The Islamic Republic of Iran is a malignant and destabilizing force in the Middle East and increasingly globally. Its fingerprints are all over the current crises in the region, and it has active international networks, cyber and personal, aimed at disinformation, misinformation, intimidation and violence.
The IRGC is at the centre of it all. It sits at the core of the Islamic republic. Its tentacles have broad reach, and its political influence within Iran is unmatched. It is, in some respects, a state within a state. It is a tool of internal repression, and its members, current and former, play an essential economic role both in legitimate business circles and in sanctions-busting efforts.
The IRGC Quds Force is the tip of the IRGC spear, leading Iran's pernicious efforts regionally. Its links and its support and, at times, direction of terrorist organizations across the region are well documented. The Quds Force is a terrorist organization by any definition of the word, and its listing by Canada in 2012 was appropriate.
The question of listing the IRGC itself, however, has always been more challenging. At first glance, it may seem strange to list the Quds Force but not the organization that controls it. It's a bit like listing the monkey but ignoring the organ grinder, but there is some logic to it. While the Quds Force is made up of some of the most ideologically committed and nasty individuals in Iran, the IRGC is a much more complex entity. True, it has more than its fair share of ideologues, thugs and murderers, but it also includes of a fair number of conscripts who see an IRGC connection as a way to get ahead in life. Listing won't change that reality.
The risk of listing the IRGC is that many of these conscripts, likely including some Canadian passport holders, can get caught up in a web really meant to catch the worst of the worst. Many do their service far removed from the IRGC's violent excesses. Canada does not have the capability to differentiate the real thugs from the time-servers. The IRGC is too large and its reach too expansive, and Canada is too under-resourced to be able to enforce such a listing.
The break in diplomatic relations hasn't helped. It may have freed our hand to act without fear of diplomatic repercussions, but it has also undercut our ability to know who's who both here and there. Listing the IRGC would, as a result, be a largely symbolic gesture. It wouldn't stop current or, more to the point, former IRGC members from setting up in Canada or placing assets here. It happens now, and listing would be unlikely to change that in any significant way. While listing would enable Canada to act when they are discovered—and that's something—we must be realistic about what listing would and wouldn't achieve.
There is value in symbolism. It sends a message, not least to Canadians threatened by the IRGC here and human rights activists in Iran and elsewhere whom we care about and support. That kind of messaging is important. It has long underpinned our human rights efforts in dealing with Iran.
Many different mechanisms in addressing Iran's human rights abuses have been tried over the years. These include special rapporteurs, the annual UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in Iran, controlled engagement strategies, case-by-case dialogues, sanctions, condemnations and ultimately the break in diplomatic ties. It is fair to say that none has really managed to move the needle on human rights in Iran, nor is there some magic bullet out there that we haven't tried that might do the trick. Advocacy on human rights doesn't work that way. It is slow, frustrating and often without tangible rewards. It is a process.
The Iranian diaspora and groups inside Iran are our allies in this effort, but we need to be careful about who we align with in our outreach efforts. Iranian diaspora communities and human rights groups are notoriously fractious. It is best for Canada to stay out of these disputes. We should be inclusive. It is for the Iranians to decide their future, but there is one exception.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran, or the MEK, as it is also known, is a noxious cult that, despite its odd ability to regularly attract prominent western politicians to its annual conferences, is widely despised in Iran and should be avoided.
Finally, I will end with this observation. I spent 22 years dealing with the Middle East during my 31-year diplomatic career. Nine of those were spent focused on Iran, including three as head of mission in Tehran. My conclusion is that with Iran, there are no easy solutions; there are only frustrating challenges.
Thank you.