Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'd like to call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 104 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Before we begin, I'd like to remind all members and our witnesses of the following important preventive measures.

To prevent disruptive and potentially harmful audio feedback incidents that can cause injuries, all in-person participants are reminded to keep their earpieces away from microphones at all times. As indicated in the communiqué from the Speaker to all members on April 29, the following measures have been taken to help prevent audio feedback incidents.

First, all earpieces have been replaced by a model that greatly reduces the probability of audio feedback. The new earpieces are black in colour, whereas the former earpieces were gray. Please only use an approved black earpiece.

Second, by default, all unused earpieces will be unplugged at the start of a meeting.

Third, when you are not using your earpiece, please place it face down on the middle of the sticker that you will find on the table for this purpose. You will all find a sticker right before you. Please consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback.

Last, the room layout has been adjusted to increase the distance between microphones and reduce the chance of feedback from an ambient earpiece.

These measures are in place so we can conduct our business without interruption and protect the health and safety of all participants, including, of course, the interpreters.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. For members in the room, please raise your hand if you wish to speak. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The committee clerk and I will do our very best to maintain a consolidated speaking order.

You may speak in the official language of your choice. Interpretation services are available. You have the choice of floor, English or French. If interpretation is lost, please inform me immediately. I'll remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I have been informed by the clerk that all witnesses have completed the required connection tests in advance of our meeting.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, January 29, 2024, the committee will now resume its study of Canada's approach to Africa.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses.

We have Mr. Alessandro Arduino, who is an affiliate lecturer at the Lau China Institute at King's College London.

We're grateful to have here with us today, in person, Professor Walter Dorn of the Royal Military College of Canada, department of defence studies.

We also have Mr. Mamoudou Gazibo, who is a professor of political science at the Université de Montréal.

You will each have five minutes for your opening remarks. I would ask that you each look up at the screen because once we're approaching the five minutes, I will hold up my cellphone. I would ask that when you see it, you conclude your remarks within 15 seconds. That's not only for the purposes of your opening remarks, but also for responses to members.

All of that having been explained, we will now start off with Mr. Arduino.

You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Alessandro Arduino, Affiliate Lecturer, Lau China Institute, King's College London, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I want to start by thanking the chair and committee members for giving me this opportunity to testify today. The views I will be presenting today are solely my own and do not represent any organization that I am affiliated with.

In mapping out Canada's strategic approach to Africa, in my personal opinion, it's imperative to take into consideration a core security variable. This variable is the rising influence of mercenaries or armed proxies that are aligned with external interests, such as the Russian Wagner Group.

While Canada's engagement in Africa is rooted in shared objectives and is very importantly informed by homegrown solutions, several key initiatives in the area, particularly if we look at west Africa and the Sahel region, are facing a significant challenge from mercenaries and quasi-PMCs, or private military companies. For example, a substantial portion of Canadian investment in Africa is concentrated in the mining sector. This has notably become a focal point for mercenaries, especially the Wagner Group, which are able to exploit local natural resources in exchange for the protection of the local regime.

If we move to the economy and security, another issue definitely arises from the fact that the role of mercenaries is progressively sidelining very important programs, like those for women, peace and security. These mercenaries are providing training to local militia, disregarding not only women, peace and security principles, but also fundamental human rights.

The meaningful decision to include women in peacekeeping efforts is pivotal, especially in Africa, where setbacks in this regard are jeopardizing the prospect for peace. Therefore, Canada's commitment to promote gender equality and women's empowerment as a pillar of international assistance programs in Africa is now under threat.

Another issue, which is also a security issue, relates to the fact that Africa's security landscape is evolving extremely quickly, and there is a rise in the menace of terrorism and military coups. Therefore, Canada's role in local institutions and regional institutions, like the African Union and the United Nations body dedicated to peacebuilding and peacekeeping, needs to take into consideration the fact that actions taken by quasi-PMCs like the Wagner Group aim to undermine western-led counterterrorism efforts, which Canada has actively supported.

Mercenaries have been a fixture in Africa since the second half of the 20th century, and they are used to protect incumbent leaders or install new ones in conflict zones. Their offerings that we were used to—guns for hire—which remained unchanged for decades, are changing right now. They have recently evolved with new roles that include technical advisers for sophisticated weapons systems, propaganda, disinformation outfits and the usual frontline combatants. In this regard, Africa is a very fertile environment for mercenaries. There is a prevalence of low-intensity conflict, meaning the region reduces the risks to the lives of mercenaries.

The continent has abundant natural resources and presents opportunities for exploitation. Also, there is a pervasive instability across many African nations that enables mercenaries to operate with, let's say, relative impunity, amplifying their appeal to state and non-state actors, which can engage and hire them. This is thanks to plausible deniability.

Allow me to conclude by stressing that mercenaries, when they align their interests with local military junta, infiltrate every facet of society. They drain resources from crucial projects, like projects aimed at combatting poverty, at food security and at migration, and especially the ones related to gender inequality and even climate change. These all suffer as a result of mercenaries' activities.

I think my time is spot on. Thank you for your attention. I'm looking forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Mr. Arduino. I understand that you're joining us from Rome, so it must be pretty late. Thank you for taking the time to join us this week.

We next go to Professor Dorn.

It's a great pleasure to have you here. Thank you for being here in person. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Walter Dorn, Full Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Defence Studies, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, I would like to thank you for your invitation and the committee for its interest in Africa.

Africa is a much neglected continent that in previous centuries was subject to great abuse by western countries. Even now there are external forces that prey upon the vulnerabilities of the continent. There is a one-sided race for Africa, but we in Canada seem to be oblivious to it. It echoes the scramble for Africa that took place in the second half of the 19th century.

China, using its powerful business and financial clout, is seeking to control Africa's vast mineral resources, and as we have just heard, Russia is preying upon Africa's democratic deficit by supporting coup plotters, dictators and naive leaders. I have seen first-hand the Wagner forces, which provide close protection to the president of the Central African Republic. I've seen Chinese soldiers building roads in the DR Congo, and I've seen Chinese-built stadiums in various African cities as part of China's hearts and minds campaign.

As an operational professor who tries to get to field operations frequently, I focus on what must be done to improve peace and security. One of the key solutions is a Canadian invention: the peacekeeping forces first proposed by Lester B. Pearson. UN missions, despite all of their flaws, are still the best way to provide a benevolent presence over a wide area to give Africans more security. The positive record, though unsung, is impressive, including stopping the breakup of the Congo in the 1960s; Namibia's gaining independence in 1989; fostering the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994; helping end civil wars in Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone; moving Angola towards democracy; and restoring democracy, including by using force, in Côte d'Ivoire. Also, I was delighted to witness first-hand former dictator Charles Taylor being tried in the UN special court for Sierra Leone.

Even peacekeeping's failures in Africa highlight its importance. The UN's mission in Rwanda, led by your former colleague, parliamentarian Roméo Dallaire, managed to save 20,000 to 30,000 lives with a reduced force of just 300 peacekeepers.

By learning from the past, Canada can do much more to help the cause of peacekeeping in Africa. For example, it could provide the long-promised quick reaction force to the UN's mission in the Central African Republic. It could respond to the call from the Congolese people for protection, helping neutralize once again the M23. Canada could increase its support for the UN mission in South Sudan, the world's newest country. So many other places will need UN peacekeeping forces, including Sudan, Cameroon and Libya.

Canada was once the master of working within the UN system for human security in Africa and around the world. Canada was the leading peacekeeping nation for decades. We had nine leaders of UN forces in the 1990s. Four of them were in Africa, but we've had none since then.

Canada has zero troops or units deployed in UN peace operations in Africa, and in the handout that I have provided, you will see that the number of deployed military personnel on UN peacekeeping operations is only 17, and the number of Canadian women military personnel deployed to Africa under the UN is two, despite the Elsie initiative.

Africa matters, and resolving Africa's conflicts is important. These conflicts are open wounds on the world body. They hemorrhage blood, they spread disease, they create child soldiers, they diminish democracy, they promote dictatorship and they cause major refugee flows.

At the same time, Africa has much to offer. It has natural resources that will help power the future. It has human resources that can help solve the problems of aging western populations. Africans have shown courage in the face of adversity, happiness in the midst of poverty and steadfast hope despite the blows to their body politic, but they need help.

Canada can do much more for African peace and security.

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Dorn.

We now go to Professor Gazibo.

You have five minutes, sir.

[Mamoudou Gazibo, Full Professor of Political Science, Université de Montréal, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak about a topic as important as relations between Canada and Africa.

Since I'm not an expert on Canadian foreign or African policy, I would like to begin by raising four points that I believe are crucial in order to better understand the context of Canada's engagement in Africa.

The first point relates to Africa's rapidly changing domestic context and its international implications. This is reflected in the citizens' engagement in international issues, for example, which didn't happen before. In Africa, citizens are increasingly developing new forms of what we might call veto points over relations between their country and the outside world, particularly western countries. This is made possible by a number of overlooked factors, such as rapid urbanization; the narrowing of the digital divide; the widespread use of social media, including WhatsApp; and the development of local applications that use local languages and that are easy to access, even for people who didn't attend school. These changes are also supported by the emergence of a middle class and an educated diaspora with a growing connection to the continent.

The second point concerns the challenges posed to Canada and other western countries in Africa by emerging countries, with China leading the way. As China institutionalizes strong relations with Africa, and different emerging powers such as Turkey, India, Brazil and others follow its example, Africa is gaining political, economic and strategic leverage. As a result, it's less vulnerable than before in relation to the European Union, Canada or the United States. To illustrate this situation, my colleagues already provided the example of France, a major power in the region. France has now been almost completely expelled from the Sahel region, particularly from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Another well‑known example is the recent vote by African countries at the UN during the adoption of resolutions condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This shows that African countries are aligning themselves less and less with western positions.

The third point concerns security challenges and the resulting political upheaval in a number of regions, such as the Sahel, the Horn of Africa or Central Africa. This situation can be seen either as an opportunity for stronger engagement that aligns with African expectations, or as a reason for disengagement. Here too, as my colleagues pointed out, certain countries such as Russia or Turkey are betting on going along with events. They hope that this will open up opportunities to gain influence, even if it isn't necessarily in the interest of African people. I notice that other countries, particularly in the west, generally tend to shy away from this situation and let their competitors take the stage. I think that Canada should define its policy in these types of circumstances.

The last point is related to the previous one. This point concerns what Christopher Hill, an author specializing in relations between the European Union and Africa, termed the capability‑expectations gap. An Italian colleague and I explored this issue in depth in a collective book on relations between the European Union and Africa. However, I think that it's even more applicable to Canada, as my colleague reminded us earlier. The capability‑expectations gap refers to the fact that Canada's resources, instruments, procedures and values often aren't strong or adapted enough to give Canada the opportunity to implement ambitious policies on the African continent.

To conclude, I would like to put forward three main ideas. First, given the context just described, the approaches of Africa's traditional partners are undeniably outdated in relation to the continent's current political and social dynamics. Second, any policy aimed at Africa must be adjusted to reflect its domestic and international dynamics. Third, respect and consultation must play a key role in policies aimed at Africa. Africa is changing and is increasingly seeking sovereignty and greater autonomy.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Gazibo.

Now we will go to members for questions. For the first round, each member will receive five minutes. We will start off with MP Hoback.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

Thank you, Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here this afternoon.

I'm going to start off with you, Mr. Arduino. You talked about mercenaries and the Wagner Group showing up more and more in different countries within the region. How does Canada interact in countries where those mercenaries and the Wagner Group are already present? How should we be involving ourselves with those governments, and what advice do we give to Canadian businesses, like those in the mining sector, in regions where these people have a foothold?

[Dr. Alessandro Arduino]

That's a great question.

First, in the area where the Wagner Group is present—and we are seeing that it has an expanding footprint, which started with Mali and Mozambique and is moving faster to Burkina Faso, to Niger and, probably soon enough, to Chad—there is no possibility to compete when providing security to local workers and foreign workers. As an example, there is a Canadian mine that, due to the insurgence in CAR, not far from Bangui, they momentarily left. The Wagner Group possesses it now, with a value that the U.S. Treasury estimates is between $1 billion and $2.8 billion U.S.

The problem that the Canadian mining sector is facing is not unique to Canada. It also affects other countries that operate in partnership with African countries in the sector, even China. It's quite paradoxical, but even China, having a no-limits friendship with Russia, is on a competing foot with Russia, especially with the Wagner Group and mercenaries. Mercenaries are there to prey on chaos and to promote more chaos in order to exploit natural resources, while normal mining operations work only when there is security.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

Mr. Dorn, you talked about peacekeepers and the role of peacekeepers. How do peacekeepers operate in an environment where nobody wants peace? How do they operate in an environment where both sides would rather not have peace, would rather have chaos?

What are they willing or able to do? What has to change at the UN so that peacekeepers on the ground actually have the tools and directions to do what they need to do to provide peace?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

In all the countries I have examined, the people of those countries want peace. Parties, like the mercenaries and Wagner, that prey upon the local populations and that use war as a means to enrich themselves are the ones that are resistant to peace. The peacekeepers should be there for the protection of civilians. Every multi-dimensional mission of the UN since Canada passed the UN Security Council resolution—when we were last on the UN Security Council for the protection of civilians—has had a mandate for the protection of civilians. It's really important that the UN can be there to win hearts and minds.

However, to your second question, the tools are not there for the UN to do that work because there aren't enough countries willing to provide their men and women in uniform to take robust action, as we had promised with the quick reaction force, which was precisely for that. The Portuguese have done a wonderful job in the Central African Republic to protect civilians and to take on some of the preying gangs. We need other countries to follow that example and provide units that can do a good job.

There's a variety of tools to bring parties to the negotiating table. One of them is showing them that they're better off in a society that is under the rule of law, rather than in one in which they themselves can be victims of the chaos.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

I don't disagree with you, but the reality is that if you don't have the ability, the force or the direction to do that and you can't intercede and protect civilians, it works against you. Is that not fair to say? When people expect this from the peacekeepers and don't get what's expected, doesn't that just leave civilians looking for other alternatives?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

Yes, there is disappointment from the local population. However, having some presence is much better than having no presence, so we need to support the peacekeepers who are there.

The peacekeepers need adequate equipment, including non-lethal weapons, because most of the time you can solve problems without killing people. You need tear gas, tasers and the other types of weapons that are necessary for most of the jobs. The UN runs on a shoestring. It's understaffed, underequipped and under-resourced.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

It's funny, because some people would say the UN is maybe not properly deploying the resources they have in the way they should be. Is that a fair comment?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

It's at least five to 10 times cheaper than a U.S. operation. If you do the accounting, it's extremely reasonable to do UN peacekeeping. Also, for countries like Canada and other countries, the UN reimburses some of the cost. However, we have the problem that a lot of the very capable countries, like Canada and those in Europe, are not providing the forces necessary to get to the level of capability necessary to have really well-equipped troops.

When I first started studying this in the early 1990s, it was about 50% developed and developing world. Now it's 80% developing world and just 20% developed world. Europeans are in places like Lebanon—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm sorry, Mr. Dorn. We'll have to go to the next questioner.

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

We need to get that balance back.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We'll next go to MP Zuberi.

You have five minutes.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for joining us today.

Mr. Gazibo told us earlier that we had to respect Africa, its sovereignty and autonomy.

We heard a similar theme in previous testimony from Mr. Akuffo. When I spoke with him outside of a committee meeting, he said that we needed to deal with Africa in its own right and not respond to Russia and China necessarily. Obviously, we need to have an awareness of them and other actors, but we need to deal with Africa in its own right, similar to the testimony we just heard.

Mr. Dorn, I know you're a Royal Military College professor. I was in the reserves once upon a time, so I appreciate the space that you're operating in. You spoke about Roméo Dallaire and others who have led peacekeeping missions in the past. Oftentimes when we have these sorts of interventions or involvements, we're not using the principle that was just mentioned here at committee and by others.

How do we address our involvements in the future—if we choose to have them as a country—so that while we are maintaining peace and security, we're doing so with respect for the sovereignty, autonomy and agency of the African countries and regions where we're intervening?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

You can do so because the first principle of UN peacekeeping is consent. You have to have the consent of the host state and the major parties in the conflict. The second is impartiality, and the third is minimum use of force in defence and defence of mandate.

We can better strengthen this partnership with African countries by really viewing it as a partnership. Peacekeeping forces are not there as an imposition. They're there to work with the local forces. It's part of a transition process so that as the peacekeeping forces are reduced, the local forces take on more capacity.

The problem is that when some countries, like Mali, become dictatorships, they don't want oversight. The leaders don't want the oversight the UN provides. When you have all those people on the ground, you have a huge amount of clout. The UN has all that clout from having peacekeepers deployed in northern Mali, middle Mali and southern Mali. The leaders resent the fact that the UN puts pressure on them.

I think it's really important to have peacekeeping and to view it as a partnership, but it does get really difficult when the leaders themselves want to commit human rights violations, because the UN has a human rights due diligence policy.

That's probably too long of an answer.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

The great thing about Canada is that we have people from everywhere, from all around the world, who are Canadian and are being educated and fully contributing to Canadian society in multiple ways, including in professional capacities as we grow as a country. We have many who are from different heritages, including countries within Africa.

How important do you think it is to make sure that in our missions and our presence, be they diplomatic or otherwise, we have a strong presence of Canadians with roots from the countries or regions we're dealing with, be that in the military or diplomatic context?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

I strongly support your idea. As a multicultural country, we have that as a strong resource. Bilingualism, particularly in francophone Africa, is a strong component of what we can contribute to peacekeeping in those countries.

We can also be an example. You can have people whose ancestors came from Africa and were deployed in missions, and they can say, “Look, we can integrate into the Canadian Forces.” Then you view this as oneness, not division.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

We have 40 seconds.

Do you feel strongly that cultural competency is key to respecting the agency of Africa?

[Dr. Walter Dorn]

Absolutely. You have to respect them as individuals. You have to respect their cultures and you have to help integrate culture into your policies.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Would you say it's important that we have personnel from those backgrounds not only in the implementation at the ground level, but also in the decision-making whenever possible?