Foreign Affairs Committee on Dec. 1st, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Welcome, colleagues, to the ninth meeting of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development .

Pursuant to the order of reference of October 22, 2020, the committee is resuming its study of vulnerabilities created and exacerbated by COVID-19 in crisis and conflict-affected areas.

To ensure an orderly meeting, I encourage all participants to mute their microphones when they're not speaking and to direct comments through the chair.

When you have 30 seconds remaining in your testimony or questioning time, I will signal with this yellow sheet of paper. Interpretation services are available through the globe icon at the bottom of your screen.

I would now like to welcome our first group of winesses.

We will be hearing from, as an individual, Ms. Valerie Percival, Assistant Professor of

Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.

We will also hear from Mr. François Audet, a professor at the Université du Québec à Montréal and Executive Director of the Canadian Research Institute on Humanitarian Crises and Aid, and from Mr. Thomas Bollyky, Senior Fellow for Global Health, Economics, and Development

Council on Foreign Relations (New York).

Professor Percival, I will start with you and will give you the floor for five minutes of opening remarks.

[Valerie Percival, Associate Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today.

I will discuss the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic in conflict-affected settings and Canada’s role in that response. I will conclude with recommendations for how Canada can better exercise leadership in these challenging contexts.

The committee has heard testimony regarding the social, political and health impacts of COVID-19 in fragile settings. These impacts will reverberate for decades and be exacerbated by climate change, global economic disruption and uncertain development assistance budgets. Unless the trajectory changes, these populations will be trapped in cycles of violence and fragility, with little chance of escape.

How has the world, including Canada, reacted? It is a tale of two responses.

One tale is inspiring. Networks of local and international health and humanitarian actors, researchers and advocacy organizations have identified health needs and marginalized groups, maintained health service delivery and planned for the rollout of testing, treatments and vaccines. The pandemic strained an already stretched humanitarian system. The system is far from perfect. It often fell short, but it has limited human suffering under difficult circumstances.

In contrast, the tale of the second response, global political leadership by states, is a grim and depressing one. As the UN Secretary-General stated in September, “The pandemic is a clear test of international cooperation—a test we have essentially failed.”

One response cannot work without the other. Health services and other humanitarian actors cannot fully and effectively respond to the impacts of COVID-19 without political leadership to facilitate and remove constraints to that response.

The impact of this absence of leadership has been acutely felt in conflict-affected settings. For example, states did not mobilize to offer third party security guarantees to enable COVID ceasefires to take root and transform into peace agreements. They failed to persuade governments to protect the rights of migrants and displaced people, and they did not effectively confront opportunistic crackdowns by authoritarian regimes.

In short, global political leaders did not develop and deliver a clear and unifying message for why international co-operation is necessary and a plan for how to carry it out.

Where does Canada fit?

Canada has provided important support to the first response—the work of humanitarian and advocacy networks. The government increased its funding of these organizations to support the health response to COVID-19. It brought critical attention to the pandemic’s impact on women and girls.

But Canada’s role in the tale of the second response—political leadership—is disappointing. Canada’s rhetoric soars, but our words are not followed by concrete action. Canada sits at the table. We observe. We coordinate. We do not lead. This is a missed opportunity.

Mr. Chair, I'm aware that you worked for the UN mission in Iraq. I am sure you saw the enormous potential for “difference-makers”: the power of leadership from experienced diplomats and coordinated action among states and stakeholders and how that leadership can curve the trajectory of conflict towards peace.

At this critical juncture for conflict-affected states and the world, how can Canada contribute to such leadership?

Canada can help the world develop a unifying message, craft a clear plan to address vulnerabilities exacerbated by COVID in conflict-affected settings and mobilize the international system, as well as Canadian institutions, to implement such a plan.

First, for the unifying vision for our engagement in fragile settings and elsewhere, I would suggest a simple one that builds on our feminist approach: Protect human dignity and promote human potential.

Second, to craft a plan to implement this vision, let’s learn from what has worked in the COVID response. We can support networks of civil society organizations, researchers and other stakeholders. We can facilitate connections between these networks and like-minded states. We can explore novel mechanisms to prevent conflict, stop violence and sustain peace, and we can use these networks to promote economic opportunities in fragile contexts.

Third, we can help mobilize the international system, as well as Canadians, to implement this vision.

Internationally, we could utilize our membership across diverse institutions to promote this approach. This would complement and support the UN Secretary-General’s call for “networked multilateralism”.

Domestically, we could harness the expertise of Canadians both at home and abroad. Canadian experts are leaders in the fields of diplomacy and mediation, humanitarian and development assistance, global health and advancing gender equality, yet too often, our government fails to tap into this expertise.

How is this different from what we are currently doing? This approach extends our feminist policy. It engages with networks to develop and implement this dignity agenda. Most importantly, it would ensure that Canada's rhetoric rests upon a foundation of action.

Thank you very much. I look forward to questions from the committee.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor Percival.

I would now like to give the floor to professor Audet.

You have five minutes for you statement. Please go ahead.

[François Audet, Professor, Université du Québec à Montréal and Director, Observatoire canadien sur les crises et l'action humanitaire, As an Individual]

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me. As I don't have a lot of time, I'll get straight to the point.

In response to your request, I've concentrated essentially on an analysis of the marginalization of communities and populations by the current situation. I'll talk about five observations and two recommendations.

The first observation shows that the pandemic appears to have had far fewer direct health consequences in poor countries than in rich countries. By "direct consequences" I mean health- and mortality-related issues directly associated with COVID-19. In fact, apart from some major exceptions, which are Peru, Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador, excess mortality, particularly in Africa and several regions in Latin America and Southeast Asia, is indeed much lower than observed in OECD countries. Where data are less reliable, in particular screening data, we use excess mortality as an indicator, along with cemetery counts and inventories. This provides a degree of rigour in the statistical data we use.

The second observation shows that if direct health consequences are below expectation, then the indirect consequences, as Professor Percival mentioned, are already observable. They will also have significant and lasting impacts on marginalized populations, including those that are victims of conflict. This growing vulnerability has been exacerbated since the early months by the withdrawal of humanitarian supply chains and by a significant drop in direct foreign investment, including a 28% decline in Africa and 25% in Latin America and the Caribbean. This drop is much less significant in Asia, which ia a reflection of the economic influence of China in the region.

The third observation is that the indirect impacts that exacerbate these vulnerabilities are very well documented. We were able to see this on numerous occasions in interviews we conducted recently. Among other things, trust in institutions was being seriously eroded, further stoking social tensions and conflicts owing to these growing inequalities. This was the case in Guatemala and Colombia, and in Zimbabwe, Gambia and Togo in Africa,.

As for access to health care, the International Committee of the Red Cross noted a few weeks ago that 30% of clinics had been destroyed in Mali by armed groups ifollowing the withdrawal of international humanitarian organizations. Another key vulnerability is food insecurity. This situation is well documented. In fact it was reported on in this committee. At the risk of repeating myself, I would like to point out that 55 million people were experiencing food insecurity problems in September. We are now speaking of 220 million people suffering from food insecurity as a direct result of the pandemic. I believe these figures were published yesterday. It's a major increase and truly a real-time analysis.

The fourth observation is that displaced populations, meaning those who are often called "migrants", today represent over 80 million people. As you know, some of them have refugee status. Displaced populations, migrants or those with refugee status are also extremely marginalized by this situation. The pandemic has led to the closing of most international borders, and hundreds of thousands of people are gathered at borders just about everywhere on the planet.This situation, which has unfortunately been observed in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, significantly reduces access to health care and food.

The situation in Venezuela is also extremely serious. In recent months, 100,000 Venezuelans returned to the country. They had to because the border was closed owing to an economy that is literally in ruins, as it is in neighbouring countries like Colombia too. I feel an obligation to make this committee aware of the situation in the Las Claritas region, which is also in Venezuela. It's a vast Amazonian mining region in the State of Bolívar that is controlled by armed groups and traffickers. Las Claritas is also an ecological disaster, and a place where slavery, torture and murders go unpunished, as has been well documented in the context of illegal gold mining operations. The pandemic has made this zone more vulnerable than ever. The absence of local authorities, who are either accomplices or corrupt, and the trafficking in migrant Indigenous and other Venezuelans, have also been well documented.

My final observation was briefly addressed by my colleague. In the overall context I have just described, women remain the most vulnerable population. As we know, sexual violence has increased dramatically.

There are 7 million unwanted pregnancies in the world this year that are linked to the pandemic . These are clearly alarming figures.

I will now move on briefly to my conclusions, because my time is running out.

My first recommendation is related to the fact that it is important for Canada to maintain its leadership role in connection with the humanitarian localization agenda, which I took the liberty of translating into French as "l'agenda de la localisation humanitaire".

As you know, this approach to the localization of humanitarian aid, to which Canada has belonged since the "Grand Bargain" agreed upon at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit held in Istanbul, was to transfer resources to local authorities. It has been clearly demonstrated that decentralization is the key to achieving sustainable humanitarian responses.

My second recommendation is related to the importance of scientific cooperation to provide universal non-protectionist access to vaccines. The current international humanitarian situation undeniably needs a vision of solidarity to ensure access to vaccines for everyone.

To conclude, I'm among those who think that the long-term indirect repercussions of the pandemic will be more serious than the pandemic itself. These repercussions are tied among other things to socio-economic inequalities, conflicts, famines, shrinking democratic space and the erosion of protection for women's rights.

I'd be glad to discuss and answer any questions you may have.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Thank you very much, Professor Audet.

The final round of five minutes of prepared remarks goes to Mr. Bollyky.

[Thomas Bollyky, Senior Fellow for Global Health, Economics, and Development, Council on Foreign Relations, As an Individual]

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the response of the international community, including the Canadian government, to the humanitarian needs that have been created and exacerbated by the pandemic.

Plagues put a mirror to the societies they afflict. The coronavirus pandemic has exposed the failures of governments that do not invest in the health of their own constituents, or address the collective risks that arise when vulnerable groups globally lack adequate health and economic protections.

The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, non-partisan institution dedicated to advancing understanding of foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. We recently released a report of an independent task force on preparing for the next pandemic, “Improving Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons From COVID-19”.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Mr. Bollyky, I'm sorry to interrupt. We have lost the interpretation because of connectivity issues. Let's put this over to our IT team for some quick advice.

I was advised, sir, that maybe you could turn your camera off and we may possibly gain some bandwidth that way.

I believe the issue has been resolved, so please continue.

[Thomas Bollyky]

I appreciate the indulgence of the committee and I'm sorry for the Internet connectivity issues.

I'll continue on the three interrelated conclusions from the task force report.

First, while confirmed deaths from the coronavirus are approaching 1.5 million globally, the most damaging and long-lasting humanitarian consequences of this pandemic may not be from the virus itself. During the West Africa Ebola epidemic, more people died from the lack of regular medical care, particularly treatment for malaria, than were killed by the Ebola virus itself.

Even in nations that have yet to experience explosive growth in COVID cases and deaths, the pandemic is exacerbating poverty and inequities in health care access and food security. A recent survey of 18 African Union members found about half the respondents were delaying needed medical care or health care visits. A similar percentage reported difficulty in accessing medication in the pandemic. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network has estimated that the pandemic has coincided with a 25% increase in food assistance needs continent-wide.

The World Bank estimates 88 million additional people will be put into extreme poverty as a result of the COVID pandemic. In some regions like South Asia, higher economic growth may overcome some of that poverty it caused, but poverty in slower-growing economies in Africa and in fragile states like Venezuela is likely to persist.

National governments have failed to use multilateral forums effectively to forge a collective response to COVID-19 or its indirect health consequences. A strategic rivalry between China and the United States has undercut potential action at the G7, G20 and the United Nations Security Council.

The lesson here is that multilateral institutions do not spring magically into life during crises. Their success depends on the enlightened leadership of their member states that should be willing to put their differences aside and mobilize these bodies behind a collective effort.

The World Health Organization needs funding for its health emergencies program and should be required to report when governments fail to live up to their commitments. There needs to be a new global surveillance system to identify pandemic threats that is far less reliant on the self-reporting of early affected states.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

Madam Clerk, I think we may have lost Mr. Bollyky completely. Maybe the IT team could circle back. Let's let him know, and I will also reiterate that he's very welcome to send submissions in writing and that members of the committee could address questions to him in writing.

In the interest of time and the already compressed round that we're going into, we will now go into our first round of questions for six minutes.

Mr. Chong, the floor is yours.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Percival, thank you for your opening remarks. You mentioned that rhetoric soars with this government but there's little corresponding action. We know that overseas development assistance has been cut by 10% under this government compared to the previous government, from about 0.3% of GNI to about 2.7% of GNI. Canada has not met its commitment to 0.7% of GNI for foreign aid for many years.

What do you think is an appropriate target for us to achieve in the coming years? Obviously 0.7%, I think, is not realistic immediately. What should we be aiming for?

[Valerie Percival]

That is a very good question. Thank you very much for that.

Development finance isn't my area of expertise, so I'm hesitant to put a number on it. What I will say is that I think that, obviously, we need to commit to increases in our official development assistance budget. I know that the U.K. has signalled that because of COVID constraints it potentially will be cutting its overseas development assistance budget. We cannot replicate that here.

I would also add that sometimes, while I agree strongly that we need to increase our financial assistance, I think we also need to be more nimble and flexible in our response. That's maybe what I was trying to get at in terms of this idea of mobilizing networks. There is often a lot you can do with small amounts of money: I think empowering local actors, as Professor Audet has mentioned, and I would also say, empowering our high commissions and embassies overseas to be able to respond quickly.

People I know who work in humanitarian organizations talk about Canada's cumbersome budgetary processes for grants and how long it takes them. I have one friend who is in the ninth month of a negotiation for a COVID grant. We really need to roll things out faster. We need to look at the amount, but we also need to look at the efficiency and at how that assistance is supported by diplomatic action and leadership.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

You mentioned that there have been bad things—A Tale of Two Cities—during this pandemic. Opportunistic state actors have taken advantage of this to engage in conflicts. I think of the conflicts in the south Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan. You also mentioned opportunistic crackdowns; I think of the imposition of a draconian national security law in Hong Kong at the height of the pandemic. So, your analysis rings very true.

I have a question for Mr. Audet.

You mentioned the requirement for universal access for vaccines in your second recommendation. I want you to comment.

The government has claimed that it has signed contracts for more vaccines per capita than any other country on the face of this earth. I'd like you to comment on the government's assertion with respect to your second recommendation.

[François Audet]

Thank you for your question.

Like my colleague, I'm not an expert in vaccination issues. We've seen that in the global response, different states apply somewhat more protectionism and nationalism, while others tend towards multilateralism and universalism; these are the two extremes. Canada, at least for the time being, is straddling these two camps. There was a huge commitment to purchase vaccines. I do not want to comment on the brands or the effectiveness of these vaccines, because I'm not knowledgeable about this area. However, in terms of absolute numbers, Canada was one of the countries that took a position. It made a commitment to buy a very large number of vaccine units. Although this may be wishful thinking, let's hope that collective immunity and saturation will occur in Canada fairly soon and that any surplus not yet shipped to Canada but already purchased from companies, could perhaps redistributed to those regions of the world that have not had access to them.

If you will allow me to make one further comment, I'd like to add, in connection with this recommendation, that in view of the ecosystem for a pandemic like this one—and this was observed with Ebola—Canada remains vulnerable for as long as the threat of protectionism in the management of safety remains. Ensuring universality contributes to Canada's national protection. Universality and solidarity with regard to vaccines will serve national security interests too. This is not a paradox because all these factors are closely related.

To return very briefly to your first question, if you will permit, we have studied the financial commitments of countries for a long time. I agree with Ms. Percival that amounts should be in keeping with donors' ability to pay. However, the most important issue is trust in donor promises. I believe that we can criticize…

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

I'm sorry. We have to leave it there in the interest of time. We have to make sure everybody gets their round. Thank you.

The next six-minute round goes to Dr. Fry.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much.

Is Mr. Bollyky coming back on at all? Gosh, do I have lots of questions for him.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

I don't see him at the moment, Dr. Fry. We can direct questions to him in writing—

[Thomas Bollyky]

I'm on.

[The Chair, Liberal, Sven Spengemann]

He's back. Okay.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Great. All right.

My first question is for you, Professor Percival.

You talked a lot about how the Government of Canada does not have a global foreign affairs policy, nor does it have global foreign affairs experts. If the government should begin to talk about doing that in a way that would mean that we actually have a multilateral response with other countries, what are the parameters of developing such a group? How would it be done? What would it cost? How could Canada set about doing it?

[Valerie Percival]

I'm sorry; you cut out a little bit. When you're talking about a group, do you mean domestically or do you mean internationally?

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

No. You said that Canada does not have a global foreign affairs policy nor bureaucrats who are able to complete a global foreign affairs policy.

How do we go about setting that up? What parameters do we need to have to make it work?

[Valerie Percival]

I believe you're referring to comments I made in writing about our lack of a global health strategy.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Yes.

[Valerie Percival]

Just to be transparent, I did work at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada as a senior global health adviser. I just want to make sure the committee knows that.

I think one of the things I have experienced in my dealings with Global Affairs Canada in more recent years is that the number of health experts is declining within that department. The other thing I have noticed in my interactions with the Government of Canada is that there is a lack of coordination between the Public Health Agency of Canada and Global Affairs Canada in terms of its global health response.

In previous writings—they predated the COVID pandemic—I suggested a global health secretariat at the Privy Council Office, led by a global health ambassador to act as a coordinator and establish a global health strategy and develop priorities across the Government of Canada with relevant departments. I think that kind of secretariat would have proved very useful during the COVID pandemic.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much. I only have a few minutes and I want to go to Mr. Bollyky.

Mr. Bollyky, you talked about the inherent vulnerability of an international system of pandemic detection that relies heavily on the transparency, judgment and discretion of individual national governments. Obviously, they vie with each other, Mr. Bollyky, for getting vaccines, for doing everything, and don't actually work in the best interests.

You also talked about setting up an autonomous group that would be a watchdog and would find indicators and ways of measuring how governments are responding in ways that are in the best interests of an international global health strategy. It follows up on what Professor Percival was saying.