and control. We're seeing quite serious changes in the national situation, particularly as a result of the potential increase in litigation that we anticipate in Europe as the Arms Trade Treaty and the common position of the European Union increasingly come into force.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Maire, I apologize for interrupting. Would it be possible for you to raise your microphone slightly and centre it in front of your mouth?

[Jacques Maire]

Yes, I'll do that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much.

[Jacques Maire]

You're welcome.

The pressure on our export policy has come from Yemen, in particular, not really from Turkey. Why? Because Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt are major clients of France and Turkey is not.

France exports approximately €50 million worth of military materiel every year, and we aren't much involved in any of the major strategic programs for which we've positioned ourselves—major aeronautic, naval, submarine and air defence programs, for example.

That being said, in September 2019, France established a fairly stiff sanction mechanism in the specific context of the partition of Syria and an extensive occupation of the fringe region south of Turkey in Syria to establish a new "Yalta" in Syria between the Syrians supported by the Russians, on the one hand, and the Turks, on the other, all to the detriment of our Kurdish allies in the fight against ISIS.

This sanction situation is actually quite unusual. It was never made public in France. It includes sanctions and regular efforts to exert pressure, but they haven't been made public because publicizing them generally tends to destroy the bilateral relationship and ultimately to jeopardize the entire partnership.

However, in the case of Turkey, since it's close enough to us, complex and disruptive right now, we decided to make the measure public. It wasn't broadly followed by other European countries, which probably would have preferred to employ other methods, including methods based more on the targeting of individuals.

To be clear, since one of the previous speakers referred to the circumstances regarding Armenia and the drone issue, it's true that we're genuinely concerned about Turkey's proliferation policy as it spreads its own equipment into other theatres, either for political purposes—as in Azerbaijan—or for other purposes that are less clear. The same drones as Azerbaijan and Turkey used in Armenia were recently employed in the Ukrainian theatre by Ukraine against the Russians.

These developments caught our attention, and we're now seeing behaviour from the Turks that's clearly hostile toward NATO itself. For example, a serious naval incident occurred on June 10, 2020 in the course of a NATO operation that you are no doubt aware of called Sea Guardian. As you will recall, the situation in Libya involved two parties and NATO, which was determined to interdict arms shipments to Libya, at either Haftar or Sarraj.

Since the Turks had successfully supplied enormous amounts of equipment to the western zone, NATO decided to conduct an embargo inspection operation on a ship, the Çirkin, which was being escorted by several naval vessels and refused to identify itself. I simply want to say that, after the ship had been monitored by American aircraft and Italian vessels and hailed by the French navy, the French ships were completely illuminated and threatened by missile and gun batteries, something that's not done between NATO friends.

This caused a crisis within NATO and increased the level of caution at the European Union, which decided, in December, to impose more individual sanctions on Turkish leaders, as a result of which the Turks decided to resume dialogue with the European Union, which has been actively pursuing that dialogue for several months now.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Mr. Maire.

We will now go to our first round of questions by colleagues. They're six minutes each. Leading us off will be Mr. Diotte, please.

[Kerry Diotte, Conservative, Edmonton Griesbach, AB]

Thank you very much.

My first question is for Professor Jolicoeur. You mentioned that Turkey has had issues in violating human rights, which has become, as you say, more and more of a cause for concern. I believe you said that you wonder if we share the same democratic values. How does Canada address those issues? They're big issues. Turkey is obviously a NATO partner, and so on. That's a huge question for you, if you could weigh in on that.

[Pierre Jolicoeur]

Thank you for your question.

It's a very difficult position. We want to maintain good relations with Turkey because it is, after all, a member of NATO. However, prohibiting certain forms of trade could offend the Turks.

I can't give you a better answer than what I'm about to tell you. If, after all, we decided to sell weapons to the Turkish authorities, we would have to ask them for a better monitoring system, or at least to tell us what will be the end-use of these weapons by the Turkish state. All we can do after that is hope for collaboration and transparency with respect to this use.

Our experience in the Caucasus would appear to indicate that Turkey is not ready to demonstrate such transparency. I should mention that the Canadian controls implemented would appear to be satisfactory. The problem is not so much selling weapons to economic partners in Turkey, because these partners did their work properly. It's rather that once the designers of these drones have sold the equipment to their country, it is ultimately the Turkish government that can decide to use it for other purposes than we as Canadians expect.

If the Turkish state is prepared to comply with such rules, then verifiable assurances could be required from them.

[Kerry Diotte, Conservative, Edmonton Griesbach, AB]

Good.

Professor Boucher, would you have anything to add on that subject?

[Jean-Christophe Boucher]

Sure. I'll be brief.

Other countries in the EU have had Turkey on their radar for a while. The Netherlands, for example, whenever there is any requirement for an export permit, has to notify the Parliament of doing this.

Although they have been an ally, I'd say they're a sketchy ally for Canada or for NATO countries. Other NATO countries have had Turkey on their list of countries to double-check, and to make sure that things are in line.

This is why one of the recommendations I would make is that we should have, in Canada, a list of countries where there needs to be an extra level of authorization and notification to Parliament that we are exporting weapons to these countries. That would allow us to have better transparency in how we are doing this.

[Kerry Diotte, Conservative, Edmonton Griesbach, AB]

Thank you.

Professor Boucher, you talked about the Canadian government not having been very transparent regarding arms. Could you elaborate a little bit on that?

[Jean-Christophe Boucher]

Sure. I think we've been pretty much blindsided by the Saudi weapons exports and everything, and in the grand scheme of things we haven't designed a good process to have these debates in the public sphere.

I think the 2019 bill, Bill C-47, has done a good job at moving us forward in this, but I think there are other things we could have done better to create transparency. For example, much of what we're doing right now is at Global Affairs Canada, which is not really a department that is super keen on transparency, and much of the reporting that has been done is actually terrible.

In other countries where this is done, there are requirements for quality reports. The Netherlands does this. In the Netherlands, every time they have all these quarterly reports, they actually tell you how many export permits were authorized, how many were rejected, where, how much they are worth, and all of this, which we don't have in Canada.

Also, in Canada there are different departments responsible for this—GAC, DND, ISED—which makes it really difficult to follow what people are doing.

I think there is a lot of work still to be done to create an environment where we can have this debate in the public sphere and also create an environment where the defence industry has a really good sense of what they can and can't do, and where they should go and not go. I think moving forward on this is in the interest of the Government of Canada, both to respect human rights and also to allow these companies to flourish.

[Kerry Diotte, Conservative, Edmonton Griesbach, AB]

Thanks very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Mr. Diotte.

Next we have Dr. Fry, please, for six minutes.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I want to thank everyone for presenting to us, and we're sorry to have kept you waiting while we voted, but that's a must, as always.

I think most of us are now listening to witnesses, and we have agreed that there needs to be some way of finding a balance between working with our allies and finding the humanitarian piece that we need to be aware of. I think it's important when you give us recommendations as to what other countries are doing, and what we could do to become a little more transparent and move in line with other people.

I think though that one of the things we note is that when we deal with the United States, we don't go through the same kinds of questions on the ATT as we should. Is it just because the United States is an ally that we cut them this slack, as we would say? Do you think we should do that, or should we just be absolutely clear that it doesn't matter who you are, because we're going to follow the same transparency and the same rules?

Perhaps Mr. Boucher you might want to answer that. I see you laughing, so....

[Jean-Christophe Boucher]

Yes, I'm laughing because this is a really difficult question, and I've been struggling with this issue. It seems easier to target countries where our economic relationships are not as great. You're absolutely right that our relationship and how we've developed our defence industry with the Americans is a big blind spot in all of this.

I haven't been convinced yet on taking a stance on either side, I don't know what to do on this. I would like more transparency, but I understand how difficult...and there are a lot of pitfalls.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

It's a tough decision.

Monsieur Jolicoeur, do you have something you want to add to that?

[Pierre Jolicoeur]

I share Mr. Boucher's ambivalence on this matter.

Our relations with Turkey are significant. Turkey is our fourth largest trading partner for military equipment. However, there are bigger players.

Canada and the United States engage in trade in just about every possible economic sector, and not just the military sector. If we were to question our partnership in the military sector, there could be repercussions in many other areas. This would be unsustainable for Canada given the current and future state of the economy. The economic symbiosis between Canada and the United States does not allow Canada any autonomy in this.

However, beyond these economic partnerships, the Canadian military sector is integrated, as Mr. Boucher mentioned. Our military industry is integrated. Not only do American companies have operations in Canada, but Canada often manufactures parts and equipment that are compatible with those in the American military industry. We couldn't…

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you.

It's okay to not have rules, depending on whether it's a friend that you're working with. I understand the economic, the trade, and all of the things in our relationship with the United States. I mean, if we want to borrow a cup of sugar, we reach over the border and get it.

The point is that I think we need to decide whether we're going to be principled in all things or not. When we start picking and choosing what we do, shouldn't we have some clear, objective guidelines that we use for everybody? If you want to argue about this, Turkey is actually very important to all of us when they fight the Daesh. I think, here we go, so there they are. They're doing something we would like them to do, and then they do things we don't like them to do.

This is not an easy question. We dance around it every time we hear witnesses. Everyone's is saying, “Well, yeah, but...,” and, “Yeah, but....”

I also wonder if I could then ask a question about whether there is any responsibility, ethically, for the arms industries to have some kind of principled position on.... If they find out that they have been selling to a particular country that has always been a good client and that they've always worked well with and suddenly—like you said Turkey did—that country becomes erratic and becomes difficult to understand, is there a responsibility on the part of those people who make the arms to have a clear set of principles that they also follow?

What we do here is we try to come down on one side or the other, and there is no one side or the other. There is a very difficult problem that we need to think about before we go ahead, jump up and down, and say so and so....

I'd like to hear from you and perhaps from Mr. Maire if he has any ideas. I mean, you've obviously sanctioned Turkey.

What are some of the practical things that we can do that would improve transparency and that would put in place some kind of principled position here—the ATT regardless? Is there something we can do when the geopolitical realities continue to be fluid, flexible and changing every day?

I am not asking this because I am trying to support my government in this. I'm just asking because it is a very difficult question to answer. I don't know about my colleagues, but I know I am struggling with it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Dr. Fry, you are out of time. You have given your witnesses little time to answer.

We'll just invite a very quick answer from whoever wants to take it in 30 seconds or less, please.