Foreign Affairs Committee on Jan. 25th, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Good afternoon. Welcome to meeting number 45 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room, as well as remotely through Zoom.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike, and please remember to mute yourselves when you are not speaking.

Interpretation for those on Zoom is at the bottom of your screen, and you have a choice of floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

For today's purposes, the topic of our meeting is the current situation between Azerbaijan and Armenia and, more specifically, a focus on Lachin road.

I'd like to welcome the two witnesses, who will each have five minutes for opening remarks. We have Mr. Robert Cutler, who is a former senior research fellow at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University. We also have with us Ms. Olesya Vartanyan, senior south Caucasus analyst for the International Crisis Group.

You will each be provided five minutes for your opening remarks, but when you have 30 seconds remaining, I will put up a red sign as a warning. We'd be grateful if you paid attention to that. The same goes when members are asking you questions.

Mr. Cutler, we will commence with you. You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Robert Cutler, Former Senior Research Fellow, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Thank you for the privilege.

For identification purposes, I am a fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and director of the energy security program at the NATO Association of Canada. I appear in my personal capacity and the views I express are my own. I matriculated at MIT for my bachelor's degree and earned my Ph.D. at the University of Michigan. I have taught at all university levels in Canada and internationally. For over 20 years I was a senior research fellow at Carleton University, as you said.

I will make my opening statement in English.

However, I will answer questions in the language in which they are asked.

Canada has a long history of co-operation with Azerbaijan and Armenia, starting with NATO's partnership for peace program in 1994. Beginning in 2001, tens of thousands of military aircraft and supply trucks transited Azerbaijan, carrying NATO forces and equipment to Afghanistan. Beginning in 2002, the Azerbaijani peacekeeping battalion participated in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. When the northern distribution network was established in 2009, Azerbaijan continued to be a key link until it was closed a few years ago.

Canada has had formal diplomatic relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia since 1992, when it recognized their territorial integrity within the borders they had before the Soviet collapse. Acknowledging four UN Security Council resolutions from 1993, Canadian policy has always supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and opposed separatism, just as it has done in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

Like Canada, Azerbaijan gives tangible support to Ukraine. It sends large cargoes of humanitarian aid. The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, or SOCAR, owns filling stations in Ukraine that give free fuel to such emergency services as ambulances and fire trucks. Azerbaijan recently provided Ukraine with emergency power generators for winter use.

What can Canada do today? First, Ottawa should do more to help demine the full one-sixth of Azerbaijan's territory—a region more than twice as large as the greater Toronto area—that was militarily occupied over the course of 30 years. Canada's contribution to the demining effort in Azerbaijan has not matched, I'm sorry to say, its international prominence on the issue. Many countries, NGOs and international organizations around the world contribute not just funding but also personnel and training and education assistance to Azerbaijan's long-term demining program.

Around the single destroyed city of Aghdam, no fewer than 80,000 mines were discovered and neutralized. Estimates of the number of mines laid throughout the formerly occupied territories range from upwards of one million. Canada should also encourage Armenia to fulfill its obligation under international law to turn over to Azerbaijan all maps of the mines laid by its forces during 30 years of military occupation, which it has so far refused to do.

Second, Canada should open an embassy in Azerbaijan. The latest crisis on the Lachin road, and indeed the whole political instability in the region, is today engineered by Russia, which seeks to derail the peace process. The European Union, United States and other western powers all agree that only direct bilateral contacts and negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia will succeed in arriving at a definitive settlement. Azerbaijan has many times declared its willingness to embrace Armenia, to reconcile the two civil societies and to build mutually beneficial co-operation, economically and otherwise. Russia alone opposes this, because it does not want to be locked out of the region where it has been so long accustomed to being the sole hegemonic power.

Both Canada and Azerbaijan are genuinely multicultural middle powers that continually punch above their weight in international diplomacy. Both Canada and Azerbaijan have demonstrated their belief in a rules-based international order by their actions, by their conduct of international diplomacy, by their participation in international co-operation and by their leadership of international organizations. If Azerbaijan is not as democratic as we might like, then without diplomatic representation we lose the chance to discover the real pluralism in Azerbaijani society, to engage in open dialogue and to tell official Baku what we think.

Azerbaijan is the most significant local geopolitical player in the broader region. Not only does it provide important support to Ukraine, but it's also a very important ally of Israel, which its neighbour Iran—ironically, like Russia, an ally of Armenia in the conflict—does not like. An embassy in Baku is essential, not only to be better represented in the broader Caspian region but also to get an even-handed view from the ground, sensitive to all the critical nuances upon which the whole future of the region will turn.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Mr. Cutler.

We'll now go to Ms. Vartanyan.

You have five minutes for your opening remarks.

[Olesya Vartanyan, Senior South Caucacus Analyst, International Crisis Group]

Good afternoon, Chairman Ehsassi, Vice-Chair Bergeron and distinguished members of the committee.

You have already had the chance to listen to a number of speakers who have provided details of what's happening on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh. Today, at this important hearing, I will aim to support you with more context as to why we are seeing these developments and what should be done to stop them from happening, not just now but also in the future.

I will be speaking using analyses of my many colleagues at the International Crisis Group. Together we are doing field research and speaking to those who are affected by the conflict and to decision-makers from all different sides, both in the region and in foreign capitals.

International Crisis Group has been working on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for over 15 years. During this period, we have seen many ups and downs. The latest war was in 2020, and it took the lives of over 7,000 people in six weeks of brutal fighting. This year, we at the Crisis Group included Nagorno-Karabakh in the top 10 conflicts to watch worldwide. This was based on our analyses of the events that started taking place last year. Unfortunately we now see more potential for a new war in the region. Let me explain why.

Last year, Armenia and Azerbaijan started peace talks. Their leaders met several times, and foreign ministers started discussing the peace treaty. Their sights were really ambitious as they aimed to finalize the work very fast. Some even aimed for the end of the year, but the contents of these conversations were really difficult, with too many important parts that still needed to be discussed. Unfortunately, given all of the complexity of the talks, this negotiation process still has more chance of collapsing than of succeeding, but when or if that collapse happens, it will certainly be bad news as it will open chances for more instability in the region.

The stakes are really high for a new war. Last year, we already saw three escalations, each deadlier than the previous one. Two of them were in Nagorno-Karabakh and one was at the border. Azerbaijan has been making use of its military upper hand while Russia has been busy invading its neighbour and while others in the world have been distracted with responding to the war in Ukraine.

As a result, last year Azerbaijan seriously reinforced its positions, which have now been provided with significant military advantage should a new fight start. When I travelled to the place of the most recent fighting at the border, I saw the Azerbaijan military reinforcing its positions. In case of a new flare-up, Azerbaijani soldiers can make a military push through the only gorge that now separates their positions from the Azerbaijan exclave of Nakhchivan to the south of Armenia. This would cut Armenia in two, with severe humanitarian consequences, and it would leave the Armenian leadership under enormous pressure to make concessions.

To prevent this from happening, the European Union announced two days ago that it would deploy eight civilian unarmed monitors to observe the situation on the ground and report directly to all of the member states. In the coming days, we at the Crisis Group will have a report that discusses in detail what and how this should be done to make the mission work. Canada, similar to other interested outside actors, should support this mission and help it get enough staff and the necessary means and mandate to effectively prevent incidents that have the potential to spiral into a new war.

The mission will minimize chances of a new war, but it will not be able to completely eliminate the risks. What will be essential is a functional negotiation process that should lead to a peace accord to put an end to this conflict. The European Union has been playing an important role in facilitating more contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It brought leaders together and was present and ready to help when they agreed to proceed with the peace talks. The U.S. has been supporting this process. The European Union will need to pursue this diplomacy, and it should be supported by those in the region and in foreign capitals.

In light of all I have just told you, let me circle back to the events in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The situation is getting worse and many are worried, but as you can see, this is only the most recent manifestation of tensions. Indeed, more diplomatic pressure to relieve the situation is necessary, but what is also needed is a path for ending the cycle of crises and flare-ups, each one bloodier than the last. One way forward could be calls to resume contacts and talks. During the summer, the EU and the U.S. started working on a new track between Baku and Stepanakert. Such contacts could really help with resolving any future problems on the ground. They would also provide more confidence to the local Armenians that they will not be forced out of their home.

I will be happy to discuss these ideas in the question and answer session.

Thanks again for having me here for your session.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you very much, Ms. Vartanyan.

We will now go to members.

Each of you will have six minutes.

Mr. Chong, we begin with you.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

We're here today in particular to focus on the blockage of the Lachin corridor. My questions will be focused on that issue in particular.

I'd like to understand what exactly is the physical nature of this blockage. Is it at the border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia? Is it within Azerbaijan proper? Does the blockage consist of human people standing in the way of traffic, or are there trucks or other pieces of equipment blockading the route? I'd like to understand the physical nature of the blockage first.

If you could speak to that, it would be helpful. If you don't know, that's also okay; I'll move on to other questions. Either one of you or both of you can answer the question.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Please go ahead, Mr. Cutler.

[Robert Cutler]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for your question, which betrays a widespread misunderstanding. I'm pleased to inform you that there is no blockage. Since some time—months—a thousand trucks of the Russian peacekeeping forces and the ICRC have passed through the Lachin road.

The situation started on December 13, when Azerbaijani eco-activists sought access to the territory temporarily occupied by Russian peacekeepers in order to verify the observation of ecological laws by a Swiss company, which, contrary to international law, is mining gold in the occupied territories. In fact, a British company, which has the contract to these deposits, has formally drawn the attention of the American, British and other governments to this fact.

The particular problem was not only that these illegally mined deposits were being taken to Azerbaijan for refinement and export through the corridor or road. There was also the ecological problem of not observing the necessary protocols for maintaining the environment. That was the original motive of the Azerbaijani protest on the road on December 13.

What happened then was that Russian peacekeepers blocked the road by erecting fences across the road to prevent the Azerbaijani protesters from proceeding further. That blocked the road for about a week. Then Armenians from Hankendi, a city that during the Soviet period was called Stepanakert, made an excursion, a manifestation, out from their city along the road to the place where it was blocked to see that it should be unblocked.

Following this, the Russian soldiers took down their fences, and since then there has been free passage of vehicles through the road. They're making sure there are no illegal exports of gold and making certain that there are no mines being imported to be laid, as has been done, so the road is now open.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

Could I hear an answer from Madam Vartanyan as well on this? What is the physical nature of the blockage? Maybe you can give your perspective on what is going on.

[Olesya Vartanyan]

Thank you so much for giving me an opportunity to respond to the question.

I believe you have already heard from a number of people who not only have heard from someone about this but also have a personal connection to the region. We at the Crisis Group speak to those who are affected by the conflict.

I had a chance to speak to those who are currently in Stepanakert. In fact, I have been doing that since the very beginning of the blockade, which has lasted for over 40 days. What I understand is that people are not able to travel through the road.

The 2020 war left us with a peace accord. According to this peace accord, we got the territories that are currently populated by the ethnic Armenian people and the Russian peacekeepers who are present there. The Russian peacekeepers are responsible for keeping up and observing the ceasefire on the ground.

In addition to this area, there is a road, and this is the only road that connects Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and, as an effect, to the outside world. The current blockage is happening at exactly that place.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I have no further questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

We will now go to Dr. Fry.

You have six minutes, Dr. Fry.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I think both witnesses have shed some light on what is going on with the Lachin road. That's a big issue that we're here to look at. Is it creating a humanitarian crisis? That's what we're asking at this committee and what we're trying to find out, as well as, of course, whether Canada can do anything.

I want to ask a couple of very important questions. We know that the European Union became engaged and we know that Russia is meant to do the peacekeeping. We also know that there were observers from the European Union there. There's a report on all of that. People are engaged in trying to find out what's going on.

There's a big thing that I want to ask about. The United Nations can intervene. The United States has intervened and met with both sides. France has intervened and met with both sides. We know that Russia, actually, officially intervened around Christmas and met with both sides.

What do you think the chances are that the OSCE, the group that originally was dealing with the Minsk agreement...? Why did that fail? What can the OSCE do? The OSCE doesn't really have troops to put in, but members of the OSCE could marshal some help there. I mean, Canada's a member of the OSCE. As you know, there are 57 nation-states, some with and some without any kind of capability.

Why did the Minsk agreement, which is the official body for negotiating, fail? What are the chances that it can be renewed? What are the chances that we can put this to an end? Most of us want to see it end. Most of us want to see a peaceful settlement. Most of us want to see that people are able to go to their homes and to see that ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis are able to be friends. There was a time when they were friends. There was a time when many of them still continued, as Mr. Cutler said, the multicultural relationship and multireligious relationship they used to have.

What can we do? What is the role of Minsk and why did Minsk fail? Those are the two questions I'd like to hear either of you answer, perhaps starting with Ms. Vartanyan.

[Olesya Vartanyan]

This is a great question, especially the part about the OSCE's role.

We have that organization involved and also the OSCE Minsk Group. The co-chairs are France, Russia and the U.S. As you probably know, the Minsk Group has been facing enormous problems in resuming its functions after the 2020 war due to Azerbaijani resistance to engaging with the group. Baku believes the group failed with the negotiations regarding a peace accord. Baku still tried to engage with the group, but then they saw that it wasn't really going the way they wanted and the process got into a deadlock.

The other reason we're not seeing the OSCE Minsk Group come together is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. When the west got much more involved in mediating between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, we saw Russia basically withdraw from the group. It's still there on paper, so there is potential for it to come back, but at this moment, it's difficult to see any kind of co-operation taking place between the U.S. and Russia, including on Nagorno-Karabakh, unfortunately.

Having said that—

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you, Ms. Vartanyan. If you could perhaps wrap up what you're saying, I would like to give Mr. Cutler an opportunity to get involved as well.

[Olesya Vartanyan]

Absolutely. I just want to say that the OSCE should have the role. The recent events at the border, for example, show that the OSCE can send a mission and can do fact-finding, but that does not really mean.... Even if the OSCE, which Baku is so allergic about, cannot do its job, that does not prevent Canada from doing something and supporting, for example, the European Union the way the U.S. does.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you.

Mr. Cutler, go ahead, please.

[Robert Cutler]

Thank you for the question.

To pick up on the last point made by the previous speaker, the OSCE did not send a fact-finding mission because the decision was poorly taken and without terms of reference.

The reason the Minsk Group has no chance, I'm sorry to say, is that its terms of reference have become obsolete. The Minsk Group's terms of reference were predicated upon the peaceful resolution of conflict, which has not come to pass. You are probably familiar with the six points in the so-called Madrid principles that were drafted in 2007 and revised in 2009. A reading of those six points shows that on their face they are obsolete. Either they have been accomplished or they have been overtaken by events. I think that's the way to say it. Also, if we look at the three co-chairs—Russia, France and the U.S.—none of them are interested in the Minsk Group anymore.

The U.S. Secretary of State just yesterday insisted that only direct bilateral contacts between the two parties was the way to proceed. France is not a neutral party due to very public proclamations by President Macron. For example, after the war broke out in the fall of 2020, he told his French co-citizens that France would not allow—this is almost a direct quote, because I wrote about it—Azerbaijan to reconquer upper Karabakh and that France will play its role to prevent this from taking place. That's a very close paraphrase, almost a direct quote. France is not trustworthy, and one can understand Azerbaijan's mistrust of France in this respect.

Finally, Russia doesn't want to give the U.S. or France a voice in things because they had been, until Charles Michel began his mediation or convocations in December 2021, which were very successful to a point.... Russia, following the November 2020 trilateral statement, was monopolizing the interactions between the two countries. None of the co-chairs of the Minsk Group have—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

I'm afraid you're out of time, Mr. Cutler.

[Robert Cutler]

—an incentive to proceed.

[Hedy Fry, Liberal, Vancouver Centre, BC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

Thank you, Dr. Fry and Mr. Cutler.

We'll now go to Mr. Bergeron.

Mr. Bergeron, you have six minutes.

[Stéphane Bergeron, Bloc, Montarville, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being with us today.

I'll address Mr. Cutler first. First of all, I would like to say that at first blush, his depiction of the situation seems to be an alternative take on the reality unfolding there. Indeed, this presentation does not, at first sight, correspond to all of the information circulating about what is really happening in the Lachin corridor. In that sense, I welcome his contribution to the work of the committee.

This prompts an immediate question. I must say that I am extremely dubious about the presentation, insofar as Canada, the United States, the European Union, France—which in any case the gentleman claims is not a reliable, credible and neutral player—in the first hours or days of the blockade, which would have taken place on December 12, demanded that Azerbaijan reopen communications. Yet Mr. Cutler presents a different sequence of events.

Mr. Cutler, are you suggesting that the intelligence services of the United States, the European Union, France and Canada were completely wrong?

[Robert Cutler]

I think the member has finished speaking.

Do I have the floor, Mr. Chair?

[The Chair, Liberal, Ali Ehsassi]

The floor is yours, Mr. Cutler.