Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before the committee.
The war was not expected to last this long. Despite Russia's military superiority, the Ukrainian army is resisting. The situation on the front has been stagnant for some time. All indications are that the Kremlin has made another ill-informed calculation. Let me backtrack a bit.
Indeed, in 2014, the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbass were supposed to deter Kyiv from turning to the west and signing association agreements with the European Union. This did not happen. The agreements were signed in 2015. Popular support for the EU rose to almost 75%. Support for NATO membership tripled to almost 60%. The wars, the one in Donbass since 2014, followed by the current one, blurred regional differences at the same time. Traditionally Russian-speaking and pro-Russian regions in the east and south are supporting Ukraine against the invasion of Russia and anti-Russian sentiments are growing.
In order to control Ukraine, the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 were to allow—according to the Kremlin's interpretation—the reintegration of Donbass into Ukraine as an autonomous territory with a special status, which would have given them a de facto veto over Ukraine's future geopolitical direction. Faced with the fiasco of this scenario, Mr. Putin took advantage of a perceived weakening of the west and used military pressure at the end of 2021, hoping to obtain guarantees from NATO regarding the end of its enlargement and the withdrawal of its troops from the eastern flank. This has not happened. The invasion of Ukraine followed, with Ukrainian resistance and determination again surprising the Kremlin. Mr. Putin's idea of overthrowing the government in Kyiv and establishing a greater Russia has met with a real obstacle. We are now in a kind of stalemate on the ground that explains the impasse in the negotiations, where the parties are not ready to make concessions.
Moscow still demands that Kyiv recognize the annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Moscow wants Ukraine's demilitarization and neutrality status, including implicitly non-membership in the European Union as well. If Ukraine says it is ready to discuss neutrality, it is asking for security guarantees in exchange. As for concessions on territorial integrity, it is clear that they would be considered illegitimate in the eyes of the population. Mr. Zelenskyy therefore wants to postpone any negotiations on this issue until the coming years. Any future arrangement will have to be put to a referendum. Indeed, any agreement reached above the heads of the Ukrainian people has little chance of holding.
It goes without saying that, in the face of the human drama unfolding before our eyes, a ceasefire is necessary. Even if it is not in Moscow's interest to prolong the war, which has cost it some $25 billion since February 24, it is in Russia's interest to prolong the talks a little in order to gain enough ground to be able to talk about the success of its operation.
On the one hand, despite some breakthroughs by the Ukrainian army in recent days, it is unlikely that it will be able to push the Russian army out of its entire territory on its own. On the other hand, while sitting at the negotiating table, Russia is stepping up the scale and brutality of armed actions on the ground in the hope of breaking the morale of the Ukrainian side and bringing about political divisions leading to eventual capitulation. Waiting for such an outcome may be too long and too costly. Another scenario, in fact, is now emerging. It is the partition of Ukraine, which was already mooted in 2014.
In addition to Crimea, at the very least, it involves occupying the entire Donbass region in eastern Ukraine, beyond the territories controlled by the pro-Russian separatists of the self-proclaimed republics, including in particular the city and port of Mariupol, which are still undergoing a brutal offensive.
However, the plan seems more ambitious at the moment. In the south of the country, the offensive is increasing around Mykolaiv and Odessa. In the Kherson region, Russian forces are trying to set up another pro-Russian people's republic. If Russia succeeds in advancing on these eastern and southern territories, it will have control of the land link between Donbass and Crimea and potentially also, through Odessa, with the self-proclaimed pro-Russian Transnistrian republic in Moldova. Moscow could then claim a geopolitical success, that of having cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea, over which Russia will dominate.
Where will Russia stop? That depends crucially on how much time it can buy before a ceasefire is signed, which is why it is important to keep applying pressure, sending more and more aid to Ukraine and imposing even tougher sanctions to rapidly weaken Russia's military capacity. Unfortunately, there is no realistic scenario for Russia's total withdrawal from Ukraine.
I do not like to make pronouncements and predictions about the future, but unless there is a dramatic turnaround by Russia, in the next few years or decades, there will probably be another frozen conflict, a ceasefire, a demarcation line between the warring parties. However, there will be no peace treaty, because neither Kyiv nor the international community will recognize such a forced partition of Ukraine.
For its part, Russia has a history of using territory in neighbouring countries to advance its geopolitical agenda. For more than 30 years, Transnistria as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been destabilizing Moldova and Georgia, respectively, and standing in the way of their western aspirations. A prolonged confrontation is brewing, a wall between two civilizations, according to Mr. Putin.
Thank you for your attention.