In general, there are two hypotheses to explain why the Russian forces present on the contact line between the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the rest of Azerbaijan do not intervene.
The first assumption is that they do not have the capacity to do so because Russia, busy losing ground in Ukraine and mired in its war in Ukraine, cannot open a “second front”.
The second hypothesis is that Russia does not want to, because it has economic interests today that coincide very strongly with those of Azerbaijan. As I said in my statement, on the one hand, Azerbaijan is one of the countries that allow Russia to lighten the financial burden of international sanctions, notably through the distribution of Russian oil that goes to Azerbaijan and then arrives in Europe.
On the other hand, the objective interests of Russia and Azerbaijan converge in exerting maximum pressure on Armenia to make concessions regarding Artsakh and this future corridor Azerbaijan would like to see, which would pass through southern Armenia and connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.