Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 114 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Before we begin, I'd like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please only use an approved black earpiece. Keep your earpiece away from microphones at all times. When you are not using the earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses and members as well. Before speaking, please do wait until I recognize you by name. You may speak in the official language of your choice. Interpretation services are available. You have the choice of either floor English or French and if interpretation is lost, please do inform me and the clerk immediately.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Thursday, February 16, 2023, the committee will now resume its study of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the current situation in Iran.

I'd now like to welcome our two witnesses here in person. We have Dr. Farzin Nadimi, who's a senior fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Joining us virtually is Mr. Kasra Aarabi, who is the director of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps research group. Thank you both for joining us.

You will each be provided five minutes for your opening remarks, after which we will open it to questions from the members. However, I ask that you look over to the screen and the monitor every once in a while, because if I am raising this item in my hand, it means you should be wrapping up your comments or your response to questions posed by members within 10 to 15 seconds.

That having been explained, we will go to Dr. Nadimi. Dr. Nadimi, the floor is yours. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Farzin Nadimi, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, As an Individual]

Thank you.

For over four decades, the Islamic regime in Iran has founded and aggressively supported terrorism and terrorist organizations in the Middle East and defied international norms by conducting these terrorist activities, with global repercussions.

The roots of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, go back to the 1979 anti-status quo revolution in Iran, when a number of paramilitary terrorist groups merged to assume the role of enforcer of the new regime. They targeted activists, rival political factions and ethnic and religious minorities in line with the regime's monopolism and suppressive behaviour.

This role of protecting the revolution and its achievements was inked into the new Iranian constitution's article 150. In fact, according to the second charter of the IRGC, published in 1982, the revolutionary guard's main agenda is not only to safeguard the Islamic revolution and its achievements but also to continuously work toward realizing God's will and expanding the rule of God as interpreted by the supreme revolutionary leader and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The IRGC is one of the very few military forces in the world, and perhaps the only one, that claims a direct connection with the Almighty through its chain of command. Throughout the 1980s and the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC grew into separate forces—ground forces, navy and air forces, Basij, and the Quds Force, the expeditionary branch of the IRGC.

The Quds Force has repeatedly been targeted with sanctions for its active role in supporting and leading terrorist organizations in recent years, but the Quds Force is only one part of the whole. It is often boosted by other branches of the IRGC and answers directly to the highest levels of the chain of command in Iran.

After spending almost a decade expanding both its defensive and offensive powers, in the early 2000s, the IRGC shifted its attention to fighting the United States and the west in general, which were, by then, engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also to defeating its self-declared enemy, the state of Israel. By following one of the basic principles of warfare, the economy of force, which means judicious employment and distribution of forces, Iran created and managed a network of proxy militant groups to do most of the fighting and dying for it.

Iran has also increasingly relied on criminal gangs in target countries to target Iranian dissidents and journalists. The IRGC also has a powerful intelligence arm, the intelligence organization, with extraordinary powers, undeclared prisons and a notorious reputation for locking up, torturing and raping political opponents. The IRGC's intelligence organization has a foreign operations branch, and it's especially involved in targeting foreign and Iranian citizens in countries like Turkey, and as a result was designated last year by the U.S. Treasury.

The IRGC is by design an anti-status quo, ideological international force that seeks to alter regional and also international balances of power. Its extraterritorial role makes IRGC one of the main tools of the regime's state-sponsored terrorism beside the intelligence ministry. State-sponsored or directed terrorism is generally defined as government support or control of acts of international terrorism, usually by violent non-state actors with funding, training, hosting, directing and supplying weapons to them. Those definitions rarely include a state that commits acts of terrorism all by itself in a systematic manner.

The IRGC does have such quality in the form of its Quds Force, the same extraterritorial arm. Therefore, international terrorism is not a problem isolated to non-state actors or certain regions; it is a global problem, and so is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, the IRGC. The IRGC has also quickly gone to work to export the revolution by supporting guerrilla movements around the world.

Also, when the devastating Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the IRGC played a very key role in prolonging it. The IRGC expanded exponentially both as a conventional military organization but also as a force to safeguard Islam and export their revolution.

The U.S. Department of State has designated and sanctioned four countries—Cuba, North Korea, Iran and Syria—as ones that have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism pursuant to three specific laws.

Under Iran, in April 2019 the State Department designated the IRGC as instrumental in founding, training and supplying Hezbollah, a group designated a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department, and also by the Canadian government, in 2002.

While the Canadian government mainly sees the threat of terrorism originating from the three main components—violent Sunni Islamist extremism, both at home and abroad; international terrorist groups; and domestic issue-based extremism—it also admits to the changing nature of the terrorist threat facing Canada. It is now time to broaden this definition and clearly include state terrorism conducted directly by its main element of power.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much.

We now go to Mr. Aarabi.

You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Kasra Aarabi, Director of IRGC Research, United Against Nuclear Iran]

Thank you.

Honourable members, I testify before you today at a time when the threat from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps jihadi terrorism has reached unprecedented levels in the west. In the past 72 hours, we at United Against Nuclear Iran have identified an individual at a rally in Toronto, dressed in IRGC attire, threatening IRGC-inspired jihadi violence on Canada's streets.

Despite the rising threat of IRGC terror, there is a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the IRGC, its violent Islamic extremist activities on western soil, and how proscribing the IRGC will practically mitigate its ability to operate abroad, including in Canada.

The IRGC is not a conventional armed force. It officially recognizes itself as an ideological organization with an “ideological mission of jihad in God's way to spread sharia law across the world”. It operates no differently from proscribed Islamic extremist terrorist organizations, from ISIS and al Qaeda to Hezbollah. It has a formal program of indoctrination to radicalize all of its members and their families in a violent Islamist extremist ideology, which, as my research has revealed, calls on its members to wage armed jihad against Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians on the basis that “they have unacceptable faith” and must either convert to Islam or be killed. It also teaches its recruits that Iranians who oppose the Islamic regime in Iran are moharebs, waging war against God, and must not just be killed but also be tortured prior to their death.

In a bid to make the IRGC into a more ideologically pure and extremist force, Ayatollah Khomeini has increased indoctrination in the IRGC, which now makes up more than 50% of its training. It has also restricted its conscript intake to members of the Basij paramilitary force and has doubled down on the most extremist Islamist and anti-Semitic doctrine—namely, the apocalyptic and militaristic doctrine of Mahdism, which calls for the destruction of the state of Israel and the killing of Jews worldwide to facilitate the return of the so-called messianic “Hidden Imam”.

These are not just empty actions. Look at the modus operandi of the IRGC—terrorism, hostage-taking, hijackings. In the past few years, the IRGC has increased its terrorist activities on western soil. In 2022 alone, U.K. authorities announced that they had foiled more than 16 IRGC terrorist attacks on British soil.

The IRGC is not only conducting direct acts of terror in the west; it is also seeking to nurture homegrown Islamist radicalization and terrorism using tactics identical to that of ISIS and al Qaeda. At United Against Nuclear Iran, we recently obtained and exposed videos of eight IRGC commanders being hosted online by a London-based entity called the Islamic Students Association of Britain and Europe. In their online speeches, these commanders glorified IRGC terrorism, propagated extreme anti-Semitism, and even called on British Muslim students to join their apocalyptic army that will eradicate “the lives of Jews everywhere in the world”.

This student body also has branches in Canada. Indeed, in 2023 an IRGC-affiliated propaganda anthem, Salute Commander, designed to radicalize children, was recorded on Canadian soil.

These methods are identical to homegrown Islamist radicalization tactics used by ISIS and al Qaeda. Unlike ISIS and al Qaeda, which are proscribed terrorist organizations, the current sanctions regime on the IRGC does not prohibit its propaganda activities, and nor does it prohibit its ability to disseminate jihadi propaganda.

Proscribing the IRGC would fundamentally change this. Proscription would give the Canadian government a clear mandate to prohibit any activity, including propaganda activity, related to the IRGC. It would also provide Canada's local communities, including teachers and local police forces, with the necessary safeguarding tools to identify and prevent against IRGC or Shia radicalization.

At present, Canada's preventive program designed to identify and prevent individuals from becoming involved with terrorism through radicalization is almost exclusively focused on Sunni Islamist extremism, meaning that IRGC and Shia Islamist extremist activities are blind spots. Proscribing the IRGC would fundamentally change this and equip Canada's communities with the ability to identify and prevent Shia and IRGC radicalization.

In other words, the claim that proscribing the IRGC is just a symbolic move is entirely false. Proscribing the IRGC will have practical and meaningful consequences on the IRGC's ability to conduct its radicalization and terrorism activities on Canadian soil. This is a step the Canadian government must immediately consider. I speak as both an expert on the subject matter and as someone whose best friend, British-Iranian journalist Pouria Zeraati, was stabbed in London only a few months ago in an IRGC terror attack.

The continued failure to prescribe the IRGC is putting Canadian lives at risk and poses a major national security threat to Canada.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much.

We now open it up to questions from the members.

First up is MP Epp. You have five minutes.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to both of the witnesses for their testimony.

I'll start with you, Mr. Nadimi.

You referenced the IRGC's judicial use of force and their actions through proxies such as the Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. Some of those groups we've already listed as terrorist entities. How much would we diminish them by simply going after IRGC? What is the level of coordination through what has been coined as the “axis of resistance”?

[Farzin Nadimi]

Well, on the “axis of resistance”, even if at some level there is a loose connection, with more coordination and given the existing technologies to communicate, at the same time Iran has been investing for years to arm these groups and to train them, to encourage them, and together to plan for situations exactly like the Houthis have been involved in since last November.

Even if there is not day-to-day operational planning involving both the Iranians and Houthis or Hamas fighters, this kind of planning has been done for years, and that includes the horrendous terrorist action by Hamas on October 7. Even if Iran was not directly involved in that particular day and that particular operation, for years Iran has sponsored Hamas and has helped them arm and train for this exact reason.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Aarabi, do you have a comment on this as well?

[Kasra Aarabi]

Yes. The IRGC has manufactured various proxy groups in the Middle East, and there is a significant level of coordination, particularly with those IRGC-manufactured groups. These are groups that the revolutionary guard has created from scratch, and they have spent a significant amount of capital, not only in training, arming and funding their fighters but also in radicalizing their recruits in the same ideology as the revolutionary guard.

In relation to the Houthis, we, United Against Nuclear Iran, identified the Behshad intelligence ship, which the IRGC owns and operates and has directly been providing intelligence to the Houthis to conduct terror attacks against commercial shipping as well as U.S. and its allies' ships in the Persian Gulf. The level of coordination is there.

Even if we monitor in the months and years leading up to the October 7 terrorist attacks, we see the changes to the IRGC's personnel and changes to the IRGC's doctrines, and the broader military security infrastructure of the regime in Iran indicated that the IRGC was preparing for a major confrontation with Israel. All the IRGC—

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

I'm sorry to interrupt, but I'm just so short of time.

Now let's bring this to our shores. There are allegations of 700 militants acting in concert with the IRGC here on Canadian soil, allegations that the IRGC is working with Hells Angels here and in the U.S. Can you comment on their level of integration, their level of control, their level of activity right here on our Canadian soil?

[Kasra Aarabi]

The IRGC has three ways of operating when it comes to terrorism.

The first is direct terrorist attacks. It sends its operatives to conduct these operations. There is a strong track record for this.

As well, it uses armed gangs, which it has been using increasingly, more so than before.

As well as that, it also uses the same methods as ISIS and al Qaeda, nurturing a social constituency in Canada, in the U.S. and in the United Kingdom. It has used the same methods as ISIS and al Qaeda to radicalize people, using the networks affiliated with the regime in Iran, from religious centres to mosques to community centres to schools, as a means to radicalize local Canadian nationals and local British nationals and recruit them for operations.

Homegrown Islamist extremism is an increasing threat that the IRGC poses, and the current sanctions regime does not prohibit against that.

[Dave Epp, Conservative, Chatham-Kent—Leamington, ON]

If we list them, as we should, as a terrorist entity, practically, how will that diminish their activities in Canada?

[Kasra Aarabi]

Absolutely.

Practically speaking, as I explained in my testimony, the current sanctions regime does not prohibit the IRGC's ability to disseminate its propaganda or disseminate its jihadi propaganda activities. Soft power activities are not covered under the current sanctions regime.

The IRGC is unlike ISIS and al Qaeda, which are proscribed terrorist organizations. Proscribing the IRGC would give the Canadian government a full mandate to prohibit any activity, including propaganda and soft activity, related to them.

As well as this, it would equip Canadian local communities, the local police force and the local schools with the tools necessary to identify and prevent Shia and IRGC radicalization.

Again, the current preventive program in Canada, as in Britain and the European Union, is exclusively focused on Salafi-Jihadism and Sunni Islamist extremism. Proscribing the IRGC would fundamentally change that, and, as I said, would equip Canadian local communities with the ability to identify and prevent Shia and IRGC radicalization.

Previously in my testimony, I mentioned that we at United Against Nuclear Iran, in the past 72 hours, identified a Canadian individual at a rally in Toronto dressed in IRGC attire and threatening IRGC-inspired violence on Canada's streets. This is ongoing. It's a major problem, and the current sanctions regime does not prohibit it.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you.

We'll now go to MP Oliphant.

You have five minutes.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both our witnesses.

Without casting any doubts on anything you're saying, I'd like to understand how you gather both your intelligence and your evidence.

Strong statements have been made on exactly what's happening. I feel like I'm speaking to intelligence officers or people who are engaged in that activity.

From both of you, I'm just wondering how you get your information. How is it verified by double source? How do you get it?

[Farzin Nadimi]

I was born in Iran. I've lived in Iran and studied and worked in Iran. I did my military service in Iran until 2005, when I moved to Britain to study. I did a master's degree in war studies. I did a Ph.D. degree in Middle Eastern studies at the University of Manchester and King's College London, and then I moved to Canada for a year. I was a visiting fellow at York University.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I'm not questioning your qualifications; I just want to understand your current research, your intelligence sources and how your intelligence is verified.

[Farzin Nadimi]

I do not have access to classified intelligence, but I am a senior fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where we constantly talk with people from the intelligence community, from foreign administration and other Iranians who have primary knowledge of the IRGC's operations.

From an analytical point, much of the content of these statements that I made were analytical, based on information that is readily available.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I'll go to Mr. Aarabi now with the same question.

[Kasra Aarabi]

Like Farzin, I'm an Iranian. I've been looking at and studying the IRGC for more than a decade. Through my expertise and time working on the IRGC, I've developed a network of contacts inside of Iran and an ability to identify locations in the online space where the IRGC is active and has provided open-source information.

Through such means, through both networks on the ground and knowing where to look, I've been able to maintain a constant flow of primary information, primary data, primary Farsi material and primary IRGC material. Through these means, I have been able to assess this primary IRGC material and therefore publish on the subject.

For example, I have obtained the internal training manuals the IRGC has used to radicalize its recruits, as I referenced in my testimony.

I've always ensured that my analysis is centred on primary material—primary Farsi material—specifically related to the IRGC.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you. I would like to move on a little bit.

I'm a Canadian, but I don't have access to Canadian intelligence, so I'm just trying to figure that out.

I want to follow up on Mr. Epp's very good line of questioning with respect to the so-called axis of resistance.

You didn't talk about money. Is there money that flows from the IRGC? Do you track it? Do you understand the financial or resource relationship between the IRGC and/or the Quds Force, Hezbollah and Hamas, Hamas or the Houthis, or any other groups? Is there information about how that happens?

I'll go to Mr. Nadimi first.

[Farzin Nadimi]

A lot of that information is open source.

Yes, Iran and the IRGC fund Quds Force operations, because the Quds Force is a branch of the IRGC. The Quds Force—

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

From the Quds Force to the proxies, is there...? I don't imagine they publish their financial statements.

[Farzin Nadimi]

Well, according to statements made by Iranian officials and many of those proxy group leaders, like Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, when they visit Iran, they usually carry suitcases full of cash. Qassem Soleimani, before he was killed by a U.S. military operation in Iraq, visited those countries. He visited Syria, mostly. They carried cash. There were regular cargo flights from Iran to those countries, and those flights also transported cash and gold.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

That's illegal activity, though, regardless of what you're talking about.