Evidence of meeting #113 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was iranian.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you, Professor Juneau.
We now go to MP Bergeron. You have six minutes, sir.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
My questions are for Witness 1.
First, I really like your assertion that we can chew gum and walk at the same time, meaning that we can use all of the tools at our disposal to crack down on the IRGC and, if we need more resources, add that organization to the list of terrorist entities, which is what you believe it is.
In Professor Juneau's own opinion, we also need to devote more resources to enforcing the Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, since very few funds have been frozen to date, at nearly $79,000.
You said something that really struck me. According to you, the south believes Canada to be rather complacent towards the Iranian regime and, consequently, towards the IRGC, and that this should lead us to put the latter on the list of terrorist entities. Last week, we heard from Professor Raboudi from the University of Ottawa, who also told us that the IRGC met the definition of a terrorist entity, but that it was not appropriate to add it to the list, as that would discredit us in the eyes of the international community and the global south in particular, and that we had to take into account the current conflict in the Middle East. In fact, I'm interpreting what he said; I don't want to put words in his mouth.
What do you think of that analysis, which runs counter to yours?
As an Individual
Thank you for your question.
I think I understand the reasoning behind his assertion, which is highly conjectural. He believes that, today, in the context of the war in Gaza and the situation there, including the IRGC on that list would de facto place us in the camp of pro-Israeli countries, which could damage our credibility in the eyes of a certain segment of international public opinion. I imagine that that is what led him to make that assertion.
My answer is that there's no good time to put an organization, which is indeed comparable to a fascist organization, on such a list. It's true that there might be a price to pay in diplomatic terms and in terms of our international image.
However, it's time for Canada to stop playing it safe, being risk avoidant and cautious. There comes a time when courageous action is needed.
Bloc
Stéphane Bergeron Bloc Montarville, QC
We were rather surprised in recent months to see the Houthis attack nearby vessels in the Red Sea.
In your opinion, what was Iran's objective behind those attacks, given that the Houthis are being attacked by an international coalition? Was it to broaden the international coalition against them, or simply to destabilize international trade?
As an Individual
This is really Professor Juneau’s area of expertise. I’ll let him complete what I’m about to say, and I’ll speak subject to his authority.
You’re quite right. The Iranian regime’s activities, in general, respond to a clear principle: to create disorder and instability. This includes the activities of its cyber-army, its propaganda activities and what it’s doing in Lebanon and Yemen. As you know, the IRGC Quds Force is active in Sudan, where it supplies Shahed‑136 drones to the army of the general whose name escapes me, but whose aim is precisely to gain a foothold on both sides of the Bab el‑Mandab Strait and the Red Sea and destabilize, if not disrupt, world trade and shipping.
Bloc
Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I think you said it well. The threat posed by the Houthis in the Red Sea is very serious and will remain there for the long term. That threat is the direct result of Iran’s support of the Houthis. The various capabilities that the Houthis use in the Red Sea, such as drones, underwater drones, ground-to-sea missiles, amphibious assault teams, naval mines, come overwhelmingly from Iran. Without Iranian support, the Houthis would not have these capabilities.
The Houthis’ goal is to emerge as the internationally recognized government of Yemen, which is not the case at present, since there is another government that is internationally recognized. The problem is that this government is weak, corrupt and fragmented. De facto, the Houthis have won Yemen’s civil war. That’s bad news, but it’s the reality. Today, the United States, despite its efforts to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, has an extremely limited number of options to stop them.
Therefore, it’s a threat in the Red Sea that we’ll have to deal with in the long term.
As an Individual
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and sharing this with us.
Professor Juneau, you just spoke about the Houthis and how the U.S. has very little control in the region. I'm concerned, as a parliamentarian for Canada, about what Canada should be doing to counter Iran's influence in the area, given the horrifying humanitarian situation and the suffering of Yemenis under the Houthis as well as in the Saudi war, which was of course, as we know, supported politically by Canada. There is a desperate need for real peace and a real diplomatic solution.
What can we do, in this case, that would benefit the people of Yemen, who we know have suffered so greatly at the hands of both warring parties?
Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you.
To build on what I said in answer to the previous question, the reality right now is that the Houthis have won the civil war in Yemen. They do not control the entire territory of the country, but they control about 60% to 70% of the population. Politically and militarily, they are by far the strongest actor in the country.
That is very bad news for the people of Yemen, because the Houthis have shown themselves to be absolutely brutal in terms of their administration. It's bad news for the region, because now they are exporting that brutality outside the borders of Yemen. We suspected that for years, but now we actually see it in terms of what they're doing in the Red Sea area. The problem is that it is not going to stop. A ceasefire in Gaza, for example, is a separate discussion, and it is not going to stop the Houthi threat to the Red Sea. It is independent of that.
From a Canadian perspective, I think we need to support U.S. efforts to counter the Houthis, because that is good for regional security and ultimately for the Yemeni people. How do we do that? It's by participating in the maritime mission in the Red Sea. Even if it's a symbolic participation, as it is now, it's better than nothing. If we ever have a ship to spare—which is not obvious—I think that would be a good idea.
Beyond that, there's not much of a political process in Yemen right now, because the Houthis are not interested in it.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Yes. Also, I suppose having a feminist foreign policy—or being purported to have a feminist foreign policy—means we should be looking at ways we can end the impact on women and children, who we know are the ones feeling the brunt of this conflict.
Speaking of our foreign policy, one thing you talked about was the fact that Canada is at reputational risk because we are not following through on what we promise. We say one thing, but we don't follow through on it. That's been the problem with using sanctions as a cornerstone or large piece of our foreign policy: We have no ability to enforce them. We're known for being quite good at putting people or entities on the list, but the follow-through and enforcement of those sanctions are very weak.
You mentioned there is potential significant harm to Canada's reputation because of this. Can you describe that a bit more for me?
Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
That's an extremely important point.
In general, in Canadian civil society, media and politics, we really underestimate the damage to our reputation by being easy riders on defence and national security issues and by underinvesting in these issues. It's true for sanctions, as I said, but it's absolutely true beyond sanctions.
To be perfectly blunt, I'm not especially bothered by reputational risk in the global south, but there is a significant reputational risk among our allies in NATO and especially in the U.S. That's what should really bother us, especially because, as the 2020s and 2030s go by, more and more in multilateralism—on which we are so dependent—it's about what you bring to the table. It's not about your reputation as a do-gooder or anything like that, and what we bring to the table is limited. More and more, we are not going to be invited to ad hoc multilateral arrangements. Think about the AUKUS working groups and multiple other examples.
Whether it's sanctions or something else, we need to be much more coherent and consistent at this level.
NDP
Heather McPherson NDP Edmonton Strathcona, AB
Well, one would think too of the fact that our reputation is weak with regard to sanctions and other areas within the multilateral fora. There is also the idea that we are piggybacking on a reputation we had some time ago. We are losing that reputation of being, as you put it, do-gooders in the global community.
You know, we've seen that we have not been very coherent with regard to support for international law. We have not been very coherent with regard to support for trade and the impacts of Canadian companies working abroad. A number of times our foreign policy has not aligned with our actions on the world stage. We will see the impacts of that as we go forward.
One of the things you talked about was dedicating enough resources to things like sanction enforcement and how we have not added those resources. Can you talk a little bit more about what that could look like and what other countries are doing with regard to ensuring that these things are adequately resourced and are given the tools necessary to do the job?
Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Well, the first thing I would note is the last point I mentioned in my presentation, which is the need for more transparency at this level. Generally speaking, we are not very good at transparency on the national security foreign policy front, and the same goes for the sanctions side.
I am not in a position to give any numbers to quantify my answer. This is based on research, conversations, interviews and informal parts of my work on a regular basis. I'm also saying this as a former government person.
In a nutshell, whether it's CSIS, the RCMP, CBSA or Global Affairs—which plays a major role now in terms of coordinating these issues on the international trade side of foreign affairs—there is very simply a need for more resources, more human bodies and more money. If you look at OFAC, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is the U.S. office that manages sanctions in the U.S., it is gigantic. We are not the U.S. and we never will be, but proportionally we are nowhere close.
NDP
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you very much, MP McPherson.
Given that we have a few minutes left, I'm going to ask two questions.
First of all, Professor Juneau, I completely understand the arguments you've been making regarding resource management, and that's fair enough.
What concerns me is that I have not seen us do anything concrete to deal with all of the activities the members were asking you about, whether it's money laundering or transnational repression. There's been very little concrete action. What is the risk from that? Does that not embolden the Islamic Republic and the IRGC as well?
Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Well, the simple answer to that is yes. I and a number of my colleagues have been saying for years now that we have been neglecting national security issues. The IRGC is on the list of threats we have been neglecting, but it is far from the only one.
Look at the whole debate on foreign interference that is going on right now. I would bring to your attention the report that a number of my colleagues and I did at the University of Ottawa two years ago. There was a task force that had a number of former directors of CSIS, former national security advisers and former deputy ministers of defence and of foreign affairs. The bulk of that report was a call to action on the cost of neglecting all of these threats, which included the IRGC. That was only one of the many threats we highlighted, which also included cyber, economic, espionage, money laundering, terrorism, extremism, China, Russia, India and so on.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you very much.
My last question is for Witness 1.
As you know, our authorities work hand in glove with our American counterparts, especially when it comes to law enforcement. Have you had an opportunity to discuss the concerns that you expressed with U.S. authorities? What are their perspectives, given the reality that they have already listed the IRGC?
As an Individual
Thank you for the question.
Unfortunately, I didn’t have the opportunity to talk about that with the American government. On the other hand, I have often had the opportunity to talk, candidly and informally, with representatives of the U.S. armed forces. Each time, they are astonished by the lack of a clear strategic line in Canada’s foreign policy. Yet that is a sine qua non for a coherent policy, particularly with regard to the IRGC.
I’d like to take this opportunity to talk about our reputation and the use of our resources. Earlier, I used the example of the IRGC’s activities in Sudan, where a civil war is currently raging—there are 8 million displaced people and tens of millions dead. We don’t even have an embassy there, not even a special envoy. What’s more, we still have no African policy. The IRGC is building a base in Port Sudan, which puts them close to Yemen. It is also negotiating the construction of a naval base in Djibouti.
As I said, some players are lucid. Others are naive, and I’m afraid we’re one of the latter.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you very much, Witness 1.
Thank concludes questions by the members.
At this point I'd like to thank Professor Amiry-Moghaddam, Witness 1 and, of course, Professor Juneau. We are very grateful for your time and your expertise.
Before the members leave, I want to talk about the budget that was sent around to you. It's the budget for the study of the appointment of Dr. Bennett as Canada's ambassador to Denmark. The amount was $1,000, and this budget amount was circulated to you.
Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt that budget?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
That's excellent.
Then there is the SDIR budget, a budget for the study of the current situation in Ethiopia, in the amount of $6,800 for the subcommittee on international human rights.
Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt that budget?
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Finally, we have a budget for the study of the current situation in Sudan in the amount of $6,750 for the subcommittee.
Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt that budget as well?