Evidence of meeting #21 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was chair.
A video is available from Parliament.
4:55 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Stéphane Bergeron
Yes, but I would ask that you stick to the content of Mr. Genuis's motion to adjourn debate on Ms. Fry's motion until the committee has finished its work on Ukraine.
Although I appreciate that the history behind the current conflict in Ukraine is important to understand the reasons for getting back to that work, please keep in mind that we need to hear your position on why the debate should be adjourned to get back to the Ukraine study.
Please continue, Mr. Brock.
4:55 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant, ON
The reasons were stated at the outset of my intervention that I am here to share my personal thoughts on the matter, as a parliamentarian, where I felt that I was impeded in my ability to do so in the House, because of time constraints. I wanted to highlight the passion that I have on this issue and the critical urgency that this current study not be adjourned to allow another study, which, quite frankly—
4:55 p.m.
An hon. member
It doesn't call for adjournment.
4:55 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant, ON
Thank you.
With your permission, I'll skip ahead various paragraphs, because I think there is relevancy in this document.
A couple of pages talk about Russia's involvement in Ukraine in World War II. I will not comment on that. I will move on to current, 21st-century issues, as follows:
Putin has referenced Ukrainian nationalists in service of his own political agenda of portraying modern Ukrainians as Nazis.
I've referenced that. The article continues:
Prior to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea, many Ukrainians viewed Bandera and other freedom fighters in a less favorable light, says [Ms.] Shevel. After, however, she noticed a shift, with these individuals, some of whom fought alongside the Nazis, being called heroes. The Soviets, once held up as liberators from the Nazis, were now the bad guys again.
Bandera may no longer be [the] official hero of Ukraine, but his memory and that of other 20th-century independence fighters endure. In 2015, Ukraine passed a series of decommunization laws calling for the removal of communist monuments and the renaming of public spaces in honor of Ukrainian nationalists and nationalist organizations, including those known to have participated in the Holocaust. The legislation has received pushback from scholars who see it as whitewashing, or ignoring the dark sides of these movements and their activities.
Shevel agrees that a complete reversal in framing is “probably not the best outcome.” Although the previous Soviet narrative was very one-sided, she cautions against replacing it with an equally one-sided narrative that labels Ukrainian nationalists unconditional good guys. Either way, Shevel says, the issue is one that should be debated internally, not by a foreign invader: “It’s problematic, but it’s a domestic debate.”
Dobczansky, for his part, believes Ukraine is entitled to its own version of history and that Ukrainians should be allowed to choose how to present their own experiences. He praises local researchers’ efforts to study the Holocaust and open their archives and notes that Ukraine’s current president, [Mr.] Zelenskyy, is Jewish.
“Ukraine has begun the process of confronting the darkest pages of its past,” he says.
In today’s charged atmosphere, saying anything critical about Ukrainian nationalism or calling attention to Ukrainian nationalists’ involvement with the Nazis can be seen as supporting Russia’s depiction of Ukraine as a Nazi nation, Belsky notes.
This Russian narrative is nothing new.... [I]t’s part of a long-term Russian information war—
I would call it a misinformation war.
—on Ukraine. Putin’s ahistorical justification of the invasion doesn’t surprise [scholars]. What does surprise [scholars] is the outpouring of support [they've] seen for Ukraine, with even [the very popular American skit comedy] “Saturday Night Live” paying tribute to the beleaguered nation.
[Scholars theorize] that the outraged response to the invasion is tied to society’s relatively recent reexamination of colonialism. Because Ukraine was successfully integrated into the Soviet Union after World War II, Dobczansky doesn’t see the period leading up to Ukrainian independence in 1991 as an occupation so much as a relationship between a colony and a colonizer. By waging war on Ukraine, Putin is, in essence, trying to hold on to a colony.
“[Russian leaders] basically don’t recognize any Ukrainian historical agency except the agency that they imagined for them,” says Dobczansky.
Ukraine—and the world—seem to be imagining something different.
I think the takeaway there is the false narrative that Putin is sharing with the world as his illegal justification for invading this country. It may appease and it may pacify his nationalists in Russia because of its state-controlled media, but the rest of the world does not buy into this misinformation rhetoric.
The issue regarding colonization is troubling, because we all know that Putin is a relic of the U.S.S.R. We all know about his pursuit of power at all costs. His international war crime legacy and history are not lost on me. This begs the question: What country is next? Is he going to be satisfied with just Ukraine? Is he looking at some of the other Baltic nations?
Right now, we have what could be described as a ground operation in Ukraine. We have ground and air strikes. We have missile strikes. However, what about the cyberwar? There is a cyberwar currently happening with respect to this conflict, and I want to share my thoughts and concerns on that issue at this time, with this quote:
It has widely been assumed that the Western world saw the last of its hot conventional wars with the end of the Second World War, as the world grew increasingly integrated economically, making this type of conflict inefficient. The liberal international order assumed rationality would prevail and countries would choose the economic benefits of these relationships over conflict. Economics became a new tool to replace traditional military means of force if peaceful relations deteriorated; sanctions, preferential trade and exclusion from financial institutions all became methods of punishment and retaliation. With the rise of the internet, the world became further interconnected, but also more vulnerable to attack through cyber-space, as critical infrastructure, finance and access to information all have come to depend on online systems. Warfare came to be regarded differently, with cyber-warfare expected to be the future of conflict. Yet, Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, launching a full-on conventional war. Western countries rushed to apply economic pressure, applying sanctions—
I will, after this article, start talking about the history of the Magnitsky sanctions, the origin of those sanctions and the man himself, because it's important to put everything in context.
—excluding Russia from the SWIFT system, payment systems and banks, cutting access to the country, banning travel and a host of other harsh conditions.
Meanwhile, the internet has been flooded with real-time information on the invasion. However, disinformation and censoring are rampant, with civilians, combatants, world leaders, governments and journalists competing to post the latest updates. Cyber-attacks are playing a role in the conflict, though have not been the sole or even most important aspect of the hostilities; furthermore, they are coming not just from state-sponsored organizations, but non-state hacker groups and even volunteer hackers on both sides. Private sector organizations were drawn into the conflict as some chose to suspend services to Russia or support cyber-resiliency in Ukraine. In recent years, Russia has employed many devastating cyber-attacks against Ukraine, including on the country’s electricity grid in 2015, with the virus NotPetya on the Ukrainian financial system which spread globally, and other Eastern European countries. Considering Russia’s extensive history of hacking and policy of information warfare, this raises the question: Why are we not seeing a cyber-war, and will we?
To fully answer that question, it's important to get context on the record as to what really is a cyberwar:
Cyber-war is a fairly contested term, and not all believe that cyber-war actually exists. For the most part, nation states look to international law and the rules on use of force and self-defence regarding the legality of cyber-operations. The Tallinn Manual and Tallinn Manual 2.0 both analyze extensively—
5:05 p.m.
Liberal
Rachel Bendayan Liberal Outremont, QC
Mr. Chair, I have a point of order.
About 20 or so minutes ago, you mentioned the importance of relevance and the need to connect the passages the member is reading to the amendment before the committee and the motion dealing with women's sexual and reproductive rights.
I wonder whether there is such a connection and whether the member's comments are relevant.
5:05 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Stéphane Bergeron
Thank you for that reminder, Ms. Bendayan.
I would remind Mr. Brock that it is entirely acceptable to refer to supporting documents in committee debate, but obviously, the member has to state his opinion on the content of Mr. Genuis's motion. Mr. Brock, please finish what you're reading and explain how it relates to the motion.
5:05 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant, ON
I will conclude my reading and I will put my own personal thoughts on that and why it has relevancy. For the benefit of Ms. Bendayan, there is relevancy to this, Mr. Chair, so I will continue:
...The popular vision of cyber-war is one in which critical infrastructure, telecommunications, the internet and all connected systems are completely shut down, effectively crippling society. We have seen this to varying degrees in the aforementioned case of Russia's attacks on countries in its neighbourhood, as well as on infrastructure in other countries such as the Colonial pipeline attack in the United States, but nothing to such a complete extent.
However, despite the increasing predictions of this sort of cyber-war—of which there is no broadly accepted definition—it has not made an appearance thus far. There could be many reasons for this, one of which of course is that we simply don't know it's happening; after all, it is often strategically useful in a cyber-attack to remain undetected for as long as possible. It could also be that this simply would not meet the strategic goals of the invasion. In this case, Russia has long considered Ukraine as key to its plans for many strategic reasons, including territory and warm water ports. Ironically, Western sanctions in the wake of the 2014 annexation made Ukraine even more important to Russia's geoeconomic ambitions as part of a land route for energy exports. Based on its goals, this type of complete cyber-war seems unlikely to be useful. This is not to say that cyber has not been used in this conflict; however, these activities have been used in different ways, as a supporting activity of the war aiming to accomplish the two main goals that cyber-activities usually attempt to achieve: propaganda and disruption. ...Cyber-attacks cannot gain territory, but they can disrupt the other side's operations, target infrastructure and civilians and affect public opinion during the process of gaining physical territory. ...These operations are simply better suited to spreading disinformation and confusion and attempting to cause distrust and chaos, bolstering the conventional forces.
Many on this committee may be asking, “When is Mr. Brock going to get to the point?” I will eventually, but there's more to add, Mr. Chair. The next question I want to put to the committee and provide some explanation for is this question: What cyber-activities have we seen so far in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict? As stated in the same article:
Propaganda and disinformation have been widely employed in this conflict, and the reach of these activities has been global. Social media has played a role in conflicts before, though this truly global scale is unprecedented, especially among youth. Young Russian TikTok influencers posted videos with a justification of the invasion—all apparently following the same script. Young Ukrainians also took to TikTok, as well as other platforms such as Instagram, to post their own videos of updates. While many sincerely try to ensure their information is as accurate as possible, this is not always easy—especially with just as many people deliberately spreading disinformation. Some examples include attempts to cause fear and panic; Russians found local Telegram chats and posted false warnings about upcoming bombings to scare citizens away. People created Discord servers for updating and commenting and livestreamed battles online in addition to news footage. Social media was not only used to spread information—whether it was true or not—but to boost morale and push narratives, and much of the information circulating on social media is in favour of Ukraine. Videos and photos of President...Zelensky went viral, from his impassioned speeches—
including his impassioned speech to our Parliament
—about defending the country to the end to posing with his dogs. There were photos of Ukrainian couples getting married on the front lines and citizens crowding the streets wanting to get weapons and join the fight. In Russia as well, videos of Russians protesting the war and getting detained started to circulate, and Ukrainians posted videos of Russian soldiers surrendering or being captured.
Disruption and espionage have been used by both sides, with Russia hacking government ministries and defacing Ukrainian websites even before the invasion. The most substantial cyber-attack so far, which has not officially been attributed to Russia at this time, is the hack [at] Viasat, a satellite communications provider, which impacted other European countries as well as Ukraine. The American company is still working to bring users back online and recently stated that they are still actively defending the service from malicious activities. Russia has also actively blocked Western social media—
including Canada
—and created what is being called a “fake news” law to control the narrative at home. It’s also threatened steep fines for Wikipedia if it does not remove certain information about the war that it considers inaccurate. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s volunteer hackers and other hacking groups, including the group called Anonymous, have also made progress in disrupting Russian government websites and services. So far, however, there have been no largely debilitating cyber-attacks on infrastructure, with the extensive damage done coming from conventional attacks and weapons.
That begs the question, Mr. Chair: If we haven't seen it so far, will we?
Let me continue:
For the foreseeable future, cyber-activities will likely remain in the realm of propaganda and disruptions of communications and services. In this conflict, complete cyber-war does not appear to be strategically useful, though cyber-activities including disinformation will continue. Disinformation will remain a powerful tool, especially as digital propaganda techniques using artificial intelligence become increasingly sophisticated. The environment for cyber-operations and disinformation is increasingly complicated, which has been demonstrated in this conflict; the involvement of new actors, ranging from youth on social media to private companies both large and small, to any civilians engaging with online content, makes for an environment impossible to control and potentially creating a variety of new targets in conflict other than states.
Experts also warn that civilian infrastructure will increasingly be a target of cyber-operations. Sensitive infrastructure, including nuclear weapons, is a serious concern that is especially difficult to discuss considering its highly classified nature. While our interconnected systems are convenient, there is always a risk of compromise.
The risk of cyber-attacks in retaliation for sanctions remains high....
We as a country have sanctioned Russia, as have many other countries in this world. Our chair is probably on the list of several politicians in the 44th Parliament who have been banned. The threat to Canada is real.
The risk of cyber-attacks in retaliation for sanctions remains high, but being the first country to launch a complete cyber-offensive would probably be costly in many ways, and some experts believe it could even lead to the cyber equivalent of mutually assured destruction. It seems unlikely in the current circumstances that cyber-war will come to the West, but it is vital to have cyber-defences on high alert to prepare for any possibility.
I hope that this committee spends some time hearing from experts and witnesses on this very real risk to this country.
Canada's intelligence agencies are preparing for an increase in cyber-threats and warning Canadians to be vigilant in their online activities.
If our security experts are giving us that warning, Mr. Chair, it's incumbent upon this committee to heed those warnings.
The last part of this article that I will read various portions of, Mr. Chair, is titled “How to be Strong, Secure and Engaged in Cyberspace”.
In 2017, the Department of National Defence (DND) released its Strong, Secure and Engaged defence policy, which envisions Canada's armed forces as agile—
5:20 p.m.
Liberal
Randeep Sarai Liberal Surrey Centre, BC
Mr. Brock is a very esteemed colleague of mine and steers in my other committee, too.
Mr. Genuis last time said that the definition of a filibuster is when you start reading articles and you read articles over and over. That's the definition of a filibuster.
Mr. Brock said the same thing in our other committee, and I have a lot of regard for him. His judicial mind is very astute. I'm just wondering how this is not a filibuster when we're reading articles from national security or cyber-security things and how it's relevant to this.
I would like him to enlighten me, or perhaps the chair can enlighten me whether that contradicts the definition of a filibuster or if it stays relevant.
5:20 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Stéphane Bergeron
Mr. Sarai, Mr. Genuis is allowed to have his own take on what constitutes a filibuster.
I have already said that it's not unusual to cite passages from documents during parliamentary debate, but it is unusual to read one document after another. Some may perceive that as a stalling tactic.
A few times, I have asked Mr. Brock to explain how the passages he is reading are germane to his personal position on Mr. Genuis's motion. I will ask him again to please tell us where he stands on the motion in question.
Back to you, Mr. Brock.
5:20 p.m.
Conservative
Larry Brock Conservative Brantford—Brant, ON
I have been doing that, with all due respect, Mr. Chair. I have absolutely been doing that. I read out, probably about five or 10 minutes ago, the warnings of Canada's security intelligence. We need to be aware of the risks of a cyber-attack founded by Putin and his misinformation agenda.
My suggestion is that it's important to put that into context as an item for further consideration at this committee. I provided my personal opinion. Maybe you didn't hear me correctly, Mr. Chair. I invited this committee to perhaps look at calling in some experts from Canada's security intelligence and other experts in this particular area. Canada needs to secure not only its borders, but its international cyber domain, so it's important for these warnings to be shared with this committee.
I'm almost done. I'm sure the committee will be very happy to hear that. I have two paragraphs to read. I think it's important for the whole article to be on the record as an invitation for further witnesses whom this committee can hear from.
The warning is on how to be strong. How does Canada remain strong against cyber-attacks?
The article says, “Canada must reaffirm its commitments to security alliances including NATO and NORAD. To maintain a peaceful international system, staying secure means upholding its relationships and contributing its fair share.” I could probably go on for another hour about whether or not Canada is living up to the obligation to contribute its fair share, but I'm sure I would receive several points of order on that, so maybe I'll defer it to another day.
The article goes on:
NATO recognizes cyber-space as a domain it must be able to defend as effectively as land, air or space, and is committed to cyber-space being peaceful and secure; Canada also believes that a peaceful and secure cyber-sphere is necessary to its security, economy and democratic values, and that collaborating with allies is necessary to achieve this. In order to realize its vision of security and resilience, innovation and leadership and collaboration in the National Cyber Security Strategy, contributing to NATO's efforts, especially the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, is imperative. If Canada seeks to support NORAD modernization, particularly in detecting and deterring threats in all domains, including cyber, and promoting research, development and innovation, it will require significant investment and commitment.
The last paragraph is on how Canada can remain secure:
[S]trong emphasis on digital literacy in schools and workplaces, and free independent journalism can help foster trust, establish reliable channels of information and spread awareness. Canada should use its advanced position in cyber-security and artificial intelligence to reinforce defensive strategies and detection abilities for sophisticated disinformation techniques. Finally, our digital infrastructure and communications are dependent on technology such as satellites in space, which is a dangerously contested and crowded environment with virtually no norms and outdated international law. Canada has historically been an important contributor to space technologies and was the third country in the world with its own satellite in space. Space has been identified as a strategic asset that is essential for security and sovereignty; Canada needs to work with its allies to establish better governance in space, building off the extensive work done to write a Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space....
On that note, I've completed my intervention, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the opportunity.
5:25 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Stéphane Bergeron
Thank you, Mr. Brock.
I see that we have just a few minutes left. My understanding is that we can't go much later than scheduled for technical reasons.
Now, I will turn the floor over to Ms. Gladu.
5:25 p.m.
Conservative
Marilyn Gladu Conservative Sarnia—Lambton, ON
Thank you, Chair. I want to say that you're doing an excellent job of moving things along, but I'd be remiss if I didn't also say that I've been to this committee several times, and I wanted to recognize the work of the former chair as well and to wish him well in his new responsibilities at the UN.
I'm very glad to be here and speaking about this today, because I have five main themes to cover on why I really think that this committee needs to use the precious committee time that's left to focus on Ukraine.
Everyone is aware of the war that's happening between Russia and Ukraine, but I want you to know that in my riding of Sarnia—Lambton we have people who have actually gone over to Ukraine and are on the ground in Ukraine, as well as in the surrounding countries. They're at Medica, and I know my colleague across the way, Mr. Ehsassi, was there with another one of my colleagues.
There are folks from my riding who are there and who have set up stations to help the Ukrainians who are fleeing the country. The various churches in my area have missions; they actually created churches and orphanages and all kinds of things in Ukraine years ago, so there are still people there who are giving us a daily update on what's happening. Our entire community—many organizations—has reached out. We're trying to bring about 100 families to Sarnia—Lambton.
I'm certainly seeing on a daily basis the urgency of the situation. It has been three months. The war is not getting better. It's getting worse. We're seeing a number of things that are not going well and a number of areas where there are gaps that need to be addressed. Also, then, we see an escalation. Those are the things I really want to talk about today.
Now, in terms of the efforts in my riding, I could tell you many stories, but really, let's talk first of all about the people who are on the ground in Ukraine and the situation there. People are without electricity, and some are without water. We've all heard and seen the various social media tapings of people who are in the subway stations underground and of the constant bombings and everything else, so you know it's urgent.
I think that is one of the main reasons this committee needs to focus on the situation and address it.
At the same time, there are six million people who have left the country in the hopes of going somewhere. The problem is, it's really taking way too long to get them out of there.
There's this one lady, Tanya, with two kids. She was in Ukraine. We have a place for her in my riding, so she had to leave with her two kids on a Saturday to go to Warsaw to get her biometrics. It ended up that the embassy wasn't open on Sunday, and then on Monday the system went down because of the overload from everybody applying. It was the same thing on Tuesday. On Wednesday, she gets told that she can have a biometrics appointment in a month. Well, what is she supposed to do with two kids in Warsaw with no money for a month?
That is certainly something that the government needs to address. They exempted children from the biometrics requirement, which is great, but I don't know any mother who is going to send her children off to Canada, where they don't speak the language, without having—
5:30 p.m.
Liberal
Rob Oliphant Liberal Don Valley West, ON
On a point of order, Mr. Chair, it is reaching the end of our scheduled time for this committee meeting. I thought that before you suspended the meeting it would be important for us to see whether or not we could continue the meeting, because we would very much like to bring this to a vote. We could do three pretty quick votes before that. I don't know what the situation is with respect to House resources, but I would like us to vote on this fairly quickly so that other committees could do their work and we could then continue with our Ukraine study.
The Conservatives don't seem to be aware that, actually, their filibuster is stopping us from doing the work they're asking us to do in their filibuster. There's a problem with the logic of that, because—
5:30 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Stéphane Bergeron
I gather, then, Mr. Oliphant, that you are looking for unanimous consent to vote immediately.
5:30 p.m.
Bloc
The Vice-Chair Bloc Stéphane Bergeron
Seeing as there isn't unanimous consent, Ms. Gladu, I'm going to have to suspend the meeting, and you'll have to finish what you were saying next time.
The meeting is suspended.
[The meeting was suspended at 5:33 p.m., Monday, May 16]
[The meeting resumed at 3:49 p.m., Thursday, June 2]
5:30 p.m.
The Clerk
Welcome, members. I see that we have a quorum, so I will get started.
Due to a vacancy in the position of chair, the committee must proceed directly to the election.
I must inform members that the clerk of the committee can only receive motions for the election of the chair.
The clerk cannot receive any other types of motions, cannot entertain points of order and cannot participate in debate.
We can now proceed to the election of the chair. Pursuant to Standing Order 106(2), the chair must be a member of the government party.
Ms. Bendayan, you have the floor.
5:30 p.m.
Liberal
Rachel Bendayan Liberal Outremont, QC
Thank you, Madam Clerk, and it is a great pleasure and an honour to be able to nominate my colleague Ali Ehsassi.
May 19th, 2022 / 5:30 p.m.
The Clerk
It has been moved by Rachel Bendayan that Ali Ehsassi be elected chair of the committee.
Are there any further motions?
Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt the motion?
(Motion agreed to)
I declare the motion carried and Mr. Ehsassi duly elected as chair of the committee.
5:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Ali Ehsassi
Allow me to start off by thanking all of you for the confidence you have placed in me.
I can assure you that I will endeavour to the best of my ability to ensure that this committee continues to work in a collaborative and co-operative manner. I'm very, very grateful and very humbled.
I can also assure you that I will rely heavily on the wisdom of the clerk.
Welcome back to meeting number 21 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.
We are continuing the discussion that began on Monday.
As always, interpretation is available through the globe icon at the bottom of your screen. For members participating in person, please bear in mind the Board of Internal Economy's guidelines for mask use and health protocols.
I'd like to take this opportunity to remind all participants in this meeting that screenshots or taking photos of your screen are not permitted.
Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. When speaking, please speak slowly and clearly. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute. I remind you that all comments by members should be addressed through the chair. Thank you.
Go ahead, Mr. Genuis.