Foreign Affairs Committee on June 10th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 113 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Before we begin, I'd like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Use only the black earpieces. Keep your earpieces away from all microphones at all times. When you are not using your earpiece, please place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of our distinguished witnesses, as well as the members.

Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. You may speak in the official language of your choice. Interpretation services are available.

In accordance with the committee's routine motion concerning connection tests for witnesses, I've been assured by the clerk that she has very kindly made sure that the tests with all witnesses who are joining us virtually have been completed.

I should start off by apologizing to the witnesses. We had a number of votes. That has changed the schedule somewhat today, but we're very grateful that you can join us.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 16, 2023, the committee will resume its study of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the current situation in Iran. Of course, as everyone is aware, to the extent possible, today we're going to keep the focus on the IRGC and what it does beyond the borders of Iran.

That all having been explained, it's a great pleasure to welcome today Dr. Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, who is a professor and the head of the Iran Human Rights centre.

We're also grateful to have with us here in person Professor Thomas Juneau, a professor with the public and international affairs department at the University of Ottawa, who is familiar to all of you.

Also, joining us virtually, we have Witness 1.

Each of you will be provided five minutes for your opening remarks, after which we will open it to questions by the members.

We will start off with Professor Amiry-Moghaddam.

You have five minutes, and the floor is yours, sir.

[Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, Professor, Iran Human Rights, As an Individual]

Thank you so much.

Thank you for inviting me, ladies and gentlemen.

As was said, I'm the director of the organization Iran Human Rights.

Iran Human Rights has been monitoring and reporting human rights violations in Iran for the last 17 years, with a particular emphasis on the death penalty. The imposition of the death penalty serves as a critical indicator of the human rights situation and remains the primary tool employed by the Islamic Republic of Iran to sow fear within society. Following the nationwide Woman, Life, Freedom protests, the regime has been executing an alarming average of two to three individuals every single day.

Iran Human Rights documented a staggering 834 executions in Iran last year alone, with eight of those individuals being protesters. The execution of protesters sparked an international outcry and escalated the political cost of imposing death sentences on protesters in the Islamic republic. However, the majority of executions are for drug-related offences. There were at least 471 executions for drugs in 2023.

Regrettably, the global community has largely turned a blind eye to drug executions, failing to condemn these grave violations of human rights. Even more concerning is the complicity of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC, which not only remained silent in the face of this surge in executions but also proceeded to sign a new co-operation agreement with the Iranian authorities. These executions are not aimed at combatting drug trafficking; rather, they serve as a ruthless tactic to instill fear and deter future protests.

Individuals sentenced to death for drug offences are deprived of legal representation and a fair judicial process by the revolutionary courts, particularly impacting marginalized and impoverished segments of Iranian society. Ethnic minorities, notably the Baluchi minority, are disproportionately represented among those executed, serving as the low-cost victims of the Islamic republic's killing machine.

Compounding these injustices is the compelling evidence that implicates Iranian authorities and the IRGC in collusion with international drug cartels. Notably, a renowned terrorism expert has highlighted drug trafficking as one of the main sources of income for the IRGC, underscoring the illicit nature of its operations.

In 2012, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated IRGC Quds Force General Gholamreza Baghbani as a specially designated narcotics trafficker under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, shedding light on the deep-rooted ties between the IRGC and the drug trafficking networks.

The collaboration between the IRGC and the international criminal cartels extends beyond drug trafficking and money laundering to include the reprehensible practice of abducting opposition members.

This partnership was exemplified in the case of Habib Chaab, a Swedish citizen and member of an Iranian Arab opposition group. In October 2020, Chaab was abducted by the IRGC, in collusion with international criminal networks, while visiting Turkey. Subsequently, he was transferred to Iran, subjected to a sham trial by the revolutionary court and, ultimately, executed in May 2023.

Similarly, Ruhollah Zam, a prominent Iranian journalist and political activist, fell victim to the IRGC's campaign of terror when he was abducted in 2019 during a visit to Iraq and subsequently hanged a year later.

Jamshid Sharmahd, a German citizen with U.S. residency, faced a similar fate after being abducted while in the United Arab Emirates in 2020, forcibly transferred to Iran and handed a death sentence. He remains under the imminent threat of execution.

The IRGC and the Islamic republic have not only rendered neighbouring countries insecure but also orchestrated a series of terrorist attacks targeting Iranian dissidents on foreign soil, notably in Europe.

One notable incident occurred in 2018 during an Iranian opposition gathering outside Paris, where a foiled terrorist plot implicated an Islamic Republic diplomat with ties to the IRGC. Subsequently, a Belgian court sentenced the diplomat to 20 years in prison on terrorism charges, underscoring the extent of the Islamic Republic's global reach and its willingness to resort to terrorism to suppress dissent.

These acts of terrorism perpetrated by the Islamic Republic and its ideological arm, the IRGC, are not confined to Iranian dissidents but extend to non-Iranian individuals worldwide, posing a grave threat to global security and stability.

It is crucial to underscore that the Iranian people have been the main victims of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC's oppressive regime over the past four and a half decades. From the brutal mass killings of dissidents—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Mr. Amiry-Moghaddam, you are a minute over. Are you going to be concluding in the next 20 or 30 seconds?

[Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam]

I will be 20 seconds.

Just as the world now condemns the atrocities committed by the SS under the Nazi regime, future generations will look back on the IRGC with the same contempt and horror. The Iranian people are crying for justice, freedom and solidarity. They need the international community to stand with them in their struggle against oppression.

By designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization, Canada can send a clear and powerful message of support to Iranians.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Professor Amiry-Moghaddam.

We now turn to Professor Juneau.

Welcome. You have five minutes. The floor is yours.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau, Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

I'm pleased to be here today.

My starting point is that Canada does not do enough to counter IRGC activities inside the country here. Committee members, I think, are well aware of the nature of IRGC activities, especially in terms of transnational repression, the presence of senior regime members or their families, the parking of financial assets and so on.

To better counter IRGC activities in Canada, a combination of targeted measures should be the way forward. I understand the symbolic politics of listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code. I am especially sensitive to pleas from victims of IRGC repression or brutality, and from family members of victims, but the most ethical response to the IRGC's activities here is an effective one, a response that targets those doing the most harm and that best protects the victims.

To situate my thinking, I would emphasize that I don't view this issue through a Iran lens specifically, but through the broader prism of Canada's overall security priorities and policies. This broader perspective emphasises two factors.

One is that Canada faces a deteriorating security environment today, with multiple and intensifying threats. IRGC activities represent one of these threats, but they're not the only one, and I would say it's not the top one. The other is that our security and intelligence agencies today are already vastly overstretched and under-resourced. That's the broader context.

Listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code would be very labour-intensive. There are hundreds of thousands of current and former members. Enforcing this would be very demanding for law enforcement and national security agencies. It also raises the risk that innocents can be caught in the sweeping net of broad sanctions. This has become a serious problem in the U.S.

To counter this problem, several people will suggest exemptions whereby only those, for example, with blood on their hands or above a certain rank would be sanctioned. This is appealing in theory, but in practice it further increases the workload of already overstretched agencies.

This is a serious problem, even if it's one that is easy to dismiss. Canada already cannot fulfill our existing commitments to monitor and enforce current sanctions, let alone new ones. It is important to emphasize how much this irritates our allies. It is an increasingly serious problem that we underestimate, and it is one that goes beyond only sanctions to national security and defence in general. It also sends a message to adversaries that we are not serious about penalizing them and that we care only about the domestic politics of it, not about actually enforcing concrete measures.

In the reality we live in of scarce resources, proponents of listing the IRGC should explain which threats our national security agencies should stop focusing on as they redirect energies toward managing the listing of the IRGC and how this would make Canada more secure overall.

Proponents often answer by suggesting that the government should simply increase the resources of national security and law enforcement agencies. This is valid in general terms, but does not support the argument in practice. IRGC activities are only one of the many threats that our national security agencies struggle to counter. It is not clear why eventual additional resources should be targeted at the IRGC as opposed to what I think are the bigger threats coming in particular from China and several others.

I would also add that my colleagues who are lawyers question the lawfulness of listing the IRGC, which is the armed forces of a state, on a list that is meant for non-state actors. Not being a lawyer myself, I'm not in a position to expand on this point, but I would encourage the committee to look further into it.

My suggestion to the committee, as we try to find the most effective way to better counter IRGC activities in Canada, is to focus on targeted measures, and more specifically on five initiatives.

The first is to fully implement and enforce measures that we have already adopted, notably under the Special Economic Measures Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, which, as I said, we are not fully enforcing as it is.

The second is to consider adding more individuals and entities under SEMA and IRPA, and making greater use of other tools, such as corruption investigations. We could also better target Hezbollah financial networks here in Canada. The reality is that we are not fully exploiting the more surgical tools at our disposal.

To do that, the third initiative is that we need is to provide our national security intelligence and law enforcement agencies and departments with more resources to enforce and monitor sanctions. I cannot emphasize enough how badly overstretched they currently are.

The fourth is that we could also improve coordination and information sharing among the many departments and agencies involved in the development and enforcement of sanctions.

The fifth, and I will finish on this, is that we could also enhance transparency on sanctions and their enforcement. This would allow for more accountability and better scrutiny by civil society, by Parliament and by the media, including scrutiny of the fact that we are a poor performer on the sanctions enforcement front.

We also need to be more transparent about what we aim to achieve with sanctions, and whether we are achieving it or not.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Professor Juneau.

We now turn to Witness 1. You have five minutes.

[Witness 1, As an Individual]

Good evening everyone.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development on such an important issue.

I'll start where my colleague Mr. Juneau left off.

The concept of terrorism may not necessarily apply to the IRGC. It's a vague concept on which there is no consensus. I won't teach you anything by telling you that there is no commonly agreed definition within the United Nations. It's more of a political concept than a scientific one.

Nevertheless, there is an intuitive understanding of what a terrorist organization is. It's an organization that uses violence and fear to achieve political objectives, usually by illicit or illegal means. Now, if we stick to that definition, imperfect as it may be, the IRGC meets a number of those criteria, which would lead me directly to the belief that it is a terrorist organization, even if it isn't a non-state organization.

First, it's a violent organization that employs illegal means. Its involvement in Iran's ballistic and nuclear programs, which are subject to international sanctions, already makes it an illegal organization. The IRGC controls vast segments of the Iranian economy, and uses that power to finance illegal activities. From that point of view, one criterion has already been met.

Second, it's a brutal and arbitrary organization that uses indiscriminate violence. It has been accused of numerous human rights violations on many occasions over many years. Professor Amiry‑Moghaddam reminded us of that.

The IRGC doesn't shy away from acts of torture, systematically raping women when they're arrested and sent to prison. Surveillance, intimidation, physical violence and detention all suggest that this organization's weapon of choice is terror and psychological pressure.

On the other hand, it is a subversive organization that uses ideological means to achieve political goals. When it operates outside Iran's borders, it works to overthrow power or promote a number of non-state actors seeking to seize power, from the Houthis in Yemen to Hamas in Palestine. It acts by supporting internal repression, or by contributing, through the Quds Force, to clandestine operations and targeted assassinations. It is increasingly involved in insurgency and regional destabilization in the Middle East and elsewhere. It therefore challenges the status quo.

Furthermore, in a much more concrete and precise way, it's an organization that has long been involved in terrorist activities in Latin America. As my colleague reminded us, it has recently been involved in terrorist activities in Europe. It has carried out targeted attacks and assassinations on European soil, and supports terrorist groups. For example, of Hamas's $500 million annual budget, $100 million came from the coffers of the Iranian regime and the IRGC's budget.

Together, all these factors suggest that we are indeed dealing with a terrorist organization, even if it is not a non-state organization.

In conclusion, I'd like to reiterate a number of points raised by my colleagues. Listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity does not rule out other means or approaches. Indeed, it's not one or the other.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, is not our greatest threat. However, as members of that group increasingly work with China, Russia and other countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, those countries represent significant threats to us and fall into the same category.

I'd like to pick up on what Mr. Mahmood Amiry‑Moghaddam said, namely that comparing the IRGC to the Nazis and the SS is no exaggeration. It's an apt parallel.

Moreover, the considerations and arguments put forward by Canada for not listing this group as a terrorist organization seem to me to be specious and complacent. The idea that this could seriously damage our diplomatic relations with Iran does not hold water. Nor does the idea that it could have consequences for the Canadian community of Iranian origin.

Many of our fellow Canadians are being intimidated by IRGC members here and on Iranian soil, and that's unacceptable. It's insulting to think that it could affect Canadian businesses, and that it could pose a—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Witness 1, we're considerably over time. Could you wrap up your comments in the next 15 to 20 seconds?

[Witness 1]

Sure, definitely.

The argument that it could pose administrative or legal challenges because we don't have the means to do that is appalling, I'm sorry.

I'll conclude my remarks there.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Witness 1.

Now we turn to the members for questions. We will only have one round for each party, and each round will consist of six minutes.

The first member is MP Lantsman. You have six minutes.

[Melissa Lantsman, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

I'll split my time with my colleague.

I want to start with Witness 1.

I want to know what your thoughts are, given the response in another testimony, about whether you think Canada is naive in our delay in not listing, or refusing to list, the IRGC, which you clearly agree with.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

That question is for Witness 1.

[Witness 1]

I agree with that comment. Canada is seen in the international community, among western countries, as naive and complacent towards the Iranian regime, particularly in the south.

I think the idea that we aren't affected by what's happening in Iran is false and a moral outrage.

[Melissa Lantsman, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

I'll follow up quickly with two questions.

First, what do you believe it will do for the diaspora community here in calling a terrorist a terrorist? Would it maybe help?

Second, what do you think it will do to our international standing with some of those who have been putting pressure on us to act more vigorously when it comes to calling a terrorist a terrorist?

[Witness 1]

I'd say that kind of decision would be well received by a vast majority—

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Excuse me, Chair.

I think some of us are not getting translation. Can we check, please?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Dr. Fry, we'll look right into it.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

I can hear you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

She can hear the interpreter now.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

There was a first question that was only answered in French. There was no interpretation.

Maybe it will work now.

Thanks.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Okay.

I'm sorry about that, Witness 1. Please proceed.

[Witness 1]

I would say that, if Canada were to decide to put the IRGC on the list of terrorist entities, it would obviously be very well received by most of our fellow Canadians of Iranian origin. It would also certainly contribute to Canada's credibility. Our American allies have already put this group on the list. I think we'd certainly look a lot more serious if we decided to do that.

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Thank you.

Dr. Juneau, you said that Canada doesn't do enough to combat the IRGC.

It's no secret that there are all these money-laundering operations in Canada with the IRGC, Hezbollah and the Hells Angels. There are car dealerships in Ontario that are owned by these groups. There are car thefts in Canada, and the cars are exported overseas. Acts of money laundering are happening every day in real estate, retail and money exchange. All of these operations are obvious, and we're still not doing anything about it.

It's hurting the Canadian economy and the Canadian people more than anything. Safety, security and inflation—it's hurting everywhere.

In your opinion, why are we not doing anything about that? Why?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

Why? It's hard for me to say.

I would say that in general Canada does not do enough on the national security front. I think that's true in general on multiple threats that we face today. It's definitely true on the issue of Iran and the IRGC, as I think I emphatically said in my presentation.

To me, my whole point is that the best and most effective way to counter IRGC activities here, including the ones you described, as well as multiple others—I would really emphasize the transnational repression aspect against dissidents and human rights activists here—is through targeted measures and using some of the tools at our disposal. It's very easy to dismiss concerns about scarce resources as despairing, but in the real world, resource constraints are real. They prevent us from doing things that we should be doing. These resource constraints are absolutely severe. Therefore, I think targeted measures would be much more effective.

It's the same thing on the issue of reputation. What hurts our reputation the most is not our failure to list the IRGC; what hurts our reputation the most is the fact that we announce measures and don't actually enforce them. That would be the case with listing the IRGC, realistically.