Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak here today regarding Canada's approach to Africa.
You are examining this subject at a critical moment in Africa's history. You have no doubt heard, but it bears underscoring, that the continent will be home to one-quarter of the world's population by 2050. Its natural resources, including 30% of the world's critical minerals that will power our modern world and help drive our economies, are found there. Moreover, it is situated at the geographic centre of our world—along major sea lines in the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea.
The region holds three non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council and it represents the largest regional voting bloc at the United Nations.
With its median age of only 18, President Biden was correct when he said that Africa will shape the future—and not just the future of the African people, but of the world. Today, the world is keenly aware of Africa's growing importance, which is spurring countries large and small to expand their political, economic and security engagement with African states.
Make no mistake, African nations and their leaders understand well their growing importance in the world. They are demanding a greater voice in the global decisions that affect them and are leveraging their diplomatic courtiers to obtain better deals for themselves and their people. This influx of new actors and this renewed assertion of African agency are creating a highly dynamic and increasingly difficult to navigate environment for the continent's traditional friends, donors and partners.
At the same time, the region itself is undergoing significant transformations in its own socio-economic, political and security landscape. That massive youth bulge is creating the greatest spread among the average age of leaders and the average age of citizens. This spread of nearly 60 years is a factor in the nine coups d'etat that African nations have experienced in the last five years. It underpins the declining democratic trends across the continent today, which see fewer people living under democratic rule than at any time since 1991.
These developments, however, have been blunted by the convergence of growing incidents of armed conflict and terrorism, which today see Africa as a global centre of jihadism, climate change—which Africans rightly highlight they did not cause, but which they are paying for—food insecurity, and COVID-19 pandemic-induced health and economic woes that have set back development gains on the continent by 20 years.
In this potent mix of forces and trends, the People's Republic of China sees the region as an opportunity. From Beijing's perspective, Africa is an untapped consumer market and a source for the commodities it needs to drive its expansion. Decades ago, it also saw in Africa an important arena in which to challenge the rules-based international order and advance its geopolitical interests.
China's engagement is not linear and it would be a mistake to view it as wholly malign. Indeed, while China is perhaps seen as a global adversary across a host of important political, economic and security sectors, the use of Africa as a chessboard only serves to undermine western efforts to strengthen and deepen our partnerships there.
Russia, too, in recent years has found in the region a permissive environment for parastatals and private military companies, often fomenting instability for strategic and financial benefit. Russia uses its security and economic ties, as well as disinformation, to undercut Africa's principled opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and related human rights abuses and to sow dissent against Africa's traditional partners. It portrays Moscow, in the historical image, as siding with Africa's independence-minded leaders against what many on the continent see as a kind of western neo-colonialism.
Many African leaders see their countries as victims of the post-World War II international order. In their view, western powers use international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to advance their interests while imposing painful conditionalities on African countries. Russian propaganda efforts did not create these views, but they do underscore them today to great effect.
Similarly, the west's long-time support for African strongmen, from Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko to Equatorial Guinea's Teodoro Obiang today, as well as its willingness to topple those opposed to its interests—as in the 2011 NATO war against Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi—have hurt the west's credibility with African partners that it now tries to sell on an agenda of shared values.
Both China and Russia are effectively using this history to advance their agendas. Make no mistake: China and Russia have identified and seized upon an opportunity in Africa, but they did not create it. The African Union has defined, in its own strategic document “Agenda 2063”, that the creation of a multipolar international system is in Africa's interest. Multiplying its partnerships and requiring those partners to compete for African influence is a benefit.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.