Thank you.
MP Aboultaif, you have three minutes.
Evidence of meeting #123 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was israel.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses. This is a very important issue.
Mr. Allen, it's been 30 years since Oslo. Oslo was a temporary framework that was supposedly going to help achieve a final situation where peace is in the Middle East so the rest of the world can also enjoy it.
Is the Oslo framework still valid, yes or no, and why?
Senior Fellow, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel (2006-10), As an Individual
The Oslo framework is still valid. The discussions that have been held over the 30 years to resolve the five final status issues, and those issues remain, are still valid. Unfortunately, the Oslo process was stalled. The second intifada occurred, which turned off many Israelis who were in favour of peace.
I don't want to put all the blame for the failure of Oslo on Israel. I don't want to put all the blame on the Palestinians. There is plenty of blame to go around, but as I said before, it doesn't mean that we shouldn't be trying again now. On the framework and the various discussions that have taken place over 30 years with Clinton, with Carter, with Prime Minister Olmert—all of those discussions and issues that were discussed and brought to the table are ready to be discussed again.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
Thank you.
Do you believe that there's still support among Palestinian and Israeli people for the Oslo framework?
Senior Fellow, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel (2006-10), As an Individual
The problem with both the Israeli people and the Palestinian people right now is that they don't trust each other. The Israelis fear that a Palestinian state will be yet another state on its border that is going to send rockets towards it, as Hamas has done, and the Palestinians clearly don't trust a government that is building settlements and attempting to annex the West Bank.
First of all, we need to build trust. With trust and with incentives, I do believe that both sides would begin stronger support for a two-state solution. Right now, it's quite low, less low in Palestine than in Israel, but with leaders who support two states, who are prepared to compromise and who lead their people in that direction, I think the region can get there.
Conservative
Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB
Okay.
How can Canada remain a serious player, a serious broker, and what's the best way to approve that?
Liberal
Senior Fellow, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel (2006-10), As an Individual
It's not a serious player.
As Ms. Verrier-Fréchette said, Canada can show leadership right now. Actually, I think its allies are waiting for countries to step up and do the right thing. Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. and Belgium may well follow suit.
October 29th, 2024 / 12:05 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
For the last questions, we'll go to MP Oliphant.
You have three minutes.
Liberal
Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank all three witnesses. I go to a lot of committee meetings, and it is rare that I listen to every word that every witness says. I felt it was emotional for me to listen to your testimony and also helpful, so to all of you, thank you for your preparation, for your care and for the work you do.
I think we're agreed in this Parliament and on this committee to a two-state solution. That has been something that successive governments have said. To do that, we need two states. The question is not if there should be two states—with the recognition of Palestine—but when. We also value a negotiated settlement.
I'm looking at what you believe are the carrots and the sticks that we can provide for the two parties to have a negotiated settlement going forward.
Finally, if we can't get a negotiated settlement, what other options under international law or the UN are there?
The question is about carrots and sticks to build a negotiated settlement for Israel and for the Palestinians, and what Canada's role could be in that, Professor Kersten.
Assistant Professor, University of the Fraser Valley, As an Individual
Thank you.
In terms of carrots and sticks, I think we need to recognize that the recognition of Palestine does not prejudice a negotiated settlement, so they do not have to go in lockstep. Again, the view of Spain and Norway for a long period of time was, in fact, that they had to go in lockstep and that recognition could only come at the end of a negotiated process. They have broken with that very belief because they no longer believe that is true.
I recognize that we want to stay in lockstep with our G7 allies, but, again, six out of seven are now considering the question that you put. They are basically considering recognizing Palestine before the end of a negotiated settlement, and I think Canada should join in that with them and try to influence when exactly that happens.
Now, it is very difficult—
Liberal
Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON
My time is limited, so I would say that we have said it's not at the end of the settlement.
I want to go to Mr. Allen for his comments on that as well.
Senior Fellow, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy and Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel (2006-10), As an Individual
Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, what Israel needs, the carrot it needs—and it's not just a carrot—is security. Canada, the United States and others have been working to try to ensure security if a two-state solution is found.
It needs a demilitarized Palestinian state, and it needs the Palestinian Authority to begin to govern in Gaza after the rule of law has been placed there, so it needs a partner.
Of course, the Palestinians, as a government, as a state, need to renounce terror, fully recognize an Israeli state as it is and continue, as the PA has been doing for years, to collaborate with Israel to prevent terrorism in that country.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you.
At this point, we're done with the first panel.
Allow me to thank Professor Kersten, Ambassador Allen and Ms. Verrier-Fréchette. We're very grateful for your time and for your insights.
We'll suspend for three or four minutes and be right back.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
I call the meeting back to order.
We're very grateful to have with us here today Professor Rachad Antonius, who is a professor in the department of sociology at the Université du Québec à Montréal. We're also very grateful to have Professor Momani of the University of Waterloo, who is well known to all the members here. We are still expecting Professor Imseis of Queen’s University, but I guess we'll get started.
Each of you will be provided five minutes, after which we will proceed with questions from the members.
Professor Antonius, given that you are here, the floor is yours. You have five minutes.
Rachad Antonius Retired Full Professor, Department of Sociology, UQAM, As an Individual
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair.
Before getting into what I'd like to tell you over the next few minutes, I want to emphasize that all the sources I use are Israeli. Not that Palestinian sources are unreliable, but my sources show that there are people inside Israel who agree with my point of view. While most of the sources are critical of the policies of the State of Israel, others are not.
I would like to start by stating a fundamental principle that should guide Canadian policies and that will guide my own comments in this committee. In dealing with international issues, it is in Canada’s best interest to stick to international law, for reasons having to do with both the national and the international context.
At the national level, sticking to international law provides a criterion that is objective and that can contribute to addressing tensions between various social groups who make competing claims. Referring to international law can be a good criterion for addressing these claims in a fair way. Such a stand would play an important role in toning down tensions and social conflicts. At the international level, promoting international law and upholding it has traditionally been the trademark of Canadian policy and a major factor in the high standing Canada enjoys on the international scene.
In recent years, however, Canada’s clout has been obscured by positions that reflected partisan politics rather than international legality. I will demonstrate that. Canada’s loss of its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council in 2020 is just an indicator of this state of affairs. In this case, the concept of aggressor and victim has been reversed in the public sphere. Everyone talks as if Hamas is the aggressor, but we forget that, for 100 years, policies were systematically put in place to take control of Palestine's land and expel Palestinians. I refer you to a book by Israeli historian Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, which was published in English and in French. I documented all of this in a book I recently finished, which I will table here.
In the document titled “Canadian policy on key issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”, the Government of Canada brilliantly asserts all these legal principles of international law. However, Canada has been giving lip service to these principles of international law, while actively working to undermine them. In the past, I have met with foreign ministers to express my opinions. What I did was print out Canada's official policy and ask them to implement it. Canada recognizes that settlements are illegal, but there is no serious pressure to put an end to them. None.
I'm going to quickly get to the issue of the two-state solution.
In the Oslo accords, the issue is the map published by the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions. This is the standard map that everyone publishes. It shows the territories of the West Bank and Gaza, which make up only 22% of historical Palestine. These territories were conquered in 1967, and the remaining 78% was conquered in 1949. Part was conquered under the international legality of Resolution 181 and part as a result of the war.
In practice, the entire world, including the vast majority of Palestinians, now recognizes the territory delineated in 1949 as Israel's de facto border. What happened in the Oslo accords is that the principle—
Retired Full Professor, Department of Sociology, UQAM, As an Individual
The problem is that this is the best map that was offered by the Israelis for the Oslo accords. It is a map that does not return the occupied territories and keeps part of the meagre 22% of the occupied territories remaining to the Palestinians. When Canada says that it supports the two-state solution without adding “on all occupied territories”, it is counterproductive, because it goes against international law.
My time is up. I am now ready to answer any questions the members may have.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you very much, Professor Antonius.
Welcome, Professor Imseis. It's great to have you here again.
We'll go to Professor Momani.
Professor Momani, you have five minutes for your opening remarks, after which we'll go to Professor Imseis.
Dr. Bessma Momani Professor, University of Waterloo, As an Individual
Hello. Thank you. I'm sorry I couldn't join you in person. I really appreciate everyone's time.
I want to focus my comments on what I think is the demographic reality of the territories we're speaking about. If we're going to talk about a two-state solution, we need to understand the people who are on the ground. Through understanding the demographic reality, it becomes clearer that a two-state solution is still very aspirational and is very much in need because it fulfills the desires of both Palestinians and Israelis. However, realistically, it becomes more and more difficult with time.
Based on both Israeli and Palestinian demographic numbers, by 2022, we had seven million Palestinians and 9.8 million Israelis. What I'd like to point out, of course, is that the Palestinian community is divided into three million in the West Bank, 2.1 million in Gaza and about two million inside Israel proper.
What's important to note here is that in the West Bank, where, again, mostly Palestinians live, we also have 468,000 Jewish settlers. That constitutes about 12% to 14% of the population in the West Bank. The kicker here is that these are both communities that are having children very rapidly, about seven to eight children on the Israeli Jewish side and a little less than that on the West Bank, Palestinian side.
Within Israel proper we have, as I said, two million Israeli Arabs who also self-identify, most of them, as Palestinian, although some will refer to themselves as Israeli Arab. Importantly, 40% of the population are secular Jews, but the population that most requires our attention, because it is also one that has become increasingly politically active and radicalizing, is the Haredi, ultra-Orthodox Jewish community, which currently stands at a little under 10%, but they are the community that are most likely, today, to want to live in the West Bank to create what are called “facts on the ground”. They are increasing in size and number. There are half a million, as I said, in the West Bank alone.
Also, I would point out that the entire territory that we have just spoken about, whether it's Israel proper, the West Bank or Gaza—to give you a sense of how small this is—is a six-hour drive from north to south and a 90-minute drive from east to west.
I say that all because one of the big challenges before us is that historically we could make a lot of analysis of what got us to where we are. Certainly, the unfettered expansion of Israeli Jewish settlers in the West Bank has now made it extremely difficult to find a contiguous state for the Palestinian people, starting with the West Bank.
The war on Gaza today has made that even more problematic. Not only do we find that 70% of all the buildings have been destroyed in Gaza, but it's very clear that we see and we'll continue to see that those extremist elements inside Netanyahu's cabinet have desires of making Gaza uninhabitable to clear the way for increased Jewish settlers today. There is no shortage of evidence, in fact a great deal of evidence, showing that. These extreme elements within the cabinet, within the political movement, although they are a very small percentage of the population, have outsized influence.
If anyone is curious to understand that, it's the proportional representation system inside Israel that really gives a small number of people and parties that swing vote that allows no.... Because we haven't had a majority clearly voted in through the PR system inside Israel, it means often that these minority voices, although united in their parties, can often have outsized influence.
Today, they are very much directing the political winds, if you will. It is very simple in that they have a desire for what is called “Greater Israel” and that includes overtaking Gaza and, importantly, overtaking the West Bank. In fact, overtaking the West Bank is more of a stronger religious conviction than necessarily taking over Gaza.
Taking over Gaza may satisfy what they think is their security interest, but—understandably, I think—those who have been watching Israeli politics for many years know that there's a strong desire to overtake the West Bank. Annexation of the West Bank is absolutely a political imperative of this small community that has outsized influence. In many ways, secular Israelis, who are about 40% of the population, increasingly feel that they are drowned out.
That is the status of where we are today. I'd be happy to take questions.
Thank you, Ali, for that.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Thank you very much for that, Professor Momani.
We now go to Professor Imseis.
Welcome. We're very much looking forward to your testimony. You have five minutes, Professor Imseis.
Dr. Ardi Imseis
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It has long been Canada's policy to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most practical means that Canada has of bringing this about, especially at this pivotal time, is to immediately recognize the state of Palestine.
Among many reasons for that, there are three to my mind.
First, immediate recognition of Palestine would serve as a holding operation against the clear Israeli rejection of the two-state solution. On July 18, 2024, the Israeli parliament passed a resolution formally rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied Palestinian territory. This position has been held by Israel for years, as stated publicly at the highest governmental levels. The governing Likud party platform openly rejects the establishment of a Palestine state.
Likewise, the so-called guiding principles of the present government of the State of Israel state that “The Jewish people have an exclusive and indisputable right to all [parts] of the Land of Israel”, which is a term that includes the occupied Palestinian territory, and that “The government will promote and develop settlement” in that territory to that end.
In order to apply what it calls its sovereignty in the occupied Palestinian territory, Israel has appointed a special minister, Mr. Bezalel Smotrich, who asserted on May 18, 2023, that the “core mission” of the Israeli government is to increase the number of settlements in the West Bank by 500,000 within two years.
I note that all of this happened before October 7, 2023.
Second, immediate recognition of Palestine would be in keeping with Canada's international legal obligation to see to it that the Palestinian people's long-frustrated right to self-determination is realized.
On July 19 this year, this obligation was affirmed by the International Court of Justice when it determined that Israel's continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is unlawful, in part because it violates the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. The ICJ reiterated that “all States”—which, of course, include Canada—must “ensure that any impediment resulting from the illegal presence of Israel in the [OPT] to the exercise of the Palestinian [people's] right to self-determination is brought to an end.” Recognition is an obvious means by which Canada can discharge this international legal obligation it holds.
There is an unfortunate view in the Canadian political realm that the only way for a Palestinian state to emerge is through bilateral negotiations, but this is legally mistaken. Israel's presence in the territory is an internationally wrongful act, and the end of that act cannot be made subject to negotiation under international law. It must be withdrawn—the occupation—forthwith, immediately and unconditionally.
Third, immediate recognition of Palestine would be in keeping with the fact that the state of Palestine already juridically exists under international law. Palestine meets all four criteria of the existence of a state under international law, which have historically been given a very liberal, flexible and permissive interpretation under state practice.
Number one is that Palestine possesses a permanent population of over five million people, 2.3 million of whom in the Gaza Strip are now at threat of being ethnically cleansed.
Number two is that Palestine possesses a defined territory: the occupied Palestinian territory.
Number three is that Palestine possesses governmental functions sufficient for the functioning of a state, as affirmed by the UN General Assembly, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the ad hoc liaison committee, etc.
Number four is that Palestine has established a capacity to conduct foreign relations, as demonstrated by the fact that it has been granted non-member observer-state status by the UN General Assembly and has a total of 149 other states that recognize it, representing the vast majority of people and states on planet Earth. This includes friends and allies of Canada, such as Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and so on.
I close with this: Canada has officially supported a two-state solution in Israel-Palestine since 1949. Since that year, Canada has recognized only one half of that solution: Israel. At a time when Israel is openly and publicly pursuing a policy aimed at obliterating the two-state solution, Canada must do what it can to stop this from happening. Immediately recognizing the state of Palestine is the least that Canada can do, both in accordance with its obligations under international law, as well as in order to save any prospect of peace in line with the two-state policy in the future. Canada must act now before it is too late.
Thank you very much. I'm happy to take questions.