Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12th, 2024

[Farzin Nadimi]

Well, obviously, any analyst of Iranian heritage has been subjected to some social media activities by the supporters of the regime, and I was no exception to that. I have not been able to go to Iran since 2014, the last time I visited Iran. I have been aware of the risks, obviously.

Yes, there are risks, especially for the journalists who cover Iran, especially for the Persian language networks based in Europe and the United States. They have been subjected to harassment by the Iranian regime, but with regard to analysts, that differs.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Would you comment, Mr. Aarabi?

[Kasra Aarabi]

The short answer is yes.

Without going into too much detail due to the sensitivity, I have had, for example, in-person surveillance conducted. I am a regular recipient of death threats. I have had regular cyber and malware hacking attempts directed from the regime in Iran and the IRGC. Again, I'm one of many—certainly not the exception—and the threat is increasing against Iranian diaspora members who are outspoken against the regime and who conduct research, particularly on the security and military intelligence apparatus.

Unfortunately, Iranian diaspora members no longer feel safe in the west. That is the sad reality, and I think that reflects the abject failure in western policy to take action against the regime in Iran, choosing instead to negotiate with it, which has really set a precedent. The regime in Iran believes that it can carry out attacks, it can intimidate and it can conduct these acts of terror without facing any consequence, and that really goes to the root of the problem.

Until the regime in Iran believes that it can't get away with this, my sad prediction is that this will only increase. Given the sizable Iranian diaspora community in Canada, I believe this is a major threat, and proscription can help mitigate against it.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much.

That concludes our questions at this point.

On behalf of all the members, I want to thank you, Dr. Nadimi and Mr. Aarabi. We are very grateful for your expertise and for your time.

I will suspend for a couple of minutes so that we can ensure that our next slate of witnesses can make it to the table.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Welcome back, everyone. We will resume our study on the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and the current situation in Iran.

At this point, I want to acknowledge that we're very grateful to have two distinguished witnesses with us today. We have Professor Fen Osler Hampson, who is the chancellor's professor at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University. We also have Mr. Dennis Horak, who is a retired Canadian diplomat and ambassador with very deep insights on the region.

Regrettably, I should inform the members that although we were also slated to hear from Brandon Silver from the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, he had some headphone challenges.

To our witnesses, you will each be provided five minutes for your opening remarks, after which we will open the meeting to questions from the members.

Go ahead, Mr. Bergeron.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

I certainly don't want to question the decision that was made regarding Mr. Silver. I understand from exchanges with the clerk that he had headphones that had been approved by the House at one point, but were no longer approved.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

As explained to me, that particular headset is not currently approved. I suspect it was approved.... It was a Senate headset. My apologies. I guess we're using different headsets.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

We've already discussed this issue, notably with Ms. Chatel. Wouldn't it have been possible to do a sound test to check these headphones with our interpreters? We could have determined whether they worked rather than simply sending him home when he had gone to the trouble of connecting.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

No, the guidelines as they currently stand, Mr. Bergeron, are that you are not permitted to use headphones that haven't been approved.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Even if the sound is perfect?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Yes. I'm sorry. Those are just the....

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Will we have the opportunity to hear Mr. Silver's testimony, eventually?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I don't believe so, but I should also underscore that the clerk had sent him and mailed him headphones, but for some reason.... I don't believe we'll have another chance to devote to this study.

He has undertaken to send us his written submission.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

That having been explained, we will go to Professor Hampson.

You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson, Chancellor's Professor and Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I understand the committee is focusing on three issues: Whether the federal government should list the IRGC as a terrorist entity, the connection between people or assets in Canada and the IRGC, and paths forward to support Iranian human rights activists and other political refugees. Let me comment specifically on these three issues.

I won't go through the litany of all the things that the IRGC has been up to. You've heard that in the hearings, and I don't need to add to that litany. As we all know, the federal government has referred to the IRGC as a terrorist organization, called its leaders terrorists, taken measures to prevent its leadership from entering Canada and designated the Quds Force as a terrorist entity. The House of Commons has passed non-binding motions to designate the IRGC as a terrorist entity, so why not take the final step to actually list it as a terrorist entity? As I understand it, there are three, perhaps four, major concerns.

First, a terrorist designation might affect low-level individuals who are forced to serve in the IRGC as part of their mandatory military service.

Second, such a designation would be resource-intensive and place enormous demands on our security and intelligence services.

Third, under Canada's Criminal Code, a terrorist entity is defined as a person, group, trust, partnership, or fund or an unincorporated association or organization. Does the IRGC technically meet the legal test? Some would say no, because it's a state actor, not a non-state actor.

Fourth, such a designation would prevent a potential resumption of diplomatic relations with Iran. That is perhaps one of the reasons, Mr. Chair, that the United Kingdom has not designated the IRGC as a terrorist entity, a question you put to one of the previous panellists.

Let me go to the first concern.

I draw your attention to a recent publication by the Atlantic Council that points out that since 2010, 80% of the IRGC conscripts actively chose to join the IRGC. There are further reports that many of those conscripts were already members of the Basij Resistance Force, which is a volunteer paramilitary organization. Some 20% of the membership do come from unprivileged, underprivileged and poor areas, and they have probably been forcibly conscripted into the IRGC.

Concerns about sanctioning individuals who have been coerced to join the organization and have been subjected to its indoctrination programs must be weighed against the broader risk of allowing entry to Canada of members of the IRGC who may be involved in various kinds of illicit activities that support the organization and Iranian interests. Again, that litany is a long one: money laundering, illegal business activities, spying on Iranian exiles, issuing death threats and so forth.

Globally, those risks are growing. I would draw your attention to a letter sent by a group of U.S. senators to EU officials last year, wherein they pointed out that in July 2012, Bulgarian authorities arrested an IRGC operative suspected of planning an attack on a synagogue in Sofia. In 2016, German officials arrested IRGC-sponsored assassins. In April 2022, a detained IRGC operative was identified for conducting assassination plans in Germany and France.

The second concern has to do with resource implications, as has been pointed out by a number of the witnesses here, but should that be an excuse for inaction? Should we let the proverbial underfunded bureaucratic tail wag the policy dog here?

I would point out that on October 7, 2022, the Prime Minister announced that he was going to provide $76 million to strengthen Canada's capacity to implement sanctions against Iran. That's a fair bit of change, in my estimation. I think any designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization should be accompanied by a legislative requirement to report on how existing funds are being used, and whether additional resources are required to support our intelligence and security services.

The third concern may require a legislative fix. I think Bill C-350, a private member's bill, might provide for a series of amendments to the Criminal Code and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that would go one step further than the Harper government's enactment of the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and its amendments to the State Immunity Act in 2011.

The concerns about people and assets with close ties with the IRGC are well documented by our media. In the testimony I submitted to you, I've provided hyperlinks to numerous cases, identifying individuals who have been involved with and have ties with the IRGC. I'm not going to name them publicly here, but that evidence or information is readily available in public sources.

Designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization may make it easier to expel these individuals from Canada, because the burden of evidence is lowered to do so. It will also prevent IRGC individuals from entering Canada.

Canada can also do more to support Iranian human rights activists, artists, journalists and other political refugees. The World Refugee & Migration Council, of which I am president, recently partnered with the University of Ottawa in a highly innovative program sponsored by Open Society Foundations. It supports the work of human rights activists who have been forced to leave their country of origin for challenging injustices—many of whom are located here in Canada, including Iranians—and who seek to continue their activism here to raise the flag on what's happening in their home country. That's the kind of creative approach that merits support.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Professor Hampson.

We will now go to Mr. Horak. You have five minutes, please.

[Dennis Horak, Retired Canadian Diplomat, As an Individual]

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a malignant and destabilizing force in the Middle East and increasingly globally. Its fingerprints are all over the current crises in the region, and it has active international networks, cyber and personal, aimed at disinformation, misinformation, intimidation and violence.

The IRGC is at the centre of it all. It sits at the core of the Islamic republic. Its tentacles have broad reach, and its political influence within Iran is unmatched. It is, in some respects, a state within a state. It is a tool of internal repression, and its members, current and former, play an essential economic role both in legitimate business circles and in sanctions-busting efforts.

The IRGC Quds Force is the tip of the IRGC spear, leading Iran's pernicious efforts regionally. Its links and its support and, at times, direction of terrorist organizations across the region are well documented. The Quds Force is a terrorist organization by any definition of the word, and its listing by Canada in 2012 was appropriate.

The question of listing the IRGC itself, however, has always been more challenging. At first glance, it may seem strange to list the Quds Force but not the organization that controls it. It's a bit like listing the monkey but ignoring the organ grinder, but there is some logic to it. While the Quds Force is made up of some of the most ideologically committed and nasty individuals in Iran, the IRGC is a much more complex entity. True, it has more than its fair share of ideologues, thugs and murderers, but it also includes of a fair number of conscripts who see an IRGC connection as a way to get ahead in life. Listing won't change that reality.

The risk of listing the IRGC is that many of these conscripts, likely including some Canadian passport holders, can get caught up in a web really meant to catch the worst of the worst. Many do their service far removed from the IRGC's violent excesses. Canada does not have the capability to differentiate the real thugs from the time-servers. The IRGC is too large and its reach too expansive, and Canada is too under-resourced to be able to enforce such a listing.

The break in diplomatic relations hasn't helped. It may have freed our hand to act without fear of diplomatic repercussions, but it has also undercut our ability to know who's who both here and there. Listing the IRGC would, as a result, be a largely symbolic gesture. It wouldn't stop current or, more to the point, former IRGC members from setting up in Canada or placing assets here. It happens now, and listing would be unlikely to change that in any significant way. While listing would enable Canada to act when they are discovered—and that's something—we must be realistic about what listing would and wouldn't achieve.

There is value in symbolism. It sends a message, not least to Canadians threatened by the IRGC here and human rights activists in Iran and elsewhere whom we care about and support. That kind of messaging is important. It has long underpinned our human rights efforts in dealing with Iran.

Many different mechanisms in addressing Iran's human rights abuses have been tried over the years. These include special rapporteurs, the annual UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in Iran, controlled engagement strategies, case-by-case dialogues, sanctions, condemnations and ultimately the break in diplomatic ties. It is fair to say that none has really managed to move the needle on human rights in Iran, nor is there some magic bullet out there that we haven't tried that might do the trick. Advocacy on human rights doesn't work that way. It is slow, frustrating and often without tangible rewards. It is a process.

The Iranian diaspora and groups inside Iran are our allies in this effort, but we need to be careful about who we align with in our outreach efforts. Iranian diaspora communities and human rights groups are notoriously fractious. It is best for Canada to stay out of these disputes. We should be inclusive. It is for the Iranians to decide their future, but there is one exception.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, or the MEK, as it is also known, is a noxious cult that, despite its odd ability to regularly attract prominent western politicians to its annual conferences, is widely despised in Iran and should be avoided.

Finally, I will end with this observation. I spent 22 years dealing with the Middle East during my 31-year diplomatic career. Nine of those were spent focused on Iran, including three as head of mission in Tehran. My conclusion is that with Iran, there are no easy solutions; there are only frustrating challenges.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much.

Now we go to MP Fast. You have six minutes.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair

Thank you to our witnesses. It's been good to have you back at committee.

Can you gentlemen help me with something? You've both identified the reasons that it may not be advisable to list the IRGC.

Six years ago, Parliament spoke. The House of Commons voted overwhelmingly to list the IRGC as a terrorist organization. Here we are six years later, and nothing has happened that I know of. The best we have is the Prime Minister quoted as saying that he's “continuing to look for ways to responsibly list the IRGC as a terrorist organization”.

Professor Hampson, is there a way of responsibly listing the IRGC as a terrorist organization under Canadian law?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

Well, we did it with the Kurds. I would submit that the next step is to do it with the IRGC. It is not throwing a blanket across the entire Iranian government.

Second, to me, the real issue is this: What kind of message do you want to send to the bureaucracy to mobilize itself so it can better coordinate its activities?

As I pointed out in my testimony, there has been an infusion of fairly substantial funding to deal with Iranian operatives working in Canada. A special division was set up in Global Affairs Canada, but it's clearly not working. A strong political message would provide the kind of leadership that I think is necessary to galvanize the bureaucracy to start taking this threat seriously. It would also send a strong message to our security partners—the United States being the foremost one—that we are serious. The message right now is that we're not that serious.

I think something more than a resolution by the House of Commons and Government of Canada would provide a very important strategic focal point for getting serious about a threat that is clearly growing, as you've heard from numerous witnesses. To me, the puzzle is why we haven't done it up to now.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

I am puzzled as well.

Mr. Horak, you identified a number of the same reasons for perhaps not listing the IRGC. However, I didn't hear you say that you're fundamentally opposed to listing it.

Are you opposed to listing the IRGC?

[Dennis Horak]

No, I am not.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Okay.