Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12th, 2024

[Dennis Horak]

My point was that it's fine. We can do it. I am just not sure we will be able to enforce it, and its real value would be symbolic. That's not a small thing, either. There is some value in that.

I think there are instruments now—I'm not a lawyer, so let me just preface that—to deal with some of the concerns we have, whether these are IRGC assets or not. Particularly on the assets side, as far as I understand, the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act involves confiscating, seizing and selling off Iranian government assets. The IRGC is a government entity. If they have assets here, I'm not sure why they can't be seized under the JVTA. I don't know.

To your point, no, I'm not opposed to it, but I think we have to be realistic about what it will mean. I don't think there will be much in the way of negative repercussions. We don't have diplomatic relations with them, so we don't have the concerns the British, for example, have about doing it, in terms of whether that would cause a break or downgrade in diplomatic relations. We don't have to worry about that at this point.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

The United States has listed the IRGC. Somehow they've been able to make it work.

What is it that the United States did that enabled them to use this as an effective tool to at least rid their country of some of these terrorists and cells that were presumably lodged within their country?

[Dennis Horak]

I would venture a guess that they haven't gotten rid of them. That would be my one guess.

They have used this as a tool. They have used it effectively. I think they have a whole lot more resources devoted to it than we do. I think that's part of it. We are stretched pretty thin. As we have all seen in the last little while, there are a lot of concerns in Canada about the activities of various countries, and only so many resources to go around. Certainly, devoting those to Iran is important, because they are a threat to the Canadian Iranian community and the country itself. However, there are only so many resources to go around.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Is there a way of doing this responsibly, in the way that the Prime Minister has suggested he is seeking?

[Dennis Horak]

What do you mean by “responsibly”—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Answer very briefly. We're over time now.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

As I understand it, the normal procedure for designating an entity as a terrorist threat, a terrorist organization, is a bureaucratic process. Mr. Horak should be able to explain what that process is, but it does require the collaboration of the different government departments to come to that conclusion.

I think the resourcing issue, quite frankly, is a bit of a red herring, for the reasons that I mentioned. One of the concerns—and I've certainly heard this expressed by some former officials—is that this would really prevent any effort by this government or a subsequent one to restore diplomatic relations with Iran, but I don't see that happening anytime soon.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Now we go to MP Zuberi. You have six minutes.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here today. I appreciate your presence here and the testimony of all others. As we said earlier in our study, if any witnesses are harassed or intimidated in relation to their testimony, they should let the committee clerk know.

With respect to Mr. Horak, it's good to see you here. I know about your work in the past and that you have served as a Canadian diplomat for many years, including in Iran and other countries. You spoke about the importance of clearly checking Iran. In no way, shape, or form are we giving Iran a pass with respect to all of the crimes that have been committed by the Iran government, the many that we can enumerate and have enumerated.

As a diplomat of the past, you did touch upon the importance of relations between countries. I'd like to allow you to have more time to speak about that and to note that in September 2012, we closed our mission here, of Iran to Canada. The Iranian diplomats were not permitted to stay. Since then, Italy has served as Canada's protecting power. Do you want to speak about that in particular, please?

[Dennis Horak]

Do you mean how it got there?

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

It's not how it got there, but in terms of where that left us.

[Dennis Horak]

Yes. I was in Iran up until about four or five weeks before we closed our embassy there. We were doing all the preparations. I had actually recommended that we should close because of the circumstances in which we found ourselves. The Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and the prospect of Canada seizing Iranian government properties here in Canada made the presence of a Canadian embassy in Tehran completely untenable.

I made that recommendation, though with some regret, I have to say, because I think we lost something in not being there. We lost the ability to see for ourselves what's going on, on the ground, and to make contacts there and to be able to talk with our allies—the U.S. and Israel, which aren't there—and to give them our perspectives, which we did, but also to get a sense for ourselves.

Also, that's not to forget the kind of service that we could provide to Canadians, and there are thousands of them that live in Iran. We lost all of that for the trade-off of a piece of legislation. Iranian government properties have been seized and sold off and judgments have been paid, but they've been paid, as I understand it, largely to American plaintiffs.

We have given up all of the positives of being there for a symbolic move, which has not benefited Canadians whatsoever, nor has it deterred Iran from sponsoring terrorism. We've lost that ability to see what's going on and to be able to talk to them, and these are important things.

I become frustrated when people see diplomatic relations as an instrument, as a tool, as some sort of gesture of support for a country, That's not what they are. You talk to your enemies as much as you talk to your friends, and I think we lost that, and we continue to lose that, and it's directly relevant to the issues here.

Sure, we get information from our allies—from the Brits, from the Australians, from the New Zealanders—about what's going on there. It's not the same as being there with our ability to be able to gauge what's going on with the IRGC internally, perhaps even with some of the people, some of the businesses. A lot of these guys have their hands all over business in Iran. To be able to have a sense on the ground of what they're all about and what links they may or may not have to Canada—those are intelligence assets that would greatly support this kind of legislation, this kind of listing. We don't have it.

We rely on our allies, which we always did—and we always would, in any case—but we have lost our own particular perspective, and that's challenging for us in listing the IRGC. It's challenging for us to know what's going on with Iran. It's challenging for us in being able to have a dialogue with our Five Eyes partners in particular, and also with Israel, about what's going on there and to be able to shape their perspectives. We've lost all that, and for basically a gesture.

[Sameer Zuberi, Liberal, Pierrefonds—Dollard, QC]

I remember the Ben Affleck film, when Canada was very involved in 1979 in helping our ally, America. I know it's not factually accurate, but still, for pop culture....

In terms of the successes or challenges we've had with Canada and our allies in confronting the IRGC up to date, do you want to opine a bit on that in the next 40 seconds?

[Dennis Horak]

I don't really have a whole lot to add. At least when I was there, we didn't really face pressure on that. We all talked about it. Everybody was agreed on the Quds Force, but in terms of the IRGC, everybody understood the challenges.

One challenge, in answer to an earlier question as well, is this differentiation. There are a lot of people who got caught up in the IRGC. Professor Hampson has mentioned it as well. They're basically doing their time. They build connections. It's a way to get ahead. It's not exactly analogous to the Baath Party in Iraq, but there is an analogy in some respects, so being able to differentiate among them....

Some of them are probably living in Canada. They did their time and they served and they had nothing to do with anything bad. Are we going to want to differentiate, or are we going to catch everybody in the same web? I don't know, but that's one of the challenges of dealing with the legislation as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We now turn to MP Bergeron. You have six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for joining us this evening to shed light on this extremely important issue.

I'd like to ask you exactly the same question I asked our previous guests. Many witnesses have come to talk to us about the security threat posed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, not only internationally, but particularly domestically. In most cases, they urged us to see to it that this organization was placed on Canada's list of terrorist entities.

Last week, however, we heard some rather iconoclastic testimony from a professor at the University of Ottawa. He was telling us that, whatever the thing to do, now is not the time to do it since, because of the conflict in the Middle East, it would have the effect of causing Canada to lose an enormous amount of credibility in the global south in general.

What do you think of this statement?

My question is addressed first to Mr. Hampson.

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

Thank you very much for your question.

There are two parts.

What are they up to in Canada? As I said earlier, I provided quite a few links in my testimony, which the clerk will make available to the committee members, of well-documented cases of money laundering, influence peddling and business associations—those who, if they're not IRGC members who have ties with the IRGC, have been involved in in Canada.

I would add parenthetically that this was one of the reasons we suspended diplomatic relations with Iran. It was because their embassy was not doing the things embassies normally do. There was a lot of spying and other kinds of subterfuge taking place in Canada that was certainly making Iranian students and others very uncomfortable.

In terms of timing, I would make a different argument. Iran is the major supporter of Hezbollah. It's the major supporter of Hamas. It is the major supporter of the Houthis in Yemen. It has launched major attacks directly against Israel. It's not business as usual in the Middle East and it's not business as usual in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I think we all know that. We are entering a very dangerous era. One only has to go to our Global Affairs website, which is pointing out that Canadians travelling in not just the Middle East but also France, Spain and other countries of Europe have to be on the lookout for potential terrorist activities and threats that may put them at risk. Well, why is that? It's because of the conflict that has taken a terrible turn in the Middle East.

I would submit that one of the reasons Canada should designate the IRGC a terrorist actor is to close the circle. Is it a perfect fix? No. Is it a difficult call? Yes. I would agree with everything Mr. Horak said, and it's a tough call, but on balance, given the world we're in now, given the fact that this is one way to prevent those with ties to the IRGC from coming into Canada.... There may be sleeper cells here. I don't know, but when you're faced with the kinds of risks that are real, then this kind of action, yes, is symbolically important, and it also says to the government and to officials in government that we have to take this threat seriously.

[Dennis Horak]

In terms of the Iranian embassy not being here, yes, they were up to some pretty nefarious activities, but their having a presence here helped us be able to see, monitor and track those activities in a way that we can't now.

On the question of the reaction if we were to act now, I agree completely with what the professor said.

One thing, though—maybe this is what was meant, but I don't know—is that it would be presented and perhaps perceived in other countries in the world that we're doing this to benefit Israel. If that's the problem, too bad. I don't think international reaction should be a deterrent to our doing it. The Iranians will be ticked off, but so what?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

MP McPherson, you have six minutes, please.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I thank both of you for your testimony testimony today. It's been very interesting.

I am struggling with something, though. I'm hearing a bit of a mixed message: It is a symbolic gesture to list the IRGC and we can't enforce it, but it is an important gesture and it will have an impact. You can see how I'm struggling a little bit with that.

Is it symbolic? If we are not able to enforce it adequately....

You spoke, Dr. Hampson, about not letting the tail wag the dog. If we don't have those resources, if there is no transparency on where the $76 million are going and if we have no ability to measure whether there is an impact of listing the IRGC, then it does seem slightly performative. I do worry that even that symbolism is not, as you put it, in the balance going to be as effective as some of the other measures. It's that we actually have to fix some of those things before we take this step.

I understand what you're saying—that this moment in time requires this action. In my mind, I'm really struggling.

Dr. Hampson, the other thing you said is that 80% of those we would be worried about catching in this web are actually choosing to be part of the IRGC. Surely you don't mean that it's okay that we catch those 20% of people who didn't choose and that the others are collateral damage, I guess you could say.

Can you explain what you meant by that?

[Dr. Fen Osler Hampson]

In the context of whether this would just be a symbolic act, it depends on how you frame it. I would suggest that it shouldn't be. It should include reporting requirements. How is the money being used? What is the bureaucracy doing to up its game? How are they tightening the net?

Now, some of that may be difficult to do in open committee, but there are other ways of getting that information or at least introducing some accountability in terms of which additional resources have been put to deal with this issue. I think it also makes it clear that this should be a priority for our intelligence services.

Your second question was about the conscripts. The argument that some made—it was based largely on a somewhat dated CIA report—was that many, if not the majority, of the members of the IRGC were unwitting conscripts. More recent evidence suggests that is not the case. Those who join it do so.

The indoctrination element is hugely important. You may be an unwitting conscript, but once you've gone through the indoctrination program, you're a threat, particularly if you're an IRGC operative. That would be my point there.

It's not just people sitting at desks and passing religious notes across the table. This is an organization that does have operatives. Not all of them are here. A lot of what the IRGC does is maintain internal order and control in Iran.

[Heather McPherson, NDP, Edmonton Strathcona, AB]

My understanding, though, is that there are members of the IRGC who could be cooks, people who are not implicated in that.

I think, Mr. Horak, that you wanted to add something to that.

[Dennis Horak]

Yes, and that is right. As with any organization, there are pencil-pushers who are far removed from a lot of the excesses, but on this question of conscripts and whether they're involuntarily conscripted into the IRGC, as you were saying, I think the numbers are a bit off.

Being a member of the IRGC has some prestige in certain circles in Iran. It has some benefits in terms of developing networks. There are former IRGC officials and members who are, as I was saying earlier, all over the Iranian economy. When I was there, if there was a big deal, whether it involved telecommunications companies or whatever, you could bet there was an IRGC or often a former IRGC person behind it. You can think of it as being almost like an American fraternity—yes, a terrible fraternity. I don't know what Greek letter it would be, but there are networks or advantages to having been in the IRGC.

You're right that there is an indoctrination process as well, and a lot of people are ideologically committed to this, but a lot of them want to be in the IRGC for the material benefits it can provide to them if they go down that road. Now, whether we excuse them for that is a whole other question, but there are different elements within the organization. Of course, the worst of the worst go into the Quds Force.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We next go to MP Hoback. You have three minutes.

[Randy Hoback, Conservative, Prince Albert, SK]

Thank you, Chair.

Just leading into that, we do have prosecutorial discretion here in Canada, so if we were to list them, there's a process they would have to go through. It's not as though they would automatically be thrown in jail. They could go through the process and have it determined at that point in time whether they were in a situation that they didn't really want to be part of, and were part of it, but did nothing wrong or did no harm. There's also a process whereby we can identify, let's say, that this guy's a bad actor and thus is treated accordingly.

Is that not fair to say?