Foreign Affairs Committee on May 11th, 2021

[Marty Morantz, Conservative, Charleswood—St. James—Assiniboia—Headingley, MB]

In terms of this practice of diverting equipment, which isn't really supposed to happen, what can we do to try to control that? Do you have any suggestions or an international practice that could be used by GAC to try to clamp down on our arms technology being diverted to places where it shouldn't be?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Outside of decisions that are made on political grounds—and I emphasize “political grounds”—particularly when one considers the significance of Canadian military defence exports, or the lack thereof, which is the nature of our industry, there's not much GAC can do.

One can try to predict the future, but if the future.... As we know, as it has unfolded, if we think back 20 or 30 years—and this has been talked about, I believe, with the committee before—today a friend may tomorrow be an adversary. Politics shift, and of course you cannot predict it. All you can work on is the basis of the current situation and the current reality—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor Fergusson.

I'm sorry to interrupt you. Just in the interest of time, we'll need to go to our next member of the committee.

Ms. Sahota, you have six minutes, please.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question really is going out to anybody.

What countries would you identify as shining examples or benchmarks in terms of their export control regimes, and for what reason? I can tell you that in the last panel the Netherlands was mentioned as a country that had a list that they must double-check, or certain countries were put on a list such that if they were to agree on an export permit for that country, I believe Parliament needs to be notified. Also, then, the previous witness mentioned that there are quarterly reports that they also undertake.

Would you see the Netherlands that way? Or do you have other examples of countries that you think are shining examples that we should follow?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Very briefly, my answer to this is that I can't answer that question, clearly because I'm not an expert on national foreign export controls. I would suggest to you, however, that at the end of the day most countries are shining examples within the political realities and the strategic realities of the world they face.

I think the United States could be understood as a shining example...it's different from us. The Dutch.... Others all have, as a function of different political cultures and different political institutions, different perspectives of where they sit in the world.

I'll be honest with you. I don't think Canadian export controls are in trouble at all. They're not problematic. They—

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Fergusson.

Ms. Babin, please.

[Dominique Babin]

I don't know what the legislation in every country is either.

I have no shining examples.

That said, the United States has done very well in terms of predictability. They identify products through the use of an Export Control Classification Number, or ECCN. Export restrictions for certain countries are also indicated.

For example, ECCN X cannot be exported to country Y because of this and that.

In terms of transparency, it's a good example. The United States may not be a shining example, but the main industry issue is that our export control system needs to be harmonized with the United States' system to facilitate trade between the two countries. It would also be useful if the systems on both sides of the border were exported beyond North America.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

That's interesting. We've had witnesses who obviously feel differently than both of you do here today.

In terms of harmonization, would you say that Canada should be getting more in line with U.S. export controls or vice versa? The ATT has 110 ratifying states. In some of the opening remarks I heard, how do we get.... I think the U.S. alone might not be adequate. How do we get everyone in line? Or is that just too much of a difficult task? I did hear Mr. Fergusson talk about that a bit as well.

We have independent states that have signed on to this. How do we get one interpretation and a consistent regime that's followed?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

In my view, the simple answer is you don't and you won't. It's just not going to happen, because the political interests of the wide range of states within the international community vary so much. That's why when you read the documents—and it's not just in the areas of the Arms Trade Treaty, the Wassenaar or others—what can always be agreed upon as a consensus by states, and why states sign them, is that the language remains vague and ambiguous. It can be interpreted in different ways. That is as far as you're going to get, because of the cultural political diversity that exists, and Canada and no one else can overcome that. We can just try to manage it.

The second point I would raise here is that when you look at consistency, the consistency for Canada at the end of the day is consistency with the United States, because of the economic and political reasons that underpin our close relationship with the United States. There is also consistency with our NATO allies.

That's the best we can hope for, and when we get to North America-Canada-U.S. versus NATO-Europe, you're still going to have difficulties and problems trying to bring them together. It's a great desire, but it's not going to go.

[Ruby Sahota, Liberal, Brampton North, ON]

Can I also follow-up then with this question? How do we move forward in our approach to export permits with Turkey?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

I think the Government of Canada needs to resolve this bilaterally with the Turkish government as a means to indicate to the Turkish government that this, for Canada, is not an issue about trying to punish Turkey for disagreements, or differences about internal Turkish behaviour, or differences over Turkish behaviour in Libya and Syria, or in Azerbaijan.

For Canada, this is a simple legal issue. It should develop in discussions with the Turkish government some form of firmer arrangements to ensure that this does not happen again. That's what we should be talking about.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you, Ms. Sahota and Mr. Fergusson.

We'll have to leave it there.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Bergeron, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here and for their comments, which are extremely helpful to the work of this committee.

I'd like to mention to Mrs. Babin that she could always send us the notes she prepared, which she was clearly unable to deliver in full given the time constraints. They would contribute to the work of this committee.

I'd like to continue with the same line of questioning pursued by Mr. Morantz and Ms. Sahota, and more specifically by Professor Fergusson, who appeared to be doubting Canada's ability, in today's world, to wishfully continue to promote the protection of human rights and values that previously guided Canadian foreign policy.

My first question will be about the following facts. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the SIPRI, estimated that the number of weapons imported into Azerbaijan from 2011 to 2020 was approximately 8.2 times higher than the number of weapons imported into Armenia during the same period. An article published in Defense News on June 25, 2020, said that Azerbaijan was planning to purchase the famous Bayraktar TB2 drones made in Turkey. We also know that a United Nations panel of experts on Libya submitted a report to the Security Council in December 2019 indicating among other things that Turkey regularly supplied weapons to parties engaged in the conflict in Libya .

So, based on what happened, you told us that governments could, independently of whatever rules are established, make decisions on a political basis. According to you, has the government of Canada turned a blind eye to what is obviously happening, or has Turkey genuinely led Canada up the garden path?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

That's a difficult question to answer in the absence of getting access to the primary documents or talking to the people who were directly involved in this.

Let's remember that if we look at the specific technology that the Canadian companies.... It's very important to recognize that this is not an issue of Canadian companies violating export permits or doing anything illegal. This is the end-user side of the problem. Technology in the world diffuses regardless of export controls. The surveillance and targeting technology—which is the key issue here—and the process by which it's diffused, of course it can can be diffused by simply taking a Canadian product, in this case, and putting it in a Turkish drone and selling it to Azerbaijan. It can also be re-engineered very easily.

In my view, in terms of your point about Azerbaijan and the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, there are two things to be considered here. One is that Azerbaijan has oil and thus it had more wealth to be able to deal with expanding its military capabilities. Armenia seized Nagorno-Karabakh back in 1991-92 and I don't recall the Government of Canada ever saying anything about it. The Azerbaijan Republic, which was part of its territory as successor to the Soviet Union, was simply prone and could do nothing about it. The negotiations failed. It was obvious that, down the road, this was going to occur.

I don't think the Canadian government—Global Affairs, National Defence or ISED—or any other Canadian institutions involved in this could see through a crystal ball that this was going to happen. That's the issue here. We can't predict this.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

We know that both Canada and Turkey are members of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a group of 42 states whose goal is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations.

We also know that in April 2020, the Minister of Foreign Affairs received assurances during a phone call with his Turkish counterpart, Minister Cavusoglu, that pending WESCAM permit applications concerned equipment that had been used on drones in northwestern Syria for Turkish defensive activities in Idlib.

So I'll ask you the question again. Did Canada turn a blind eye, or was it led up the garden path by Turkey?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

No, I don't think Canada has been led up the garden path. I don't know if the situation—in terms of the decision-making process in Azerbaijan relative to its relations with Turkey—set what you basically hint at as some sort of conspiratorial thinking.

It's probable that a series of events continuously occurred, which drove Turkey to make these decisions. Relative to Wassenaar, my final point about this is that it all depends, from your political perspective, what is destabilizing and stabilizing. The Turkish government may very legitimately think and believe that the Azerbaijan military actions to regain the province Nagorno-Karabakh is a stabilizing feature. It may believe that its behaviour relative to Syria and Libya is stabilizing the region and, in fact, is in their interests and in the interest of broader stability.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Merci, Monsieur Bergeron.

Thank you very much, Professor Fergusson.

The final questioner today is Mr. Harris for six minutes, please.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to both of our witnesses for joining us today.

Professor Fergusson, leaving aside Canada's relationship with the United States, where there is a defence production agreement that covers a lot of territory and a lot of our industry going back many decades, you seem to have the view that the Arms Trade Treaty is...I won't say of no consequence, but you seem to think it doesn't add anything to the mix. I'm concerned about that view. I'm questioning it to some extent, obviously. Looking at the treaty itself, there's very significant attention paid to the whole issue of diversion. A whole article is devoted to it, with many provisions suggesting how one could handle this and how to make it possible for it to work.

I want to ask I guess an open-ended question. It's not specifically related to Turkey, although Turkey shines a bright light on this whole issue of diversion and end-user assurances. Let me put this to you: If you don't have a proper end-user regime, you don't have a program, and you don't have effective rules and measures to control and prevent diversion, then effectively you have no arms control at all. Is that a fair proposition?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

It's essentially fair, except with or without the Arms Trade Treaty, the issue of diversions and the issues surrounding the problems of monitoring and enforcing diversions in export controls still exist. They don't go away. All the ATT does in this context is codify a set—relatively ambiguous—of what the group of sovereign states can agree to. It in turn reflects their national interests, which in turn reflects their national policies on export controls.

With or without the ATT, the diversion issue remains in place. The ATT will not have any significant effect on these issues or how states deal with them. It's a lesson like Canada's lesson with Turkey over the drone issue and Canadian surveillance and technology. That's the lesson. It's those types of lessons that each state learns and then tries to manage and deal with down the road.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

But given that, Professor, you suggest that the treaties are open to interpretation, but they're also open to application or not. If you don't have any proper or effective rules in your own regime that try to meet the questions that arise there, then you're not doing your job. I put it to you that in the case of Turkey, given the results of the facts that are known, there were no effective end-user assurances and there were no proper rules, or they weren't followed, in allowing this to happen.

I suggest to you that the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty provide a means, if you decide to follow them, to comply with the obligations you're taking on. Do you see the fact that the Canadian government has not actually prevented the diversion of these goods, and that if this is the approach it's not going to be able to do it in any other circumstances either?

[Dr. James Fergusson]

If national governments don't have any rules, and they all do—sometimes enforced properly, sometimes not—the existence of the Arms Trade Treaty is not going to have any effect on that whatsoever, because the treaty reflects consensus behaviour.

In my view, these obligations are interesting and they are driven by other political considerations. In the case of Canada, if we stick it in the context of Canadian foreign policy, multilateralism, we sign on to something that really has no clear implications for a country like Canada, which always has rigorous export controls. That there will always be problems and that there will always be cheating, from either an internal or an external perspective, is nothing that will be resolved by an international treaty.

I know I'm a bit extreme and a bit of a Canadian heretic, but that's me. Signing the treaties makes us feel good, but they don't do much more than that, at the end of the day.

[Jack Harris, NDP, St. John's East, NL]

Compliance may do that, sir, and I'm perhaps one who believes that if you sign an agreement to do something, you go out of your way to make sure you put rules in place to make that happen.

I think the treaty may bind you morally and politically, but in reality, it's the rules you put in place, how you enforce them, and whether you bother to enforce them, that really matters. That's the question before this committee, as opposed to whether or not the treaty itself, by itself, makes a difference.

We have to agree, I guess, to disagree on that point.

My time is rapidly running out, according to the sign from the chair, so I'll end there.

Thank you very much for your responses.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

One quick comment—

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Go ahead, Professor Fergusson.

[Dr. James Fergusson]

Treaties don't have any enforcement measures. There's the collapse right there.